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Paul Ricoeur and "The Model of the Text": Textual Hermeneutics 
and the Objectification and Interpretation of Action 
 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis I develop a critical but sympathetic reading of Paul Ricoeur’s textual 
model of interpretation as it is presented in his 1971 essay “The Model of the Text: 
Meaningful Action Considered as a Text”. 
 
My reading of Ricoeur’s essay aims to clarify some of the strengths and limitations 
of his project in “The Model of the Text”, and to develop the analogy between text 
and action in directions left largely undeveloped by Ricoeur. In particular, I argue 
that hermeneutic philosophy can help us elucidate the validity of interpretive claims 
in the human and social sciences, and also to understand the role of the 
objectification of action in ensuring this validity. The fixation of action as an object 
of inquiry opens up the possibility for interpreters to hold themselves at a distance 
from their pre-reflective judgements regarding the meaning of action. This allows 
interpreters to reflect critically upon action and to arbitrate between competing 
interpretations.  Furthermore, the textual model allows us to recognise the 
description and objectification of action as an active and constitutive dimension of 
interpretive activity in the human and social sciences. 
 
My argument proceeds by engaging in a detailed examination of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic thought, expanding upon aspects of hermeneutic philosophy that can 
inform our understanding of the textual model, and by attempting to address points 
of disanalogy and potential objections that may emerge from the application of 
textual hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful action. Ricoeur’s textual 
model has the potential to provide a valuable resource for the human and social 
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sciences by inviting its practitioners to consider the interpretation of action in terms 
of the text and textual hermeneutics, but only on the condition that self-critique and a 
recognition of objectification as part of interpretive activity are incorporated into 
interpretive practice. 
 
David Standen, UEA 
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Introduction: Paul Ricoeur and the Human Sciences 
 
 
The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur is an increasingly influential force within the 
human and social sciences.  Although probably best known for his work in 
hermeneutics, phenomenology and narrative theory, Ricoeur’s work is nevertheless 
rarely untouched by an interest in other disciplines.  It is perhaps even outside of 
philosophy that Ricoeur is presently garnering most critical attention.  Gérôme Truc, 
for example, in his recent essay “Narrative Identity against Biographical Illusion: 
The Shift in Sociology from Bourdieu to Ricoeur”, observes that “many applications 
of Ricoeur’s philosophy can be found in contemporary French sociology”, and that 
“[t]he insertion of philosophical concepts into the realm of sociology represents a 
generational phenomenon affecting all of the human sciences” (Truc, 2011: 151).  
And even if Ricoeur was not a sociologist by trade, he frequently engaged with and 
wrote about the problems and concepts of the social and human sciences from a 
philosophical perspective.   Ricoeur’s influence on the human and social sciences is 
not limited to the works in which the matter of these disciplines is explicitly 
addressed,1 but it is within these works that we get a sustained sense of how Ricoeur 
thought philosophy could contribute to the theory and practices of the 
Geisteswissenschaften. 
In this thesis I engage in an exploration of Ricoeur’s ideas about the 
objectification and interpretation of meaningful human action.  In particular I 
consider his hypothesis that textual interpretation can serve as a model for the 
interpretation of action in the human and social sciences, as outlined in the 1971 
essay “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text”.  Therein 
                                               
1 Truc’s article, for example, deals primarily with the influence of Ricoeur’s work on the narrative self 
in Oneself as Another – a text written without any overt sociological intent – upon sociological theory 
and practice, contrasting it to the critique of narrative identity made by Pierre Bourdieu in his 1986 
article, “The Biographical Illusion”. 
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Ricoeur  argues that “the human sciences may be said to be hermeneutical (1) 
inasmuch as their object displays some of the features constitutive of a text as text, 
and (2) inasmuch as their methodology develops the same kind of procedures as 
those of Auslegung or text interpretation” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 197).  In doing so 
Ricoeur articulates a hermeneutic model of the validity of the interpretation of 
meaningful action in the human sciences.  This textual model of interpretation has 
already influenced the work of a range of thinkers, including the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz2 and the sociologist John B. Thompson.3  Inevitably however, given 
the brevity and broad scope of the essay, “The Model of the Text” raises new 
questions at the same time as offering us new ways of understanding the interpretive 
practices of the human and social sciences.  This thesis represents an attempt to 
articulate and respond to a few of these questions, and to explore potential 
implications of the textual model left undeveloped by Ricoeur. 
 
Ricoeur comes to engage with hermeneutic philosophy via the work of 
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and describes his own thought as 
marked by a “concern to avoid the pitfall of an opposition between an 
‘understanding’ which would be reserved for the ‘human sciences’ and an 
‘explanation’ which would be common to… the nomological sciences, primarily the 
physical sciences” (Ricoeur, 1981a: 36).  This stands against the background of 
Romantic hermeneutics, a tradition of which Ricoeur is an indirect inheritor, within 
which interpretation is often identified solely with Verstehen (understanding) at the 
                                               
2 E.g. Geertz writes that “[t]hinking consists not of ‘happenings in the head’… but of a traffic in… 
significant symbols – words for the most part but also… anything… that is disengaged from its mere 
actuality and used to impose meaning upon existence” (Geertz, 2000 p. 45). 
 
3 Thompson is also responsible for editing and translating Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences: 
Essays on language, action and interpretation, a collection of Ricoeur’s essays focussing on the 
relevance of hermeneutic philosophy to interpretation and understanding in the human sciences.  
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expense of Erklären (explanation).  In terms of Verstehen, “understanding” is 
traditionally conceived of as an attempt to grasp the psychic life of the author, and 
meaning is identified with the intent behind the text.  This notion of “understanding” 
is in turn considered to be inherently opposed to the kind of objective verification 
seen primarily in the physical sciences, which falls under the category of Erklären 
or “explanation”.   
In “The Model of the Text” Ricoeur sketches an outline of interpretive 
understanding in the human and social sciences that integrates a dialectical rather 
than irreconcilably oppositional relationship between “understanding” and 
“explanation”.  Basing this upon his work in textual hermeneutics,4 he argues for an 
“analogical extension” of this textual model to the realm of meaningful human 
action as it is treated as an “object” of inquiry within the human and social sciences 
(Ricoeur, 1981a: 37).  Ricoeur thus uses the text primarily in order to address the 
issue of interpretive validity in the human and social sciences.  Beyond his work in 
“The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur does use hermeneutics and textual interpretation 
in order to elucidate particular problems in the human sciences elsewhere, e.g. his 
exploration of the relationship between history and fiction within Time and 
Narrative (Ricoeur, 1988: 180-92).  However, despite this continued interest in how 
hermeneutic thought can inform our understanding of human action, Ricoeur does 
not explicitly return to the “textual model” in his later work. 
There are, nevertheless, many aspects of the analogy drawn between text and 
action-as-object and the subsequent application of textual hermeneutics to the 
interpretation of action that Ricoeur leaves undeveloped and that demand further 
                                               
4 Primarily the lectures and essays from the 1970s published in collections such as Hermeneutics and 
the Human Sciences, From Text to Action and Interpretation Theory, but also, for example, his early 
work on interpretation evident in The Symbolism of Evil, Freud and Philosophy and the essays 
spanning the 1960s collected in The Conflict of Interpretations. 
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critical attention.  If “The Model of the Text” is to fulfil its stated aim of providing a 
model that might inform the interpretation of action, then it is important that we 
attempt to address some of the issues that emerge from Ricoeur’s analogical 
extension of textual hermeneutics to the human and social sciences. 
With this in mind I offer a sympathetic but critical reading of Ricoeur’s essay 
that aims to clarify some of the strengths and limitations of the project sketched 
therein.  I thus engage with Ricoeur’s stated aim of elucidating the validity of 
interpretation in the human and social sciences and argue that Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic philosophy can help us understand the kind of validity apposite to 
interpretive understanding in the human and social sciences and the role of the 
objectification of action within them. 
Moreover, I supplement Ricoeur’s work by exploring elements of “The 
Model of the Text” that remain obscure or problematic within the limits of 
Ricoeur’s essay.  This involves examining some of the potential problems faced in 
applying the categories of textual interpretation to meaningful human action and the 
centrality of self-critique as a moment within critical hermeneutic interpretation as a 
response to this.  I also place a much greater emphasis than Ricoeur does in this 
essay on attempting to understand how action is constituted as an “object” of 
inquiry and on the nature of the analogy between text and action-as-object.  In 
particular, I explore the idea that “The Model of the Text” can make us more aware 
of objectification as an integral part of the interpretation of meaningful human 
action.  In order to achieve this aim, I articulate the ways in which action becomes 
“fixed” as an object within the discourses of the human and social sciences, and the 
challenges that objectification poses to us as interpreters of action. 
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By engaging with Ricoeur’s work herein I hope to show how textual 
hermeneutics can work to inform our practices as interpreters of action.  This is not, 
however, to say that “The Model of the Text” or my own work are intended to offer 
a “handbook” for the interpretation of action.  How Ricoeur’s model may be applied 
within different interpretive disciplines depends to some extent upon both the 
intellectual traditions with which the interpreter is engaged and the particular case of 
interpretation at hand.5  This thesis engages most closely with the literature 
regarding interpretation and validity in sociology, but I neither want to limit what I 
am saying to that domain nor imply that what is presented here is any kind of fully 
formed interpretive model for sociological interpretation.  How a textual model may 
be applicable in different circumstances is a question which requires closer attention 
within different interpretive disciplines, and not within the kind of broad 
philosophical overview of the interpretation of meaningful action in which I am 
engaged.  The remainder of this introduction will be dedicated to a chapter by 
chapter breakdown of the thesis and a detailed overview of the arguments made 
therein. 
 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter One: The Model of the Text and Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Heritage 
In this chapter I offer a reading of “The Model of the Text” in terms of the 
philosophical hermeneutical tradition of which it is a part.  The purpose of this 
contextualisation is primarily to clarify the idea of textual interpretation that Ricoeur 
proposes for use as a paradigm for the interpretation of action, but also to introduce 
some of the issues that will demand further articulation and analysis within the 
                                               
5 For example, Ricoeur has written elsewhere both that “there is no general hermeneutics, no 
universal canon for exegesis” (Ricoeur, 1970: 26) and that this “diversity” of hermeneutics in part 
reflects “differences in technique” (Ricoeur, 1989b: 64). 
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thesis. In order to achieve this I examine those elements of Ricoeur’s work where 
aspects of his interpretive philosophy are expanded upon, offering a critical exegesis 
of his hermeneutic philosophy in relation to “The Model of the Text”.  Where 
necessary, I also draw upon the work of other hermeneutic philosophers, primarily 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, to help illuminate and supplement Ricoeur’s own 
philosophical thought. 
I first focus on Ricoeur’s notion of “distanciation” in discourse.  Broadly 
speaking, this refers to the potential for the meaning of discourse to become 
“distanced” from the intentions and socio-historical conditions that circumscribe its 
production; the way in which the actualisation of discourse as meaningful in 
understanding involves some kind of a remove from the act of discourse itself.  
Ricoeur discusses various forms of distanciation in the text which, taken together, 
constitute the various forms of “autonomy” attributable to textual meaning; i.e. the 
ways in which the meaning of the text can become removed from the authorial 
intention and the historical and social conditions of its production.  These various 
forms of distanciation, for Ricoeur, are important conditions for how texts can have 
meaning for their readers and factors we must take into consideration as interpreters. 
A second important aspect of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic thought lies in his 
articulation of a dialectical relationship between understanding and explanation, each 
drawing upon the other and together representing different aspects of interpretation 
as an overall phenomenon.  In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur approaches this 
reconciliation of understanding and explanation from two directions.  The first of 
these is to articulate the way in which the process of “understanding” necessarily 
involves an element of explanation. The second is to offer an account of how 
explanatory procedures ultimately presuppose that what they explain is meaningful, 
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and therefore presuppose understanding.  For Ricoeur, this recasts the dichotomy of 
understanding and explanation as a productive opposition, rather than as a problem 
requiring final resolution as it has historically been perceived within hermeneutic 
thought. 
The preceding assessments of distanciation and the dialectic of understanding 
and explanation serve to articulate the most pertinent points of Ricoeur’s conception 
of hermeneutic interpretation.  After this I turn to Ricoeur’s application of textual 
hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful human action, beginning with his 
arguments for perceiving an analogous relationship between text and action 
considered as an object of the human sciences.  Ricoeur works to articulate a parallel 
between the ways in which action and the text can be seen to be meaningful.  This 
involves the notions of “distanciation” and “autonomy”, which Ricoeur considers 
central to both the production and interpretation of meaning in the text, and the way 
in which explanation and understanding together comprise complementary aspects of 
a critical interpretive approach to the understanding of action. 
 
Chapter 2: The Text 
In this chapter I compare and contrast Ricoeur’s understanding of “the text” – 
conceived as a paradigm of meaningful discourse under the condition of fixation – 
with what Ricoeur describes as the “ideology” of the “absolute text”, a concept 
which he is eager to disavow (Ricoeur, 1981h: 201).  This “ideology” refers to any 
characterisation of the text as something existing without either author or reference, 
as a hypostasised and closed linguistic construct wherein meaning is only identified 
with the transitory play of signifiers in relation to one another.   
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Despite similarities between the “absolute text” and the autonomy of textual 
meaning as it is discussed in “The Model of the Text”, the transitory and arbitrary 
nature of meaning within the “absolute text”, and the accompanying impossibility of 
arbitrating between competing interpretations, means that it could not possibly 
function as a model for interpretation in the manner suggested by Ricoeur in “The 
Model of the Text”.  It will be useful for our purposes, therefore, to distinguish 
between Ricoeur’s notion of textual autonomy and any kind of “absolute” textual 
autonomy if we wish to be able to draw upon textual hermeneutics in order to 
articulate the validity of interpretation in relation to meaningful human action.  To 
this end I contrast Ricoeur’s formulation of the “text” with that of two thinkers 
sometimes associated with the idea of the “absolute text”; Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida. 
The first example of the “absolute text” I address is that of Barthes’ notorious 
essay “The Death of the Author”.  I argue that there are important differences 
between Barthes’ and Ricoeur’s conception of “the text”, and that these differences 
are primarily motivated by the polemical intention that undergirds Barthes’ essay.  I 
then turn to the arguably more sophisticated picture of the “absolute” text that can be 
found in the work of Jacques Derrida.  I argue that Derrida conceives of the text 
primarily as a basis for metaphysical critique, and therefore obscures the question of 
the “meaning” of texts almost entirely (despite tacitly depending upon there being 
problems at least “meaningful” enough to demand critique).  This stands in stark 
contrast to Ricoeur, for whom the text is a paradigm of discourse and therefore 
always “about something”.  It is this fundamental difference in the presuppositions 
and aims motivating their characterisations of the text that most prominently 
distinguishes Derrida and Ricoeur from one another (Ricoeur, 1981h: 198). 
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I conclude with a brief examination of how non-verbal media, such as 
photography and film, may play a distinct role within the human and social sciences, 
and the extent to which these media can be compared to Ricoeur’s notion of “the 
text” as it has previously been articulated.  As with the comparison with the 
“absolute” text, this will serve to clarify Ricoeur’s understanding of “the text”, but 
also to make us more aware of some of the potential limitations of this construction.  
I draw upon the work of film theorist Seymour Chatman in order to illustrate some 
of the ways in which non-verbal sources, particularly film and photography, can be 
used to represent action in a manner distinct from that of more conventionally 
“textual” written accounts and descriptions.  I supplement this with a brief 
examination of Chagnon and Asch’s notorious anthropological film The Ax Fight.  
Therein I attempt to demonstrate how film can be used to present action in the 
human and social sciences, but also note that the way in which this action is 
presented and supplemented with additional information can have a profound 
influence on how we understand the action represented therein.  I argue that such 
“non-verbal” media are an important complement and corrective to certain aspects of 
the predominantly linguistic discourse prevalent within the human and social 
sciences.  I also argue, however, that whilst we must be careful not to conflate non-
verbal documents of action with “literary” descriptions of action, their use as sources 
within the human and social sciences still involves working to “fix” action as an 
object of inquiry, and that as such Ricoeur’s hermeneutic model of interpretation can 
still help inform our understanding of how we receive and interpret these non-verbal 
“texts”. 
Ultimately, I argue that the autonomy of the text in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
philosophy is not “absolute” but a feature of the text inseparable from the 
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“distanciation” of which the text is a paradigmatic example for Ricoeur.  As a 
consequence, Ricoeur’s characterisation of the text can account for the autonomy of 
textual meaning without entailing the irreducible multiplicity and relativity of 
meaning commonly associated with the “absolute text”.  It is this, and the 
accompanying possibility of making contingent but valid and authoritative 
interpretations, that makes Ricoeur’s conception of the text particularly suited to the 
project described in “The Model of the Text”. 
 
Chapter 3: The Meaning of Action 
In this chapter I examine the idea of “meaningful action”, primarily regarding 
how we conceive meaningful action as something liable to being fixed via linguistic 
description and appropriated as an object of reflective inquiry in line with “The 
Model of the Text”.  To this end, I first consider Ricoeur’s own definition of 
“meaningful action”, drawing upon the speech-act theory of J.L. Austin, in which he 
attempts to argue that the meaning of action can be conceived as “propositional” 
after the manner of a speech-act, and that meaningful action can therefore be 
articulated in terms of its “locutionary”, “illocutionary” and “perlocutionary” force 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 200).  I argue, however, that this definition of meaningful action 
risks conflating meaningful action too closely and uncritically with the “action-
sentences” by which we describe and recount meaningful action.  In doing so, 
Ricoeur potentially overlooks the possibility that there are features of meaningful 
action that may not be amenable to linguistic description, and as such oversimplifies 
the issue of the adequate description and objectification of action. 
With this in mind I next turn to look at the work of other thinkers who have 
addressed issues regarding the nature of “meaningful action”.  This includes the 
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distinction made by Gilbert Ryle between “thick” and “thin” description of action 
and Charles Taylor’s analysis of the concept of meaning within the human sciences.  
I then bring these analyses into conjunction with the hermeneutic concept of the 
“linguisticality” – the Sprachlichkeit – of meaningful experience.  This examination 
of the way in which meaningful action can be understood in relation to language 
allows me to articulate some of the features of meaningful action that make it 
amenable to objectification – especially in terms of linguistic description – and 
consequently to the kind of objectification and hermeneutic interpretation for which 
Ricoeur argues in “The Model of the Text”. 
Finally, and as a challenge to the presupposition that the “meaning” of action 
should be a matter of concern for the interpretive human and social sciences, I 
consider and criticise the work of two profoundly influential thinkers for whom the 
“everyday” meaning of action is considered insignificant: B.F. Skinner and Emile 
Durkheim.  What their accounts share is an aspiration towards the kind of objectivity 
found in the natural sciences.  I argue that, by comparison, the “objectivity” of the 
human and social sciences is one that must be capable of responding to the 
“everyday” meaningfulness of action.  I argue further that by incorporating the 
“critical moment” of explanation as part of a wider interpretive schematic, “The 
Model of the Text” outlines a form of “objective” analysis of action within the 
human sciences that can fulfil this demand. 
 
Chapter 4: Critical Description 
This chapter, picking up on the preceding discussion regarding the 
objectification of action within the discourses of the human and social sciences, 
focuses in turn on the challenges posed to interpreters seeking to “objectify” and 
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describe meaningful human action.  I argue that it is the responsibility of the 
interpreter to recognise and respond to the difficulties involved in bringing action to 
discourse in the human and social sciences. In doing so I hope to explore some 
aspects of “The Model of the Text” which Ricoeur leaves relatively underexplored, 
and to articulate the ways in which we must supplement Ricoeur’s textual model 
with a greater awareness of how action becomes “fixed” as an object of inquiry.  I 
concentrate primarily upon the description of action as an aspect of the work 
undertaken by practitioners in the social sciences as a precursor to interpretation, 
arguing in greater depth that description is in itself an interpretive activity.  I 
consequently argue that “description” as a practice within the human and social 
sciences must incorporate a critical awareness of the fact that how action is described 
can influence our understanding of the meaning of that action.  In particular I wish to 
emphasise the importance of self-criticism on the part of the inquirer describing 
action. 
  I begin by examining the issue of the “description” of action in relation to 
Ricoeur’s metaphor of action “leaving a mark” in time, a notion which remains 
largely undeveloped in “The Model of the Text”, and argue that if textual 
hermeneutics is to serve as a model for the interpretation in the human and social 
sciences, then the “fixation” of action as an object of inquiry requires close critical 
attention.  I argue that there is no “neutral” system, applicable regardless of the 
circumstances and context of any particular case, for recording action as an object 
for the human and social sciences.  Drawing upon hermeneutic notions of “tradition” 
and “disciplinary prejudice”, I then argue that the descriptive constitution of action 
as an object of inquiry necessitates some level of self-critique on the part of the 
inquirer as part of the work of description.  In order to illustrate this in greater depth 
19 
 
I engage in a critical examination of Ralf Dahrendorf’s notion of “homo 
sociologicus”, and its use as a “fiction” to characterise the way in which human 
beings are conceptualised within sociology.   
I follow this by touching briefly upon the reception of pre-composed 
descriptions and accounts of action, both contemporary and historical.  Although it is 
relatively well established that practitioners of the human and social sciences should 
read critically, and take possible bias into account in their interpretations of these 
sources, it is nevertheless imperative that we also understand the importance of 
“disciplinary prejudice” in influencing our reception of such pre-composed texts of 
action.  Herein I examine these “critical” reading practices in terms of the 
hermeneutic categories of disciplinary prejudice and tradition that I used in the 
preceding discussion of the objectification of action, and draw upon Ricoeur in order 
to offer a critical reading of Freud’s Totem and Taboo as an example of how an 
uncritical appropriation of texts describing human action can lead us into 
misunderstanding.  I argue that the importance of interpreting such “given” accounts 
and documents of action critically finds its complement in the necessity for self-
criticism in the composition of descriptions of action within the human and social 
sciences.   
 
 
Chapter 5: Wittgenstein, Ethnomethodology and the Case against “Interpretation” 
 This chapter focuses on two separate but related approaches to inquiry within 
the social sciences which could potentially pose a challenge to Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic model.  Both approaches take exception to what they perceive as the 
imposition of “theory” prevalent in mainstream “interpretive” social science.  I first 
consider a number of criticisms of interpretive social science influenced by the 
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philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Peter Winch.  I then examine Harold 
Garfinkel’s work in ethnomethodology.  Although neither addresses Ricoeur’s work 
directly, I explore the possibility that such anti-interpretive approaches to social 
inquiry might pose a fundamental challenge to Ricoeur’s conception of the 
interpretation of action as proposed in “The Model of the Text”.  In doing so I aim 
primarily to offer a defence of the textual model against these anti-interpretive 
claims, but also to consider how these approaches might help us understand the 
problems that arise in relation to the “objectification” of action and how that might 
impact upon our reading of “The Model of the Text”.6 
 I begin by looking at the claim that the hermeneutic characterisation of 
“understanding” as interpretive is an over-intellectualisation of how we engage with 
and understand others in our real lives.  Influenced by the work of Wittgenstein and 
Winch, some thinkers argue that understanding is not usually problematic and that it 
is thus not necessary to “interpret” action in order for us to understand its meaning.  
Adherents of this approach recommend a more thoroughly “descriptive” approach to 
social inquiry as an alternative.  I argue to the contrary that the kind of interpretation 
discussed by Ricoeur in “The Model of the Text” – Auslegung – does not necessarily 
involve the kind of “imposition” or “abstraction” with which Wittgenstein and 
Winch were concerned, and that hermeneutic models of understanding can be seen 
as far closer to the kind of “descriptive” social inquiry recommended by such 
thinkers than the kind of positivistic and intellectualist thought which they set out to 
criticise. 
 I then turn my attention to ethnomethodology, particularly the influential 
work of Harold Garfinkel.  Ethnomethodology is, broadly speaking, an approach to 
                                               
6 Likewise, I will also attempt to outline the important ways in which “The Model of the Text” might 
impart something useful regarding the objectification and interpretation of action to the approaches 
with which I am contrasting Ricoeur’s essay. 
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sociology premised upon the idea that meaningful action can only be understood by 
reference to the environment in which it takes place, and that the “meaning” of 
action is a result of the ongoing “work” of those who are acting within that 
environment.  Taking this into account, ethnomethodology recasts the study of social 
action in terms of an inquiry into “the body of common-sense knowledge and the 
range of procedures and considerations by means of which the ordinary members of 
society make sense of, find their way about in, and act on circumstances in which 
they find themselves” (Heritage, 1984: 4).  Ethnomethodology therefore attempts to 
avoid what it sees as the distorting influence of interpretation shaped by sociological 
theory and the abstraction involved in the “objectification” of action modelled after 
the natural sciences.   
I argue, however, that Ricoeur’s modelling of “objectification” and 
“interpretation” after the text and textual hermeneutics is not necessarily prone to the 
same kind of criticism.  I also argue that although the ethnomethodological focus on 
“meaning” as a situated and contextually sensitive phenomenon provides an 
invaluable resource for social inquiry, ethnomethodology nevertheless still has to 
account for the ways in which it constitutes action as an “object” and the role of 
“disciplinary prejudice” within the production of ethnomethodological accounts of 
action. 
Ultimately, I contend that rejecting a hermeneutic approach to the 
interpretation of action such as that proposed within “The Model of the Text”, 
because of the implied abstraction from the context in which an action occurs, 
represents a misunderstanding of the hermeneutic thought on which it is premised.  I 
also suggest, contrary to this concern, that “The Model of the Text” can help us 
avoid imposing meanings upon action by helping us understand the role of the 
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researcher in constituting action as an “object” of inquiry, and thus help us fulfil our 
responsibilities as interpreters of meaningful human action. 
 
Chapter 6: Responsibility, Attestation and Distanciation 
The final chapter focuses on the kind of hermeneutic validity associated by 
Ricoeur with the interpretation of texts and, therefore, the interpretation of action 
modelled after textual hermeneutics.  I aim to articulate the nature of this 
hermeneutic validity by considering Ricoeur’s discussion of “attestation of self” in 
Oneself as Another, where Ricoeur describes “attestation” as representative of “the 
sort of certainty that hermeneutics may claim” (Ricoeur, 1992: 21).  Given this, I 
attempt to take what Ricoeur has to say about “attestation” in regards to the 
hermeneutics of the self and show how this might illuminate our understanding of 
the interpretation of meaningful action. This involves considering the idea that 
engaging in interpretive activity entails a sense of obligation and responsibility that 
must be fulfilled if an interpretation is to be valid, and examining the role that 
“distanciation” and “objectification” play in the strength and validity of 
interpretation. 
I begin by considering the kind of “responsibility” we face as interpreters.  In 
particular I argue that by engaging in interpretive activity we make a commitment to 
the truth of what we say and of the reasons we give for saying it, and that we are 
obliged as interpreters to meet this commitment.  I also argue that meeting this 
obligation involves a number of the issues discussed in previous chapters; e.g. the 
importance of being sensitive to the socio-historical context in which action takes 
place, the importance of considering the meaning of action critically and the 
incorporation of self-critique into our interpretive activities. 
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While being careful to distinguish the discussion of “attestation-of-self” in 
Oneself as Another from any application it might have to the interpretation of action, 
I draw upon Ricoeur’s notion of “attestation” in order to argue that the validity to 
which hermeneutic interpretation might aspire is inextricably connected to the 
exercise of doubt and suspicion.  In line with this I argue that hermeneutic 
interpretation involves a “trust” in our power to understand and make meaningful 
assertions about action, but that this is a trust that incorporates within itself an 
element of suspicion and self-critique.  This detour of accedence via suspicion lends 
hermeneutic interpretation a kind of validity characterised by Ricoeur as “credence 
without guarantee, but also as trust greater than any suspicion” (Ricoeur, 1992: 23). 
I next attempt to elucidate the roles of distanciation and objectification within 
the strength and validity of hermeneutic interpretation.  Taking “distanciation” as the 
key feature of Ricoeur’s conception of the text, I argue that by objectifying action we 
reflectively distance ourselves from our pre-reflective understanding of action, and 
therefore avoid being “dominated” by our presuppositions of meaning.  It is under 
this condition of distanciation that the possibility of freely endorsing our beliefs and 
understanding arises.  The text, for Ricoeur, embodies this kind of “distanciation” in 
which meaning is temporarily held in suspense and made available for critical 
consideration.  I argue via Ricoeur’s analogy between text and action that it is 
likewise within the objectification of action that the possibility of critical 
interpretation within the human and social sciences arises. 
The final part of the chapter is dedicated to understanding how we should 
read “The Model of the Text” in light of Ricoeur’s interpretive theory and the 
hermeneutic tradition in which it is located.  Key to Ricoeur’s idea of interpretive 
validity is that the kind of truth claim made in hermeneutic interpretation is neither 
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absolute nor a case of “verification” in the sense associated with the natural sciences.  
Rather, it is a case of offering arguments for and against possible interpretations by 
which we might deem them as more or less probable.  I argue that the textual model 
of interpretation is in itself interpretive in this manner, i.e., as a model of 
interpretation that draws upon various features of the text that might be applied to 
action but without making any claim to “absolute” truth nor to be the only 
potentially valid model for interpretation in the human and social sciences.  
Indicative of this is Ricoeur’s description of this project as a “model” and I 
close the chapter by articulating the way in which Ricoeur understands the text as 
working as a “model” for action.  By reading the “The Model of the Text” as making 
the kind of non-absolute claims to validity definitive of hermeneutic interpretation, 
we can consider the textual “model” as offering us a productive and powerful way of 
drawing upon textual hermeneutics in the human sciences without necessarily falling 
into the trap of uncritically generalising from textual to non-textual categories of 
understanding.  We may then benefit from what textual hermeneutics might offer the 
interpretive practices and methodologies of the human and social sciences, whilst 
still incorporating the note of critical caution sounded by Ricoeur in the claim that 
“there does not exist a general hermeneutics… a general theory of interpretation… 
there are only various separate and contrasting hermeneutic theories” (Ricoeur, 
1989d: 314). 
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Chapter One: The Model of the Text and Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Heritage 
 
 
Paul Ricoeur’s 1971 essay “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action 
Considered as a Text” outlines a proposal for the application of textual hermeneutics 
to the interpretation of action in the human and social sciences.  Ricoeur’s core claim 
in this essay is that “the human sciences may be said to be hermeneutical (1) 
inasmuch as their object displays some of the features constitutive of a text as text, 
and (2) inasmuch as their methodology develops the same kind of procedures as 
those of … text interpretation” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 197).  In this chapter I offer a 
reading of “The Model of the Text” in light of Ricoeur’s wider hermeneutic writings 
and the hermeneutic philosophical tradition of which it is a part.  My purpose is to 
both clarify the idea of textual interpretation used by Ricoeur as a paradigm for the 
interpretation of action and to begin to identify aspects of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
project that require further critical attention. 
 
1.1: Distanciation in the Text 
I begin by examining Ricoeur’s conception of textual hermeneutics. Ricoeur 
conceives of the text as a paradigm of discourse under the condition of fixation.  
Discourse, for Ricoeur, is essentially communicative: in very general terms, it 
involves somebody imparting something about something to someone.  Discourse 
can become “fixed” and enduring, according to Ricoeur, when it is inscribed as 
writing.  Under this condition of fixation, Ricoeur argues that the “message” of 
discourse is preserved and becomes available to be interpreted and understood at a 
distance from the specific situation in which discourse is produced.  Interpretation 
represents the attempt to understand the meaning of discourse through this distance.  
Essential to Ricoeur’s notions of both discourse and the text, and consequently his 
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understanding of the “objectification” to which we submit action in the human and 
social sciences, is the concept of “distanciation”.   
Distanciation, for Ricoeur, is a multifaceted phenomenon with a number of 
important consequences for hermeneutics.  Most importantly, Ricoeur argues that 
distanciation describes important features of the way in which discourse is 
meaningful, not least the “autonomy” of meaning he attributes to discourse under the 
condition of fixation.  “Autonomy”, in this context, refers to the various ways in 
which it is possible for the meaning of discourse to escape from the conditions of its 
utterance or inscription, and from the intentions of its author.  In order to understand 
Ricoeur’s conception of interpretation, it is vital that we also understand the concept 
of “distanciation”, the autonomy of meaning this lends to discourse, and the way in 
which interpretation is conceived of as a “reply” to this distension and complication 
of textual meaning (Ricoeur, 1981d: 138). 
 
1.1.1: Distanciation in the Text: Event and Meaning 
Ricoeur begins by identifying a form of distanciation that he believes to be 
inherent to discourse in general (as opposed to textual discourse in particular).  The 
“distanciation” in question here is the endurance of the meaning of discourse beyond 
the particular temporal act in which this meaning is expressed.  Ricoeur argues that 
the communicative dimension of discourse is fulfilled when the discourse itself is 
understood as meaningful, and that in being so understood it transcends the 
transitory conditions of its production.  This persistence of discourse as meaning is 
perhaps most apparent in speech; spoken words, in a very real sense, disappear when 
we stop speaking – but what is said endures beyond our silence and, according to 
27 
 
Ricoeur, “may be identified and reidentified as the same so that we may say it again 
or in other words” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 9). 
Ricoeur believes that, when we speak of “understanding” something we are 
usually interested not in the specific particularities of vocalisation or inscription but 
in the meaning of the act of discourse “insofar as it endures” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 12).  
With this in mind, he refers to the way in which all discourse is realised as an event 
but understood as meaning as the dialectic of event and meaning.   This dialectic 
refers to the way in which, insofar as we are interested in discourse as a 
communicative phenomenon, we can divide it into two poles; the “event” of 
discourse – its utterance, or its inscription as a text – and the subsequent reception – 
i.e. when the utterance is heard, or the text read – at which point it is understood as 
meaningful.  In terms of the text, it is this dialectic which, for Ricoeur, gives rise to a 
“problem of fixation” insofar as “[w]hat we want to fix is what disappears” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 198).  It is via the inscription of discourse as a “work” that the “fleeting 
event” of discourse can be made to endure. 
“Work” in this context refers to the way in which discourse is expressed as a 
unique structured configuration of some kind, something particularly (even 
exaggeratedly) evident in the manner in which discourse can become fixed in the 
form of a text.  Ricoeur describes the text-as-work in terms of bringing together a 
sequence of meaningful sentences in “a unique configuration”, the uniqueness of 
which “likens it to an individual and which may be called its style” (Ricoeur, 1981d: 
136).  The style of a text, for Ricoeur, expresses “a particular standpoint in a work 
which, by its singularity, illustrates and exalts the eventful character of discourse”, 
and it is in “the very form of the work” that this individuality and eventfulness is 
embodied and made available to us (Ricoeur, 1981d: 137).  It is in the stylised 
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“work” of the text that the individuality of the eventuation of discourse is captured 
and embodied, but is captured in a way which still calls to be read, understood and 
fulfilled as meaningful. 
In fixing the event of discourse thusly, the text makes explicit the dialectic of 
event and meaning identified by Ricoeur as definitive of discourse; the individuality 
and particularity of the event of discourse, which can henceforth be identified with 
its “fixed” form, is distinguished from the meaning of the act of discourse which is 
only fulfilled when the text is read and understood.  And although Ricoeur writes 
that the event of discourse is “surpassed” in meaning, the eventful character of 
discourse is an ineliminable quality of discourse as such.  This is reflected in the 
importance attributed by Ricoeur to the work of the text, and the way that it is in the 
“very form” of the text by which the event of discourse is preserved that we discern 
meaning.  Ricoeur therefore considers the preservation of the event of discourse via 
some form of fixation of deep importance to the possibility of taking discourse 
(including, in the case of “The Model of the Text”, meaningful human action) as an 
object of reflective understanding.  And for Ricoeur it is the “distance” between the 
event and the meaning of discourse, embodied by the text, which is the very 
condition of the possibility of such reflective understanding. 
 
1.1.2: Distanciation in the Text: The Autonomy of the Text 
 The inscription of discourse as writing also gives rise to other forms of 
“distanciation”, notably the “autonomy” of textual meaning; i.e. the various ways in 
which the meaning of a text can exceed the intentions of its author and the historical 
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and social conditions in which it was originally written.7  In regards to the intentions 
of the author, Ricoeur draws a contrast between spoken and written discourse.  
Spoken discourse has a “character of immediacy”, according to Ricoeur, because the 
speaker addresses her utterance to someone with whom they share “the situation of 
interlocution” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 29).  This means simply that there exists a shared 
context between interlocutors within spoken discourse; that the speaker and listener 
are together at a certain time or place and within a shared cultural milieu, something 
which is not necessarily, or even typically, true of written discourse.  When 
discourse is fixed in writing it endures beyond the situation of its articulation and its 
meaning cannot therefore be identified purely with the intentions of its author. The 
fixation of discourse in writing therefore demonstrates the ability of the text to 
transcend the limited horizon of the author.  A text can outlive its author, and take on 
new meanings in new situations far removed from what the author intended: “thanks 
to writing, the ‘world’ of the text may explode the world of the author” (Ricoeur, 
1981d: 139). 
In a manner, this may seem to clash with the claim that the “style” of the text 
as a work serves to represent the individuality of the event of discourse as a “point of 
view”. But the individuality of the text is not subsumable to the particular 
psychological intentions of the author.  The individuality of the text is present only 
in the text as a “work” with a particular “style”, and we needn’t reach beyond the 
text towards the intentions of any particular individual in order to justify this.  
                                               
7 In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur reserves the term “autonomy of the text” primarily to refer to 
the autonomy of the text from its author. However, for the sake of brevity, I treat authorial intention 
alongside other socio-historical factors that might be taken to genetically determine meaning without 
distorting Ricoeur’s ideas too violently.  We can perhaps think of these as falling within the broader 
category of “conditions of production” (i.e. the psychological conditions of production, the social 
conditions of production etc). 
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Insofar as the “author” exists for the text, it is as a textual phenomenon.8  This is not 
to say that authorial intention cannot play a role in how we understand the text, or 
even that it should not.  It is only to say that what the author may have intended is 
not necessarily definitive of the meaning of the text.  Thus while what the author 
may have intended can often be an important aspect of how we understand a text, the 
meaning of the text transcends this limited horizon and takes in other considerations 
potentially outside of the authorial intention.  It is in this way that the text is 
autonomous of its author. 
The same can be said of the social and historical conditions against which the 
text was produced.  It is always possible, of course, to conceive of the meaning of 
the text purely in terms of the social and historical situation in which the text was 
originally produced.  By doing so we gain an invaluable sense of the context in 
which it was possible for such a text to be produced, and, likewise, the context in 
which a text would have originally been understood.  But, as with authorial 
intention, these conditions are not entirely or exclusively definitive of how we might 
understand a text.  Under the condition of fixation, written discourse becomes 
capable of escaping its original context, available to be read and interpreted by 
anyone who is familiar with the written language (Ricoeur, 1981h: 203).  In practice, 
we might rarely have reason to read a text without considering any of the conditions 
of its production.  Ricoeur’s notion of textual autonomy does not deny this.  It only 
denies that the meaning of the text can be entirely circumscribed by these conditions.  
This “autonomy” is a product of the distanciation inherent to discourse under the 
condition of fixation. 
 
                                               
8 Ricoeur is careful, however, to distance his position and his conception of textual “autonomy” from 
that of the “absolute text”, wherein the text is considered as a fundamentally authorless entity. This 
important distinction is discussed in greater detail within chapter two of this thesis. 
31 
 
1.1.2.1: Gadamer and Wirkungsgeschichte 
In terms of understanding how authorial intention and historicism can play an 
important role in how we understand any given text, but without artificially 
prescribing and delimiting the possible meaning of the text in terms of these 
interests, an important figure to take into account is Hans-Georg Gadamer, to whom 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy is deeply indebted.  Gadamer’s notion of the 
“history of effects” or Wirkungsgeschichte of the text is particularly helpful in this 
regard.  Ricoeur does not explicitly discuss the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte within 
“The Model of the Text”, but elsewhere Ricoeur does acknowledge an affinity 
between his notion of textual distanciation and Gadamer’s interest in the reception of 
texts at a “temporal distance”.9  By unpacking the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte 
here, we will more easily understand the way in which Ricoeur conceives of the 
conditions of a discourse’s production as an important but not exhaustive 
determining factor of textual meaning.  
The Wirkungsgeschichte of a text consists of the different ways in which the 
text we receive has been interpreted and understood before us and how this can 
shape our reading of the text at hand.  Under the condition of fixation, discourse is 
preserved and becomes available to be read and understood in potentially very 
different circumstances from those in which it was originally produced.  At this 
remove we have no “direct” access to either the intentions of the author or the 
historical and social conditions under which the text was authored.10  As a text, 
                                               
9 E.g. Ricoeur, in “Hermeneutics and Critique of Ideology”, says that his remarks on textual 
distanciation can be conceived as an extension of Gadamer’s own interest in “temporal distance” and 
the linguisticality of experience, and that it is in the distanciation embodied by writing that the 
“profoundest aim” of the constitution of discourse is realised (Ricoeur, 1981b: 91-92). 
 
10 If we wish to make appeal to such conditions as constitutive of the meaning of the text, we must 
justify doing so by appeal to the text itself.  To some extent then, it is the meaning of the text that 
opens us up to drawing upon the author and the socio-historical reality of the situation in which it was 
written, not the other way round. 
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discourse rather becomes an “object” with a history of being read and understood, 
and when we come to a text our expectations of meaning are often mediated by the 
history of effects that accompanies our reception of the text.11  Distance, 
consequently, is not simply a form of alienation from the historical situation that 
would allow us to understand the meaning of the text, but “a positive and productive 
condition enabling understanding” (Gadamer, 1993: 297).  The history of the text 
does not end when it is authored, but continues to include the history of how it is 
read and understood by those who come to it throughout its enduring existence.   
If we find the “soul” of the author or the “spirit” of an age in the text, 
therefore, it is insofar as it is embodied within the text and carried with it as part of 
its Wirkungsgeschichte.  Because our reception of the text both draws upon and 
contributes to this history, Gadamer describes interpreting a text as participating in a 
form of “tradition”.12  Consciousness of this tradition and our participation in it 
becomes an important part of our interpretive activities, and opens the door to 
understanding the text in terms of the conditions of its production without letting 
these conditions delimit every valid possibility of understanding the text.  This is the 
kind of “autonomy” identified by Ricoeur as part of textual meaning, and as a 
product of the “objectification” undergone by discourse under the condition of 
fixation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
11 Even if we are reading a text “blind”, so to speak, without knowing its title, author or date, our 
understanding does involve the Wirkungsgeschichte of the text to the extent that the style and literary 
conventions of the text in question will appear to belong to our engagement with a literary tradition or 
genre of some sort, which in turn condition what we expect from the text and how we understand it in 
the light of these expectations. 
 
12 Awareness of being part of this “tradition” of reception is what Gadamer calls “consciousness of 
the hermeneutical situation” (Gadamer, 1993: 301). 
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1.1.3: Distanciation in the Text: The World of the Text 
 Another important aspect of textual autonomy is the reference of the text.  
Inherent to Ricoeur’s hermeneutic thought is the idea that discourse has reference to 
something outside of itself, that it says something about something.  Under the 
condition of fixation, however, the reference of discourse too is subject to a form of 
distanciation to the extent that it can no longer be simplistically understood as the 
same as spoken discourse.  According to Ricoeur, in the text the referential 
dimension of discourse is held in suspense and only actualised in reading.  The 
permanence lent to discourse by fixation in writing, and by which it outlives the 
immediate historical and social situation of its author, means that the reference of the 
text should not uncritically be identified with any situation shared in common 
between the author of a text and its reader.13   
Instead, the reference of the text can be thought in terms of how it can open 
up realms of meaning for the reader.  Ricoeur refers to this as the text’s ability to 
disclose a world to the reader: “the world is the totality of references opened up by 
texts… the meaning of a text… is not something hidden but something disclosed… 
Texts speak of possible worlds and of possible ways of orientating oneself in these 
worlds” (Ricoeur, 1981f: 177).14  This notion of the “world” of a text is used by 
Ricoeur in order to express the idea that, when we read a text, we do not simply 
                                               
13 Ricoeur contrasts textual reference with the idea that the reference of spoken dialogue is “the 
situation common to the interlocutors, that is, the aspects of reality which can be shown or pointed 
to,” and refers to this kind of dialogical reference as “ostensive” reference (Ricoeur, 1981f: 177).  
This is, to say the least, a remarkably thin conception of what might be the reference of spoken 
discourse, but serves largely to draw a distinction between the interpersonal interlocution by which 
something is said in spoken discourse, and the fact that the text can only “speak” to us as readers and 
interpreters rather than as partners in a conversation. 
 
14 The example used by Ricoeur to illustrate this idea is “the ‘world’ of Greece”.  This is a “world” 
not because it refers to the geopolitical entity currently known as Greece, or even to the fact that there 
once existed a group of people which we now refer to as the “Ancient Greeks”, but rather to the way 
in which the text allows us to draw upon all these different cultural and historical touchstones and 
imagine inhabiting a “world” in which particularly “Greek” forms of life were lived. 
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think of it as referring to something outside of itself, or to some purely fictional 
entity or set of events that we treat “as if” they were “out there” in the world.   
Rather, the possibility that interests Ricoeur is that we as readers may enter 
imaginatively and collaboratively into a “world” belonging to and projected by the 
text, a world in which we can imagine ourselves and others potentially inhabiting 
and in which different possibilities might be lived out.  He refers to this as the 
possibility of the reader having “a world, and not merely a situation, a Welt and not 
merely an Umwelt” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 202).15 
The reference of the text is therefore inseparable from the way in which 
interpreting a text is not simply a case of deciphering some hidden meaning, but 
allowing the text to speak to us and how we understand the world around us. It 
follows that understanding a text involves not just understanding the words of the 
text, but also coming to grips with the possibilities revealed to us in the world 
projected by the text.  This applies both to our understanding of the “world” of the 
text itself, but also our own existence and situation in relation to this “world”.  The 
text confronts us with a Welt which has the potential to alter or challenge our 
perception of the ways in which we live our lives and our understanding of the 
historical and institutional contexts in which we live them.  Ricoeur expresses this 
idea by saying that “[t]o understand a text is at the same time to light up our own 
situation” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 202). 
This possibility involves some extent of distanciation from conventional 
“ostensive” forms of reference insofar as the possibility of being receptive to what 
                                               
15 The idea of “world disclosure” is one which marks Ricoeur’s philosophical debt to Martin 
Heidegger.  Ricoeur draws directly upon Heidegger in “The Model of the Text” when he says that 
“what we understand first in a discourse is not another person, but a project… the outline of a new 
being-in-the-world” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 202).  Heidegger himself characterises discourse as “the way in 
which we articulate… the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 2008: 204). Discourse is 
therefore understood as that by which reality is disclosed to our conscious understanding. 
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the text has to say is not premised upon any prior sharing of some situation, as is the 
case with interlocution.  To subsume the referential dimension of the text to our own 
situation, or conversely to assume that the world of the text has nothing to do with 
this, is to close ourselves off to the world of the text and fail to “hear” what it might 
have to say.  The text, as discourse under fixation, carries within itself the possibility 
of disclosing a world within its fixed form, and is actualised when, in reading, we 
open ourselves up to it. 
 
1.1.4: Autonomy and the Limits of a Textual Paradigm 
At this point it may be worth touching upon some of the potential issues that 
arise from this textual paradigm.  Ricoeur’s characterisation of the autonomy of 
textual meaning is inseparable from his interest in how the meaning of discourse is 
capable of enduring beyond the moment of its initial articulation.  He conceives of 
meaningful discourse as involving a dialectical relationship between being 
understood as a fleeting event and in terms of its enduring meaning.  The text serves 
as a paradigm of discourse insofar as it fixes and embodies this dialectic.  This then 
gives rise to the autonomy of the text, according to which we cannot simplistically 
identify the meaning of discourse with the conditions of its production.  The 
importance of this autonomy of meaning, for Ricoeur, lies in the idea that the 
meaning of the text should not be thought to necessarily be grounded in anything 
outside of the text itself.  This is not to say that nothing beyond the printed page – 
such as the author’s biography, of the socio-historical situation in which the text was 
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authored – can be brought to bear upon the text, but that we are  justified in doing so 
only insofar as it is justified by the text itself.16 
For Ricoeur distanciation, of which the text is a paradigmatic example, is an 
aspect of all meaningful discourse to at least some extent.  But writing is 
paradigmatic of discourse only insofar as we consider such distanciation as central to 
the nature of discourse.  By focussing on the way in which the event of discourse is 
surpassed in meaning we already identify them as distinct from one another (albeit in 
a way which also demands that we recognise that both are essential to one another as 
part of discourse).  It is by considering them separately that we legitimise the 
introduction of writing as a paradigm of discourse.  But this arguably fails to capture 
the importance of other aspects of, for example, spoken discourse, that make it 
importantly distinct from written discourse.17 
In taking any particular form of discourse as a paradigm we unavoidably 
focus on the specific aspects of discourse that are most prominent within our 
paradigm.  However, as Ricoeur argues, “[m]eaningful action is an object for science 
only under the condition of a kind of objectification which is equivalent to the 
fixation of a discourse by writing” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 203).  Insofar as the 
interpretation of meaningful action within the human and social sciences involves 
taking action as an “object”, we therefore have legitimate reason to be interested in 
the way in which action is fixed as an object and consequently the role of 
distanciation in our reflective understanding and interpretation of action.  So 
                                               
16 If, for example, we wished to discuss the theme of railway expansion in nineteenth century Britain 
within Charles Dickens’ Dombey and Son and draw upon other sources on the matter in order to do 
so, we could point to Mr. Dombey’s troubled meditations upon the “triumphant monster” which drags 
“living creatures of all classes, ages, and degrees behind it” in order to help justify our reading. 
 
17 The level of interaction involved in dialogue and the production of meaning therein, for example. 
The importance of understanding how action is meaningful as a form of ongoing transaction is a 
central tenet of ethnomethodological thought, and is examined in greater depth in the fifth chapter 
(section 5.4) of this thesis. 
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although the paradigm of the text inevitably focuses our attention on particular 
aspects of discourse, this does not mean that we should reject it.  Rather, we must be 
aware of the implications of using such a paradigm; both what the text can tell us 
about discourse and the interpretation of action, and what it might obscure.  Whether 
Ricoeur fully acknowledges the limitations of the textual paradigm and the 
abstraction that is involved in “fixing” discourse (or action) is questionable.  But if 
we are to take “The Model of the Text” seriously such considerations have to play a 
central role in our inquiries.18 
 
1.2: Understanding and Explanation 
Another major feature of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics with important 
consequences for how we read “The Model of the Text” is his attempt to reconcile 
the dichotomous categories of “Verstehen” and “Erklären”, or “understanding” and 
“explanation”. Traditionally, hermeneutic philosophy has privileged, and is often 
identified solely with, Verstehen at the expense of Erklären.  In terms of 
“Verstehen”, understanding can be thought of as the attempt to intuit what the 
author of a text might have meant.19  This, however, may in turn be contrasted with 
the kind of “objective” verification Ricoeur considers to be characteristic of the 
physical sciences, which falls under the category of “Erklären” or “explanation”.  
This opposition is problematic for hermeneutics because there is an apparent tension 
between “the intuitive and unverifiable character” of understanding and “the 
                                               
18 The importance of confronting and acknowledging the limits of the textual model as part of its 
validity is touched upon throughout this thesis, and in greater depth in section 6.4 of chapter six. 
 
19 Such an attitude is, for example, to some extent manifest in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
who wrote that the task of hermeneutics is “to understand the utterance… better than its author” and 
that “we must seek to bring much to consciousness that can remain unconscious to him” 
(Schleiermacher, 1998: § 18). 
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demand for objectivity” (Ricoeur, 1981e: 151) associated with explanation and that 
arises within the human sciences insofar as we want to be able to arbitrate between 
the validity of different interpretations. 
Ricoeur describes his own work as marked by a “concern to avoid the pitfall 
of an opposition between an ‘understanding’ which would be reserved for the 
‘human sciences’ and an ‘explanation’ which would be common to… the 
nomological sciences, primarily the physical sciences” (Ricoeur, 1981a: 36).  He 
even goes so far as to describe this reconciliation as the “main implication of our 
[textual] paradigm” in terms of how we conceive “the methods of the social 
sciences” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 209).20  This is because, for Ricoeur, the “scientific” 
character of the human and social sciences demands that we need a characterisation 
of “understanding” which allows us to incorporate critical and “explanatory” 
categories by which it is possible to arbitrate between alternate or competing 
interpretations of the action or actions to which we are attending. 
Simultaneously though, Ricoeur is deeply aware that the possibility of such 
explanation is premised upon the idea that there is something meaningful to be 
explained in action, and that this means that we cannot apply the same categories of 
“explanation” that we find in the natural sciences to the interpretation of human 
action.  To do so would involve conceiving of human action not as meaningful or a 
matter of agency, but simply as the result of impersonal and objective forces and as 
such would constitute a failure of understanding.  It is to this end that Ricoeur 
                                               
20 Ricoeur’s identification of this as the “main implication” of “The Model of the Text” is perhaps 
related to the nature of his ongoing engagement with structuralist thought.  Ricoeur, although 
interested in structural analysis as an explanatory method and as a “moment” within interpretation, 
was nevertheless sceptical about the reduction of language to such a “science of signs” and questioned 
the dominance of structuralist thought within French philosophy in the 1960s. Instead Ricoeur looked 
to how we might understand structuralist thought in relation to phenomenology and hermeneutics, and 
in his engagement with structuralism sought to “shed light on the debate and at the same time move 
beyond it” so that we might “glimpse the validity of structural analysis and the limits of this validity.” 
(Ricoeur, 1989c: 77)  The identification of structural analysis as an explanatory “moment” within 
interpretation thus represents an important synthesis of philosophical approaches within this debate. 
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proposes to re-evaluate the relationship between Verstehen and Erklären, and argues 
that the text can provide a model wherein “understanding” and “explanation” 
together constitute interpretation as a single activity. 
 
1.2.1: Understanding and Explanation: From Understanding to Explanation 
 Ricoeur first discusses the way in which the element of “understanding” in 
textual interpretation demands some degree of “explanation”.  This finds its origins 
in Ricoeur’s belief that “to understand a text is not to rejoin the author” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 210).  An effect of the distanciation that emerges with fixation is to make 
different ways of construing the text possible depending upon how we understand 
different parts of the text as relating to one another and to the work as a whole.  This 
is because the text is, ultimately, more than the sum of its parts, a holistic whole 
rather than simply a linear accumulation of meaningful sentences whose meaning we 
could somehow “add up” as we went along.  We cannot, therefore, simply infer the 
meaning of the text from our understanding of the sentences within it, as if the 
meaning of the text was simply the “sum” of the meaning of its parts considered in 
isolation.  Rather, we must recognise that “the presupposition of a certain kind of 
whole is implied in the recognition of the [individual] parts” of the text, and 
“reciprocally, it is in construing the details that we construe the whole” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 211). 
Depending on how we see the individual sentences of a text as relating to the 
text as a totality, and consequently upon how we construe the text as a whole, there 
will be different ways of understanding the meaning of any given text. This, 
according to Ricoeur, constitutes the “plurivocity” of the text “considered as a 
whole, open to several readings and several constructions” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 212).  
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Equally important, however, is that in construing the text in one particular way we 
obscure or reject other potential alternative readings.  Ricoeur expresses this by 
comparing the “text as a whole and as a singular whole” to “an object, which may be 
viewed from several sides, but never from all sides at once” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 77).  
When we interpret a text we are confronted with different possible readings from 
amongst which we may choose, and by accepting any particular reading as the best 
available we necessarily reject others which may have otherwise been open to us.  It 
is up to us as interpreters to find the best “angle” from which to view the text, and it 
is this initial effort to construe the text in some particular fashion that Ricoeur 
identifies with the category of Verstehen. 
 But not every way of construing the meaning of a text is necessarily as good 
as every other.  To concede this would be to open up hermeneutic interpretation to 
the accusation of unbridled relativism.  In order to avoid this, interpretation must be 
able to make some kind of appeal to the idea of “validation” as traditionally 
associated with the category of Erklären.  Ricoeur claims, however, that the kind of 
validation appropriate to textual interpretation is “closer to a logic of probability than 
to a logic of empirical verification”, and that “[t]o show that an interpretation is more 
probable in the light of what is known is something other than showing that a 
conclusion is true… It is a logic of uncertainty and of qualitative probability” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 212).  Ricoeur draws this idea of a “logic of probability” from the 
literary theory of E.D. Hirsch, who characterises an “interpretive hypothesis” as “a 
probability judgement supported by evidence” (Hirsch, 1967: 180).  This refers to 
the way that, in literary interpretation, we weigh up and judge the relative strengths 
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of different possible readings based upon the textual evidence on offer.21  So while a 
hermeneutic conception of interpretative validity means that we must “recognize that 
no rules of thumb can lead mechanically to the most probable reading” (Hirsch, 
1967: 186), this is not to say that we reach an interpretive conclusion arbitrarily.  By 
critically assessing the evidence upon which an interpretative claim is based we 
engage in “a rational means of reaching conclusions in the absence of directly 
experienced certitude” (Hirsch, 1967: 175). 
Although Ricoeur directly refers to Hirsch’s concept of validation in order to 
articulate his own, there are notable differences in their approaches.  He sees the 
“logic of probability” described here as a way to “give an acceptable sense to the 
opposition between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften without 
conceding anything to the alleged dogma of the ineffability of the individual” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 212).  The appeal to a “logic of probability” allows us to conceive 
of interpretation as something methodologically distinct from empirical verification, 
but without having to renounce the possibility of validation altogether.  This attitude 
towards validity in interpretation is shared to some extent by Ricoeur and Hirsch, but 
their reasons for suggesting that such a distinction is necessary are very different.  
Ricoeur believes that interpretation is a potentially interminable project, that the 
inherent openness and permanence of the text denies even the theoretical possibility 
of there being any final truth about its meaning.  Hirsch, by contrast, believes that a 
logic of probability is necessary largely on pragmatic grounds. 
This difference is an important one.  There is nothing about a “probabilistic” 
understanding of validation which rules out the possibility that there is a correct and 
                                               
21 The evidence for an interpretation may lay both inside the text, in terms of the textual properties of 
the work we are interpreting, and outside, in terms of, for example, any historical, biographical or 
theoretical considerations we wish to bring to bear on the interpretive process.  In the latter case, 
however, this is only true insofar as the use of extra-textual evidence is supported by the textual 
evidence. 
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final reading to be made of a text, against which other interpretations are mere 
approximations to be judged.  For Hirsch this is in fact the case, and meaning 
remains an irreducibly intentional phenomenon with interpretation the attempt to 
discern the author’s intentions within the text.  Validity is a matter of probability, for 
Hirsch, simply because of the ineliminable possibility of new evidence regarding the 
author’s intent coming to light.22  Our interpretive judgements are, on this reading, 
probabilistic judgements based upon the available evidence, but cannot claim any 
absolute finality due to the possibility that new evidence might yet arise, forcing us 
to re-evaluate. 
This radically distinguishes Hirsch’s understanding of interpretive validity 
from Ricoeur’s, for whom authorial intention is merely part of the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of the text and not the definitive standard of validity against 
which our interpretations are to be judged.23  Rather, for Ricoeur, interpretation 
involves a judgement of probability insofar as we are forced to weigh up competing 
interpretations and decide between them on the basis of the evidence available to us 
within the text itself.24  This judgement is probabilistic because there is no absolute 
standard of validity against which interpretations can be judged, but rather various 
and competing interpretations which will be more or less justified depending upon 
how well we judge them to be supported by the textual evidence.  It is important, 
                                               
22 E.g. new biographical details about the author, or different drafts of the text which may help us 
understand what the author was thinking as they composed the text. 
 
23 Interpretation is, for Ricoeur, in some ways fundamentally interminable because interpretation is 
conceived as participation in an ongoing tradition. New readings of the text can always be made on 
the basis of past interpretations, and these new interpretations in turn contribute to the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of the text and thus potentially open up new possibilities or variations of meaning 
for subsequent readers. 
 
24 This includes any decision we make to draw upon anything we know about authorial intention or 
any other extra-textual information to guide our interpretations; there must be something in the text 
itself that justifies our use of this information if it is to be valid. 
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therefore, that we appreciate Ricoeur’s use of Hirsch’s work without necessarily 
identifying their thinking too closely with one another. 
What we should take from Hirsch’s work is an emphasis on the idea that 
interpretation involves decisive adjudication between alternative possibilities of 
meaning based upon the evidence presented to us by the text.  Ricoeur refers to this 
process as the ability to “move between the two limits of dogmatism and scepticism” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 213).  The limit of dogmatism, in this case, refers to the idea that 
for an interpretation of meaning to be valid it must be the one and only valid 
interpretation; that we must in some way reach the verifiable “essence”, the univocal 
truth, of the meaning of a text. The limit of scepticism represents the opposite pole of 
the hermeneutical process, the belief that, in the absence of the univocity to which 
dogmatism aspires, there is no such thing as meaning, and that to assert otherwise is 
mistaken. 
Insofar as we associate “explanation” with empirical verification, 
“understanding” finds itself stuck between these two limits.  The inherent plurivocity 
of discourse under the condition of fixation denies the possibility of the kind of 
“dogmatic” and univocal reading that verification of this foundational kind demands, 
but the alternative does not therefore have to be a “sceptical” relativism by which no 
interpretation is any more valid than any other.  Ricoeur’s conception of hermeneutic 
interpretation identifies the possibility of making resolute and non-arbitrary claims 
about textual meaning whilst still acknowledging the plurivocity of the text.  Within 
this model we compare and contrast alternative interpretations with one another.  
This comparison is guided by attending to the text itself, the fixed form of which 
serving as “a limited field of possible constructions” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 213) from 
which our interpretations must be drawn. 
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It is the argumentative process involved in coming to an interpretive 
judgement, the “conflict between competing interpretations”, that plays the role of 
falsification in a “logic of probability” as it is described by Ricoeur.  An 
interpretation “must not only be probable, but more probable than another” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 213).  Herein we see the dialectic of Verstehen – the initial effort of 
construing the text in some particular way amongst a number of potentially viable 
alternatives – and Erklären – the appeal to validation made by arguing for and 
against particular interpretations with support from the text – reconstituted as two 
terms in a productive opposition which together give rise to interpretation as a single 
process. 
 
1.2.2: Understanding and Explanation: From Explanation to Understanding 
 Ricoeur also inverts this dialectic of explanation and understanding by 
offering an account of how explanation necessarily presupposes that what we aim to 
explain is meaningful, and that our explanations must ultimately both draw upon and 
culminate in understanding.  In doing so he argues that explanatory methodologies, 
rather than being opposed to the idea of “understanding”, can be seen as an 
important stage between an unreflective “naïve” appropriation of the text and an 
informed “critical” reading for which we can offer arguments based upon the text 
itself.  Explanation is therefore not antithetical to understanding, but the means by 
which we can come to assert the validity of some particular interpretation against its 
potential alternatives.  Ricoeur describes this detour of understanding via explanation 
as the “hermeneutical arc” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 218). 
This possibility of offering “explanations” in order to support our interpretive 
activities is, once again, premised on the kind of distanciation that emerges in 
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discourse under the condition of fixation.  In particular, Ricoeur believes that it is the 
suspension of the “referential function of the text” that lends itself to the possibility 
of explanation. He writes that as readers we have the potential to “treat the text as a 
worldless entity” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 215) and hold the meaning – the reference – of 
the text in a state of temporary suspense wherein it becomes possible to analyse the 
text in terms of its structure.  Ricoeur claims that this way of approaching the text is 
“exemplified” by the various “structural schools of literary criticism”, and uses the 
structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss as his primary example (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 216). 
According to Ricoeur, the text as a work of discourse is characterised by 
being a production, a “labour which organises language” (Ricoeur, 1981d: 136).  By 
discussing the labour involved in the production of a text, Ricoeur hopes to 
emphasise the way in which composing a text involves “treating language as a 
material to be worked upon and formed” (Ricoeur, 1981d: 136), and drawing upon 
literary and linguistic convention in order to produce a structured “work” of 
discourse with a particular style and individuality.  Analysis of the text in terms of 
this structure allows us to get a sense of the way in which the text is constructed, and 
to identify key relationships and oppositions between motifs and terms within this.25  
Such an analysis can then serve as “an injunction to think in a certain manner” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 218) about the text, but an injunction that proceeds from the text 
itself.  Importantly, however, some presupposition of meaning has to exist in order 
for there to be anything that might be explained.  Explanation of any kind would be 
                                               
25 The structural oppositions we encounter in any particular text, and the relationships we perceive 
between them, will depend upon the subject matter of the individual work at hand.  Ricoeur, drawing 
upon Levi-Strauss, uses an example of the “meaningful oppositions concerning birth and death, 
blindness and lucidity, sexuality and truth” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 217) as they are found within 
mythology.  Such an “explanation” of a text’s structure, as well as providing us with a guide as to 
how the text can be read, might also work to expose ideological tensions and power relations at play 
within the text, and thereby open up the possibility of critique.  
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impossible “if there were not significant questions, meaningful propositions” 
(Ricoeur, 1981e: 160).  The possibility of this kind of explanation is therefore 
inseparable from understanding, just as the validity of interpretation demands that 
we supplement our understanding with some degree of explanation. 
Even, therefore, if the possibility of engaging in such “structural” explanation 
is premised upon holding our judgement regarding meaning in a state of “suspense”, 
this can only ever be a temporary suspension of the referential dimension of the text.  
The text remains a form of discourse which is only fulfilled when it is understood as 
a meaningful whole, and as such always “awaits and calls for a reading” (Ricoeur, 
1981e: 158).  The relationship between explanation and interpretation is therefore, 
again, a reciprocal one in which “to explain is to bring out the structure… [and] to 
interpret is to follow the path of thought opened up by the text, to place oneself en 
route towards the orient of the text” (Ricoeur, 1981e: 161-62).  This is not, of 
course, to say that any understanding we might have of the text or of discourse in 
general requires a detour via explanation, but only to say that explanation 
(Erklären), as a part of hermeneutic interpretation, can serve to guide our reading 
and understanding of the text and to support our interpretive hypotheses, and 
therefore should not be thought of as something which is supportive of rather than 
inherently opposed to understanding (Verstehen). 
It is primarily this reciprocal exchange between “understanding” and 
“explanation” which, according to Ricoeur, gives an “acceptable meaning to the 
famous concept of a hermeneutical circle” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 212), and not the more 
traditional exchange between part and whole of the text (e.g. Schleiermacher), or 
even text and reader (e.g. Gadamer).  These other kinds of “circle” form an 
important part of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic thought, but he reserves the term 
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“hermeneutic circle” or “hermeneutic arc” for the dialectic of understanding and 
explanation as the ground of validity in interpretation.  The inclusion of explanatory 
methodologies within the broader concept of interpretation emerges from the 
“distance” inherent to the fixation of discourse as a text, and such explanatory 
procedures can serve as a corrective to the uncritical acceptance or imposition of 
presuppositions of meaning upon the text.   We thus have a responsibility as 
interpreters not only to open ourselves up to the text and to seek to understand its 
meaning, but also to engage critically with and to attempt to “explain” the text in a 
manner which guides our understanding.  The possibility of such a productive 
opposition between “Verstehen” and “Erklären” constituting an integral part of the 
“hermeneutical arc” is what defines interpretive validity, and in turn what lends 
interpretation its own form of “objectivity” distinct from that of the 
Naturwissenschaften. 
 
1.3: From Text to Action 
 The main concern of “The Model of the Text” is to set the stage for the 
application of textual hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful action and 
especially human action subjected to a condition of “objectification” approximately 
equivalent to the “fixation” undergone by discourse in the text.  Action, as an object 
of the human sciences, is subject to the conditions of distanciation that he identifies 
in the text and to the interpretive dialectic between the categories of “understanding” 
and “explanation” that we witness in textual hermeneutics.  This opens the 
possibility of introducing a notion of the validity of interpretation in the human and 
social sciences and a methodological clarification of their objectivity. 
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In order to support this claim, Ricoeur first identifies a similarity between 
meaningful action and discourse that precedes the “fixation” of action as an object of 
inquiry.  The most important point of similarity at this level is the way in which 
discourse can endure beyond the “fleeting event” of its articulation as meaning, or 
the dialectic of “event” and “meaning” in discourse.  It is the meaningfulness of 
action, and how we understand action as meaningful, that interests Ricoeur in “The 
Model of the Text”.  He believes that we should recognise that meaningful human 
action too finds fulfilment in being understood in a manner analogous to linguistic 
discourse, and that we must therefore attempt to understand the way in which the 
action-event “develops a similar dialectic between its temporal status as an appearing 
and disappearing event, and its logical status as having such-and-such identifiable 
meaning” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 205).  
By this Ricoeur means the difference between understanding action purely as 
a temporal and transitory event in space and time, and as something which has a 
meaning which endures beyond this event and which may even have a significance 
that outstrips the initial conditions of its eventuation.  Just as the meaning of 
linguistic discourse persists beyond the moment in which we speak, the meaning of 
action can at least sometimes endure beyond the particular moment in which we are 
acting.  Bowing when you meet the Queen, for example, is meaningful insofar as it 
signifies a relationship of respect and subordination on behalf of one individual 
towards another based upon their traditional social status, but the meaning of the 
bow – as a formal gesture of respect and subordination – survives and endures 
beyond the moment of its eventuation.26  Insofar as we are interested in action as a 
meaningful phenomenon, therefore, Ricoeur believes that it is the potential for the 
                                               
26 This is just one reason why the Queen does not usually demand that people bow or curtsey 
constantly in her presence. 
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meaning of action to persist beyond its eventuation that opens up the possibility of 
discussing “action” in terms of “the text”. 
 
1.3.1: From Text to Action: Distanciation and the Problem of Description 
In order to develop this idea Ricoeur moves on from discussing the 
“enduring” quality of meaning and appeals to a metaphor in order to support his 
claim that action can be “fixed” in a manner analogous to writing.  He does so by 
drawing upon the way in which an action can be said to have “left its mark on its 
time” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 205) as ballast to the idea that action can become “inscribed” 
as part of our lives and in our histories.  According to Ricoeur, the “marks” left on 
time by some meaningful actions are analogous to the marks left by the inscription of 
language as writing, and thus opens the possibility of addressing meaningful human 
action as if it were a text.27 
Although this metaphor of “leaving a mark” may invite us to make a 
comparison between the way in which meaningful action can become “inscribed” 
upon time and the inscription of linguistic discourse as writing, there can be little 
doubt that the kind of “mark” or “trace” left by an action upon time is much more 
difficult to define than the kind of mark left by writing.  There is no alphabet of 
action, no schematised grammar of human behaviour, no similarly formalised system 
for codifying meaningful action as there is for inscribing linguistic discourse as 
writing.  Ricoeur appeals instead to the way in which action can become “inscribed” 
                                               
27 To say that some actions can leave a “mark” upon time, however, is importantly different to saying 
that meaningful action does this as a matter of course.  Ricoeur does not state explicitly that all 
actions “mark” time in this way, but his argument seems to be that insofar as they are meaningful they 
are the kind of things that could leave a mark upon time.  The question of whether this focus upon the 
enduring significance of meaningful action obscures the importance of recognising the “ordinariness” 
of meaningful action as it is experienced on a day-to-day basis is one to which we will return in 
chapter five. 
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in social time in the form of “persisting patterns… which become the documents of 
human action” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 206). 
Ricoeur claims that these patterns are evident in things such as formal records 
as well as apparent informally in concepts such as “reputation” and, ultimately, in 
history itself within which meaningful action becomes “sedimented” in the form of 
social institutions (Ricoeur, 1981h: 207).  But to consider either formal records of 
action or the idea of history as marks upon time as equivalent to writing in any 
simple sense would be naïve.  Perhaps most importantly in terms of Ricoeur’s 
hypothesis in “The Model of the Text” is that such a comparison with writing risks 
obscuring the importance of description as part of the constitution of action as an 
object of inquiry within the human and social sciences.  “History”, for example, is at 
least potentially an ambiguous term.  It can sometimes refer to a nebulous totality of 
everything which has happened in the past, without implying an attempt to explicitly 
distinguish or articulate any specific events or identify their potential significance.28  
But insofar as we wish to focus on any particular set of human actions and the way 
in which these events may have “left a mark” upon time, or attempt to understand 
historical events as part of a coherent and developing whole which we might hope to 
follow and understand, we are usually dealing with some particular and determinate 
account or description of action, which is already to some degree an “interpretation” 
of events.  
I do not mean to imply here that every description of historical events 
necessarily involves explicit interpretive work, but only that description is 
necessarily selective and involves focussing upon particular aspects of the situation 
                                               
28 This, of course, is different again to conceiving of history as a “totality” in a broadly Hegelian 
sense, within which the development of history is sometimes perceived as an expression of and 
progress towards some unifying and sense-giving ideal or end point. 
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being described at the expense of others.  This is because the description of historical 
events already involves, to some degree, (pre)-judgements regarding the meaning of 
those events and as to which features of the situation being described are relevant to 
understanding the events in hand.  These presuppositions in turn guide and shape the 
descriptions we make.  Similarly, formal records are subject to and filtered through 
the particular interests and methods of the recording institution, and we should take 
these contextual features of inscription into account if we hope to use formal records 
of action as sources within interpretive inquiry.  So although Ricoeur uses the way in 
which action can “leave a mark” in order to support his comparison between 
meaningful action and the text, he does not engage thoroughly with the importance 
of the methods by which action can become fixed as an object.29 
Given this, it is difficult to see how meaningful human action, even 
considered in terms of being an “object” of inquiry, is supposed to be analogous to 
writing rather than simply something subject to being inscribed in writing and other 
formal records.  The notion of action “leaving a mark” is introduced because Ricoeur 
wants to distinguish between the endurance of meaning beyond the translocutional 
situation of inter-action between agents, and the idea that actions can sometimes be 
thought of as being “fixed” or “inscribed” in a manner which preserves the transitory 
event of action.  This parallels Ricoeur’s claim that the specificity of the event of 
discourse is preserved by the individuality of the text as a work.  The marks left by 
action upon time should therefore be thought of as whatever preserves an action-
event in its specific individuality.  Ricoeur’s analogy draws attention to the way in 
which understanding action involves recognising it as a particular transitory event, 
                                               
29 The “interpretive” quality of description and the role of different methods of description and 
objectification as part of our interpretive activities is a subject that is addressed in greater depth in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis. 
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but also recognising that the meaning of this “event” has the potential to endure 
beyond the moment and situation of its occurrence. 
This does not, however, help us overcome the problematic disanalogy 
between the fixation of linguistic discourse in writing and the manifold forms of 
“fixation” that can serve to preserve the action-event.  Nor does it help us understand 
the differences between such “fixed” documents of action and action as it is 
experienced in the form of inter-action between individuals in our day-to-day lives.  
Finally, the question of how action is actively fixed via description as an object of 
the human and social sciences remains, for now, unanswered.  All of these are issues 
about which Ricoeur remains largely silent within “The Model of the Text”, and 
which must be addressed before we can begin to get a clearer understanding of what 
textual hermeneutics might have to offer as a model for the interpretation of 
meaningful human action within the human and social sciences.   
What we can take, however, from Ricoeur’s comparison between the 
inscription of discourse as text and the “inscription” of meaningful action on social 
time is the idea that the meaning of action is capable of transcending the limiting 
horizons of both the intentions of the agent to which the action is attributable and the 
historical and social conditions of its eventuation.  Thus Ricoeur claims that “[i]n the 
same way that a text is detached from its author, an action is detached from its agent 
and develops consequences of its own”: this “constitutes the social dimension of 
action” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 206).  Because of this “human action is an open work, the 
meaning of which is ‘in suspense’… human deeds are also waiting for fresh 
interpretations that decide their meaning” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 208). 
The meaning of an action is not inherently something privately enacted by 
one individual, or even between two or more interlocutors, but something social and 
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manifest publicly both in terms of its enactment and its consequences.  In the 
“marks” that action leaves upon social time – the ways in which an action-event is 
preserved as a specific event in space and time – it becomes open to being “read” 
and understood by a potentially indefinite number of people.  And whilst the 
intentions of the actor and the historical and social conditions under which an action 
originally took place are typically vital to any attempt at understanding action, they 
are not necessarily definitive of its meaning.  The importance of this kind of 
autonomy of meaning for Ricoeur is evident when we consider how he conceives the 
“reference” of action under the condition of fixation. 
Under the condition of fixation, an action refers insofar as it “opens up a 
world” for interpreters of action.  Like a text, meaningful action can be considered as 
the manifestation of some possibility of being, and insofar as it is preserved in some 
fixed form can potentially develop “meanings which can be actualised or fulfilled in 
situations other than the one in which this action occurred” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 208).  
But such world disclosure is possible only under the condition of fixation wherein 
meaningful action endures, in all its individuality, beyond “the narrowness of the 
dialogical situation” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 202) that defines its occurrence as an action-
event and therefore becomes available to be reflected upon and understood outside of 
this situation. 
The autonomy attributed by Ricoeur to meaningful action is a freedom from 
being understood purely in terms of its fleeting temporal occurrence.  He believes 
that action can have “durable relevance” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 208) beyond the confines 
of its occurrence, and that this is made manifest under the condition of fixation.  
Ricoeur’s conviction is that understanding something, whether text or action, is not 
simply a case of grasping how it might have intended, or how it might have been 
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understood by contemporaries, but of opening oneself up to the “world” that is 
manifest in that thing.  The paradigm of the text allows us to see how this can be part 
of the interpretation of action. 
 
1.3.2: From Text to Action: Explanation and Understanding 
 Using the model of the text, Ricoeur can articulate the interpretive dialectic 
of “explanation” and “understanding” in relation to action.  Perhaps the greatest 
single advantage of Ricoeur’s textual model when applied the human and social 
sciences is that it deploys a concept of validity in virtue of which “understanding” 
and “explanation” are set in productive opposition to one another.  As was the case 
with textual interpretation, Ricoeur approaches this from two perspectives, the first 
of which involves articulating the way in which “explanation” can aid our attempts 
to understand action within the human sciences.  He argues that we must recognise 
meaningful human action as something that, like the text, can potentially be 
understood in a number of different ways and thus demands construal.  In the same 
way that our understanding of the text is limited and guided by attending to the 
structural and referential dimensions of the text, human action is “a limited field of 
possible constructions” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 213) and, if perceiving the different 
possible constructions available to us requires that we exercise our understanding, 
arbitrating between them involves engaging in explanation. 
In particular Ricoeur argues that understanding an action as meaningful 
involves engaging with “the relation between the purposive and the motivational 
dimensions of action” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 213).  This means that understanding an 
action involves engaging to some extent with alternative possibilities regarding the 
motivation and justification of that action, of explaining why some particular course 
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of action was undertaken and the sense we can make of it.  Ricoeur claims that “in 
arguing about the meaning of action I put my wants and beliefs at a distance and 
submit them to a concrete dialectic of confrontation with opposite points of view” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 214).  This confrontation is roughly equivalent to the “logic of 
probability” that Ricoeur draws from Hirsch’s work on literary interpretation, 
wherein the confrontation of alternative interpretations of the text plays the role of 
falsification.  In terms of meaningful action, then, we must consider the relative 
plausibility of alternative accounts of the action that we are seeking to understand 
and the differences these accounts make to how we understand it.  This involves 
attending closely and openly to the action we are seeking to interpret, considered 
from various perspectives, in order that we should think our own presuppositions of 
meaning critically and so that our interpretations should be grounded in the “world” 
disclosed to us by the action itself.  It is the element of explanation involved in 
understanding that affords this possibility. 
Ricoeur also argues for the reverse expression of this dialectic between 
“explanation” and “understanding” within the interpretation of meaningful action.  
As with the text, explanatory accounts can serve to reorient our understanding, and 
to bring out tacit features of action of which we might otherwise have been unaware.  
Ricoeur even goes so far as to say that structuralism can provide a valuable resource 
for the interpretation of action, arguing that “the structuralist model, taken as a 
paradigm for explanation, may be extended beyond textual entities to all social 
phenomena because it is not limited in its application to linguistic signs, but applies 
to all kinds of signs which are analogous to linguistic signs” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 218).  
Accordingly, Ricoeur considers meaningful action as a semiotic phenomenon; “the 
function of substituting signs for things and of representing things by the means of 
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signs… appears to be more than a mere effect in social life. It is its very foundation” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 219).  Social life, as conceived by Ricoeur, depends upon shared 
systems of meaning and understanding, and as such we can submit the phenomena of 
social life to semiotic and structural analysis.   
But, as with the text, the possibility of this kind of structural analysis – or any 
explanatory account – depends upon the prior existence of shared systems of 
meanings and understanding.  Any explanatory schema we bring to bear upon action, 
whether some form of structuralism or any other critical framework that we might 
wish to use to help understand action, will typically involve engaging with action in 
a manner different from that of our pre-critical, everyday understanding of action.  
We are seeking instead to bring out some feature of the action that we might usually 
overlook or take for granted.  But we do this based upon some level of pre-critical 
understanding, and in order to gain a greater (or different, at least) understanding of 
that which we are explaining.  There is nothing to “explain” if there is not something 
there which we “understand” to some extent beforehand, and if our explanatory 
accounts don’t ultimately find a place in our understanding of what we are 
interpreting then they are empty. 
Conceiving the dialectic of “understanding” and “explanation” in this manner 
provides a useful template for understanding interpretive validity within the human 
and social sciences.  Recognising both “understanding” and “explanation” as 
elements of – or moments within – interpretation helps us ensure that we engage 
thoroughly and critically with meaningful human action, and thus to fulfil our 
responsibilities as interpreters.  A hermeneutic model of the interpretation of action 
allows us to acknowledge and remain open to the inherent plurivocity of meaningful 
action, whilst retaining the determination and ability to make positive and non-
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arbitrary assertions about the meaning of human action.  Both are important 
conditions for achieving a sensitive but critical understanding of meaningful human 
action within interpretive inquiry. 
 
1.4: Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to offer a survey of “The Model of the Text” 
within the philosophical tradition of which it is a part, whilst also touching upon a 
few issues arising from this that demand further critical attention.  Ricoeur offers his 
hermeneutic model of interpretation as a way of re-conceiving how we understand 
and interpret action as an object of inquiry in the human and social sciences.  He 
does so by making a comparison between linguistic discourse and meaningful human 
action, and in particular between discourse as it is “fixed” via inscription in writing 
and action as it is taken as an “object” within the human and social sciences.  Based 
upon this Ricoeur extends his reconceptualisation of the traditional hermeneutic 
dialectic of “understanding” and “explanation” and applies it to the interpretation of 
meaningful human action.  This is perhaps the most significant contribution that 
textual hermeneutics has to offer to the human and social sciences, as it provides us 
with a new way of understanding the validity of interpretation within these 
disciplines. 
It is important to bear in mind that Ricoeur does not suggest that this model 
captures everything that we might wish to say about human action, or that treating 
meaningful action as a text is the only way of approaching these issues.  “The Model 
of the Text” should be thought of as a way of critically and rigorously addressing 
questions about the interpretation and meaning of action within the human and social 
sciences, but without necessarily excluding other possibilities of understanding.  
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Ricoeur’s hermeneutic model is by no means a “final word” on the interpretation of 
action, nor would Ricoeur claim that such finality is possible.  But by directing our 
attention towards certain parallels between linguistic and textual discourse and 
meaningful action it may allow us to understand how action is interpreted within the 
human and social sciences in new or different ways and inform our interpretive 
practices accordingly. 
Ricoeur’s essay serves to orientate our thought towards this possibility whilst 
leaving much left unsaid.  Just as there is no single “correct” way in which to 
interpret literary texts, there is no single and universally correct method for the 
interpretation of meaningful action regardless of what it is we are seeking to 
understand and the context in which interpretation takes place.  It is up to us, and 
those who may seek to apply the textual model in practice, to be aware of and to 
judge what it is that “The Model of the Text” may help us see, and to an equal extent 
as to what it may leave obscure.  Within the rest of this thesis I explore a selection of 
issues related to the interpretation of meaningful human action, primarily regarding 
the objectification of action and the implications for how “The Model of the Text” 
might affect our understanding of interpretive validity in the human and social 
sciences.   
Such explorations will not bring us any closer to finding a hard and fast set of 
rules for the interpretation of action as this is not what “The Model of the Text” aims 
to achieve.  It will, however, allow us to get a greater sense of some of the potential 
strengths, weaknesses and consequences for interpretive practice that lie at the heart 
of Ricoeur’s hypothesis and in doing so help us evaluate the validity of his claims 
within “The Model of the Text” itself. 
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Chapter Two: The Text 
 
 
Ricoeur understands the text as a paradigm of discourse under the condition 
of fixation.  Central to this is Ricoeur’s formulation of the “autonomy” of the text, 
wherein the meaning of the text cannot simplistically be identified with the 
conditions of its production.30  Ricoeur is nevertheless keen to distance this idea of 
textual autonomy from association with “any ideology of an absolute text” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 201).  When Ricoeur discusses the “absolute text” he is referring to the idea 
of “hypostasising the text as an authorless entity” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 30).  Such 
hypostatisation would imply that the text exists without either author or reference, 
but simply as a weave of language in which meaning can only be identified with the 
endless play of signifiers in relation to other signifiers, considered independent of 
any final signified.   
Ricoeur’s notion of textual autonomy shares at least some features of this 
idea of the “absolute” text; for example, that the meaning of the text cannot be 
naively identified with the intentions of its author, and that there can be no “final” 
interpretation that isn’t open to reinterpretation by subsequent readers.31  Ricoeur, 
however, claims that the idea of an “absolute text” is fallacious because it “forgets 
that a text remains a discourse told by somebody, said by someone to someone else 
about something” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 30).  In terms of “The Model of the Text”, this 
distinction is important.  Minimally, if the text is to work as a model for the 
objectification and interpretation of action in the human and social sciences, it is 
                                               
30 Ricoeur’s notion of textual autonomy has been outlined in greater detail in section 1.1.2 & 1.1.3 of 
the first chapter of this thesis. 
 
31 While we are concentrating here primarily upon “the text”, it should be noted that a “reader” in this 
sense is not necessarily or simplistically limited to a consumer of writing.  Rather the “reader” is the 
person or persons that realise the meaning of any work of discourse that has been submitted to 
fixation. 
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important that there remains a possibility of adjudicating between competing 
interpretations.  This possibility is foreclosed by the radical autonomy associated 
with the absolute text. 
In order, therefore, to clarify the distinction between Ricoeur’s conception of 
textual autonomy and “absolute” textual autonomy I propose to compare Ricoeur’s 
formulation of the text with that of two thinkers who may be considered as 
proponents of the “absolute text”: Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida.32  By making 
this comparison I will demonstrate the ways in which the autonomy of the text for 
Ricoeur is importantly distinct from the sort of unbounded autonomy associated with 
the “absolute text”, and why this distinction is crucial for Ricoeur’s project in “The 
Model of the Text”.  Further to this I will also consider whether Ricoeur’s use of the 
text as a paradigm of objectification may be problematic in relation to the use of 
non-verbal media to represent action within the human and social sciences.  This will 
help us gain a more comprehensive picture of how Ricoeur believes the text can 
serve to inform the interpretation of meaningful human action. 
 
2.1: The Absolute Text: Roland Barthes 
 I begin by examining Roland Barthes’ influential 1968 essay “The Death of 
the Author”.33  In this essay Barthes is concerned primarily with overthrowing what 
he terms the “Author-God” from his perceived position as the arbiter of meaning in 
the text.  Barthes sets out his position as opposed to the dominance of the belief that 
                                               
32 It should perhaps be noted that neither Barthes nor Derrida use the term “absolute text” within their 
own work. Nevertheless, in both cases they treat the text as the kind of “authorless entity” which 
Ricoeur describes. 
 
33 Given that Barthes, Derrida and Ricoeur all contributed to the debate surrounding structuralism in 
France in the 1960s and 70s, and given that I will be referring to a number of these texts in this 
chapter, I include the dates of the original French publications of works referenced for the purposes of 
comparison where appropriate (either in the main text or in the footnotes). 
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literary meaning is purely intentional.  He does this on the basis that “[t]he image of 
literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author” 
(Barthes, 1977a: 143).  Barthes, at that time, considered language not as a tool to be 
utilised by the author in order to express or communicate thought, but simply as “a 
ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words and so on 
indefinitely” (Barthes, 1977a: 146).  Given this, he claims that the text “is not a line 
of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the “message” of the Author-God) 
but… a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” 
(Barthes, 1977a: 146).  Barthes’ text, then, seems to be the very definition of 
Ricoeur’s “absolute text”, divorced entirely from authorial intentions and where 
reference to anything outside itself is forsaken in favour of the endless play of 
signifiers within language. 
 Despite Ricoeur’s desire to distance his thought from association with any 
notion of the “absolute text”, there are a number of parallels between the ways in 
which Barthes and Ricoeur conceive the text.  Given the way that both thinkers draw 
upon (and, in Barthes’ case, radicalise) the insights of structuralism, this is perhaps 
unsurprising.  Both reject authorial intent as the arbiter of meaning, favouring instead 
a focus on the way the structure of the text guides us as readers. Barthes, for 
example, claims that when we read a text “the structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like 
the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level”.  Understanding the text 
consists in following these structural “threads” and not in a trawl for something 
“beneath” the text (Barthes, 1977a: 147).  Ricoeur, likewise, claims that reading 
involves responding to “an injunction starting from the text” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 218).  
This too involves following the sense of the text, disclosed in the structure of the text 
as a work, rather than identifying the authorial intent that might underlie the text 
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itself.  Barthes and Ricoeur also both identify the reader as the locus of the 
emergence of meaning in the text. 
Barthes’ claim that “[t]he reader is the space on which all quotations that 
make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost” (Barthes, 1977a: 
148) has, on the surface, much in common with Ricoeur’s assertion that “[r]eading… 
marks the realisation, the enactment, of the semantic possibilities of the text” 
(Ricoeur, 1981e: 159).34  There are, however, fundamental differences between 
Barthes’ understanding of the text and Ricoeur’s.  And although they agree that the 
reader is the place in which textual meaning is realised, major disagreement is 
nevertheless evident in the ways in which Barthes and Ricoeur understand the role 
played by the reader in the emergence of textual meaning.  When Barthes discusses 
the reader as the “destination” of the text, for example, he writes that “this 
destination cannot any longer be personal.  Barthes’ reader is without history, 
biography, psychology.  He or she (if Barthes would allow that they are gendered at 
all) is “simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by 
which the written text is constituted” (Barthes, 1977a: 148).  The motivation for 
emphasising this depersonalised vision of the reader is, presumably, the same as that 
which leads Barthes to call for the death of the Author-God in the first place.  To 
preserve the pure “textuality” of writing Barthes can no more identify the meaning of 
the text with the personal understanding of the reader than he can with the intentions 
of the author. 
Ricoeur, by comparison, does not want to deny that the psychology and 
history of the reader are important.  Nor, however, does he want to say that textual 
interpretation amounts to the reader gratuitously imposing her own meaning upon 
                                               
34 “Qu’est-ce qu’un texte? Expliquer et comprendre” [1970]. 
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the text.  Rather, Ricoeur’s account of reading involves an exchange between text 
and reader: a version of the Gadamerian “fusion of horizons”.35  Ricoeur’s particular 
conception of this fusion is influenced by Heidegger and conceived of as a meeting 
between ways-of-being or between two “worlds”: the world of the reader and the 
world of the text.  He describes this exchange as “between my mode of being… and 
the mode opened up and disclosed by the text as the world of the work,” and writes 
that “[t]o understand oneself in front of the text… is to let the work and its world 
enlarge the horizon of the understanding which I have of myself” (Ricoeur, 1981f: 
178).36  It should be clear from this that Ricoeur’s reader cannot be the ahistorical, 
depersonalised reader described by Barthes.  For Ricoeur, textual meaning is 
intertwined with the temporality and historicity of understanding, and Ricoeur’s 
reader is one with a “world” of their own, with particular ways of being in the world 
– of which they may or may not be consciously aware – and consequently 
expectations of meaning which allow them to engage with a text which “awaits and 
calls for a reading” (Ricoeur, 1981e: 158). 
This emergence of meaning within the “fusion of horizons” is also 
fundamental to the kind of autonomy that Ricoeur attributes to the text.  It is, after 
all, not only the world of the reader which is enlarged in this meeting.  The text has 
its own history in terms of a Wirkungsgeschichte, a history of reception.37  When we 
come to the text as a reader, our understanding can often be influenced by the ways 
in which it has been read by those before us, by the traditions of thought and the 
                                               
35 E.g. Gadamer’s account of the historicity of understanding in Truth and Method (Gadamer, 1993: 
302-07); Ricoeur’s discussion of the same in “Hermeneutics and Critique of Ideology” (Ricoeur, 
1981b: 75-76). 
 
36 “La métaphore et le probleme central de l’herméneutique” [1972]. 
 
37 The notion of Wirkungsgeschichte in relation to the autonomy of textual meaning is extrapolated in 
section 1.1.2.1 of the first chapter of this thesis. 
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“cultural weave” with which the text is identified.  The “world” of the text 
encompasses this history within the text as a structured work.  It is this referential 
dimension of the text – the way in which the work of the text directs us as readers 
towards different possibilities of meaning – which allows the reader to find the 
“thread of the stocking” which can then be traced and followed in the text.   
The autonomy of the text lies not in the utter vanishing of the author and the 
reader as individuals; the author, after all, is typically an integral part of the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of the text.  It lies rather in the fact that the permanence lent to 
discourse by inscription enables the text to escape the narrow contingencies of the 
horizon of its composition so that it might be actualised in situations removed from 
the conditions of its production.  We cannot, therefore, limit the meaning of the text 
to either the intentions of the author or to the “impositions” of the reader, as neither 
does justice to the reality of the text qua text: to the text as a paradigm of the 
dialectic of event and meaning identified by Ricoeur as an integral part of discourse. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of why there should be such a difference 
between Ricoeur and Barthes’ treatments of the text is hinted at by the very title of 
“The Death of the Author”.  The “Death of the Author” is, after all, a polemical text; 
something attested by the title’s deliberate evocation of Nietzsche’s infamous 
proclamation that “God is dead.”38  This polemical intention shapes Barthes’ idea of 
the text in a manner which is, at the very least, inconsistent with claims that Barthes 
makes elsewhere.  For example, in his 1971 essay “From Work to Text”, Barthes 
wrote that the text “asks of the reader a practical collaboration” (Barthes, 1977b: 
163).  This implies that the reader is not simply a locus of meaning, but instead that 
they bring something to the situation in which the text is actualised as discourse.  
                                               
38 Possibly Nietzsche’s most notorious proclamation, the first prominent occurrence of this statement 
comes in sections 108 and 125 of The Gay Science, and later becomes an important part of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. 
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Barthes also states that “[i]t is not that the Author may not ‘come back’ in the Text, 
in his text, but he does so as a ‘guest’” (Barthes, 1977b: 161).  This suggests not only 
that authorial intention can play a role within interpretation, but also that the 
“absolute” autonomy of the text with which “The Death of the Author” is sometimes 
identified may only be telling part of the story.  By comparison, Ricoeur’s account of 
textual autonomy, and the analogous autonomy of the meaning of action he identifies 
in “The Model of the Text”, does not find itself committed to such an extreme 
position. 
 
2.2: The Absolute Text: Jacques Derrida 
 The second thinker with whom we are to engage has a different and arguably 
more sophisticated account of the “absolute” autonomy of the text, and one which 
potentially poses a greater challenge to the kind of finite textual autonomy argued for 
by Ricoeur.  Derrida’s work in this regard is one with which Ricoeur has had reason 
to engage directly, having at one point described Derrida’s technique as “unbounded 
deconstruction” (Ricoeur, 1978: 284).39  I propose now to engage both with 
Derrida’s formulation of the text, and consequently with the differences between this 
and the construction of the text upon which Ricoeur’s application of textual 
hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful action is premised. 
 A good starting point for this comparison, and one which serves to symbolise 
the difference between Ricoeur and Derrida in regards to the text, is the statement for 
which Derrida is arguably most famous: “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (Derrida, 1997: 
158).40  This statement – that there is nothing outside the text – should immediately 
make apparent why some, including Ricoeur, consider Derrida as a proponent of the 
                                               
39 La Métaphore Vive [1975]. 
 
40 De la Grammatologie [1968]. 
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“absolute” text. Without an “outside”, writing and the text never refer to anything 
other than more writing, we are forever caught in the unending play of signifiers.  In 
this sense, Derrida’s notion of the text exceeds anything that might be printed on a 
page:  
 in what one calls the real life of these existences… there has never been 
anything but writing; there have never been anything but supplements, 
substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of 
differential references, the ‘real’ supervening, and being added only 
while taking on meaning from a trace and from invocation of the 
supplement… (Derrida, 1997: 159) 
 
The text for Derrida is therefore not only absolute in purely textual or literary terms, 
but an intimation of the instability of meaning in general.  Given this, Derrida’s 
conception of the absolute text denies not only that the text could serve as a suitable 
model for understanding valid interpretation in the human and social sciences, but 
also denies that such authoritative claims to meaning are possible at all. 
Drawing upon De Saussure’s linguistics, Derrida distinguishes between 
spoken language (parole) and writing, identifying writing with the play of signifiers 
typical of language considered as system (langue).  Specifically, however, and unlike 
Ricoeur who considers writing as the fixation of a discourse that could at least 
potentially have been spoken, Derrida emphasises not only the autonomy of writing 
from speech but also the priority of writing – considered as the play of signifiers in 
langue – over the spoken word: “There is no purely and rigorously phonetic writing. 
So-called phonetic writing… can function only by admitting into its system non-
phonetic ‘signs’ (punctuation, spacing, etc.)… the play of difference, which… is the 
condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign, is in itself a silent play” 
(Derrida, 1982: 5).41 
                                               
41 “Différance”, lecture originally delivered in 1968 and first published in Marges de la Philosophie 
[1972]. 
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 Derrida presents this play of signs in terms of “différance”.  The term 
“différance” plays on both senses of the French word différer, meaning both to 
“differ” and to “defer”. As such, différance describes not just the way in which 
language functions in terms of difference, but also how this play holds the referential 
world in suspense: “The sign represents the present in its absence. It takes the place 
of the present…. The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence… the circulation of 
signs defers the moment in which we encounter the thing itself” (Derrida, 1982: 9).  
The consequences of conceiving language in terms of différance are dramatic.  
Derrida describes them as “strategic” and “adventurous”: “[s]trategic because no 
transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern theologically the 
totality of the field. Adventurous because this strategy is not a simple strategy in the 
sense that strategy orients tactics according to a final goal, a telos or theme of 
domination, a mastery and ultimate reappropriation of the development of the field” 
(Derrida, 1982: 7).  When we focus on différance the meaning of language is no 
longer reducible to either anything existent independent of the play of signifiers, or 
to any particular end to which language is employed.  The differences that constitute 
language as a system “are effects which do not find their cause in a subject or a 
substance, in a thing in general, a being that is somewhere present, thereby eluding 
the play of différance” (Derrida, 1982: 11).  The play of language is, instead, marked 
by the constant emergence and disappearance of meaning in différance. 
 This extreme autonomy of language as a system marked by the play of 
différance implies the independence of language not only from the intentions of any 
determinate or particular speaker or author, but from the very possibility of a 
subjectivity prior to language: “the subject (in its identity with itself, or eventually its 
consciousness of its identity with itself, its self-consciousness) is inscribed in 
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language, is a ‘function’ of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its 
speech conform… to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences” 
(Derrida, 1982: 15).  Any claim for language to either express anything prior to or to 
make reference to anything outside the play of différance cannot, for Derrida, be 
justified.  Language only ever returns to itself, to the endless play of signifiers.  
Likewise, as our engagement with and relation to the world and ourselves as 
conscious individuals is mediated by language, the concepts and ideas that we take to 
ground our being in the world are equally the effects of the play of différance.  With 
this prioritisation of différance writing and the text become the locus for a critique of 
metaphysics and the sovereign subject; a “dismantling from within of all the notions 
dear to Western philosophy” (Joy, 1988: 525).  
 Writing for Derrida is effectively the “presence” of “absence”, a pseudo-
presence, insofar as it marks the instability of the very dichotomy of 
absence/presence – by reminding us of the “absence” of the “presence” it supposedly 
signifies – and, consequently, of the conceptual network with which this dichotomy 
is intertwined. Part of this, of course, involves the collapse of the dichotomy of 
“inside” and “outside” in relation to the text itself.  The text is not fulfilled in relation 
to anything outside itself, and that which lies “outside” the circumscribed space of 
the text does not exist independently of the play of différance.  In this regard, writing 
becomes the location of metaphysical critique and, as such, almost takes us beyond 
an interest in language as meaning. 
For Derrida meaning is nothing more than the play of oppositions in 
différance, one in which dichotomous pairs of terms are constituted in relation to one 
another.  Any meaning claim that aspires to a stability or significance outside of this 
transitory play of signifiers involves an illegitimate reification of meaning, one 
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which attempts to evade différance itself and therefore deny the very conditions 
under which meaning emerges.  The privileging of one side of an oppositional 
dichotomy over another is therefore, for Derrida, a covert act of violence that spreads 
throughout the system of oppositions of which any dichotomy is but a part: “in 
classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence 
of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the 
other… or has the upper hand” (Derrida, 1981: 41).42 
Derrida’s analysis of language and meaning thus involves a very different set 
of concerns to those of Ricoeur, for whom discourse is fulfilled in meaning.  But in 
emphasising the “play” of language that lies “beyond” and that is obscured by 
focussing on the surface meaning of language, Derrida risks undermining himself.  
Ricoeur, after all, never proposes that we should settle with the “surface” meaning of 
a text, or that we should have no interest in what might be “hidden” in discourse.  It 
is simply that Ricoeur conceives of the possibility of such in-depth analysis as being 
irreducibly tied to the way in which the text is understood as addressing 
“meaningful” aspects of human existence.  We must, after all, have some 
preliminary sense of what a text is about – to be able to identify meaningful 
propositions, questions or points of tension or opposition that arise from the text – in 
order to even begin engaging in the kind of structural analysis discussed by Derrida 
and Ricoeur.43 
We need, therefore, to get to grips with what the text presents to us as readers 
before we can realistically hope to identify what it might keep hidden.  Derrida’s 
                                               
42 Positions [1972]. 
 
43 In relation to Levi-Strauss’ structural analysis of myth, for example, Ricoeur points out that “[t]here 
would be no contradiction, nor any attempt to resolve contradiction, if there were not significant 
questions, meaningful propositions about the origin and the end of man” (Ricoeur, 1981e: 160). 
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account of différance brings to the surface instabilities in the picture of language and 
writing with which he is engaged, but it can only do so because contradictions do 
exist between meaningful points of opposition and because the relationship between 
language, writing, being and truth is, in the first place, an aporetic one.44  
Consequently, Derrida cannot reject out of hand an interest in language as meaning, 
but only the possibility of a final resolution to questions of meaning, or an appeal to 
any “final signified” that transcends language itself. 
Ricoeur’s conception of the text, however, is not committed to such a “final” 
interpretation, but to contingent readings which themselves contribute to the ever 
expanding “horizon” of meaning within the text.  Herein we see Ricoeur’s 
commitment to the communicative potential of textual discourse, a commitment 
which circumscribes his construction of “the text” as a concept.  Ricoeur, like 
Derrida, identifies the production of meaning in the text with a kind of “play”, but 
does not wish to limit this to the endless play of the signifier, against which we are 
powerless to say anything about anything outside of the text itself.  For Ricoeur “all 
play reveals something true,” and the play involved in reading a text exists insofar as 
we “abandon ourselves to the space of meaning which holds sway over the reader” 
(Ricoeur, 1981g: 187).  It is within this “play” that the text is capable of disclosing a 
world and is actualised as meaning for the reader.   
Ricoeur’s conception of the text is one that, as a fixed work of discourse, 
cannot be reduced to any transcendental signified, but at the same time retains its 
power to “speak” to an interpreter about a world outside of itself.  In contrast to 
Derrida, therefore, Ricoeur considers the kind of explanation involved in structural 
analysis as only partially constitutive of the interpretive task.  Explanation of this 
                                               
44 After all, why should we be concerned with the “violence” inherent to philosophical hierarchies if 
the only “victim” of this violence is a linguistic signifier? 
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kind must be complemented by an interest in understanding the text at hand, by 
which the text is appropriated and fulfilled as meaningful discourse.  It is Ricoeur’s 
aim to integrate both “understanding” and “explanation” as moments within “an 
overall conception of reading as the recovery of meaning” (Ricoeur, 1981e: 161). 
 
2.3: The Text as Discourse 
Derrida, of course, would not accept this compromise.  In reference to 
Ricoeur, as one figure among other “dialectical” thinkers, Derrida says “polysemia, 
as such, is organized within the implicit horizon of a unitary resumption of 
meaning… annulling the open and productive displacement of the textual chain. 
Dissemination, on the contrary… marks an irreducible and generative multiplicity” 
(Derrida, 1981: 45).  He also claims that “[t]he issue is to show that the risk of 
metaphysical reappropriation is ineluctable” (Derrida, 1981: 58).  Derrida’s concern 
with this “ineluctable” necessity of the critique of metaphysics lies in the belief that, 
without this critique, we run the risk of allowing the violence of binary opposition to 
continue perpetuating within our discourse. As such, we can never return to 
“meaning” in any conventional sense.  Here, then, we see what might be an 
irresolvable gap between the thought of Ricoeur and Derrida at the level of their 
interest in the text.  Derrida is interested primarily in identifying and “overturning” 
(Derrida, 1981: 41) the violent hierarchies prevalent within the dichotomies of 
language.  Ricoeur, by contrast, is “committed to action” (Joy, 1988: 526) and 
interested in the way in which meaningful discourse – and, therefore, meaningful 
action – plays a role in shaping our understanding of ourselves and the world in 
which we live and act. 
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 Taking this commitment to action into account is important in order for us to 
understand the difference between Ricoeur’s conception of the text and any possible 
formulation of the “absolute” text.  For Ricoeur, the text is a paradigm of discourse.  
The autonomy of the text is intricately linked to the way in which discourse is 
meaningful, and the way in which this meaning cannot be restricted to the conditions 
of its eventuation.  This is not to say that the social, psychological and historical 
conditions of the event of discourse have no role to play in how we come to read the 
text, but rather that under the condition of fixation these factors are only part of the 
story.  Even if the relationship between the conditions of the production of discourse 
and meaning becomes “distended and complicated” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 201) in this 
picture, this by no means denies that they might be of interest to an interpreter of 
texts.  Many of the conditions that potentially serve to limit how we read a text – that 
shape the “world” that the text reveals to us – are related to the social and historical 
conditions of the eventuation of discourse.   
This is, perhaps, even more fundamentally the case when we are considering 
meaningful action in terms of the text, as Ricoeur does in “The Model of the Text”.  
If the autonomy of the text precludes us from identifying its meaning with the 
conditions of its production in any “absolute” sense, this has dramatic consequences 
for the possibility of using textual hermeneutics as a “model” for the interpretation of 
action.  It would imply, for example, that under the condition of objectification 
action becomes detached entirely from the circumstances in which it originally 
occurred and that any attempt to draw upon the self-understanding or socio-historical 
circumstances of the agents of action would be illegitimate.  Objectification, under 
the model of the absolute text, would be fundamentally opposed to understanding. 
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 But there is an important sense in which part of attempting to understand the 
other, who may be separated from us by an historical or cultural divide, involves 
trying to take on their point of view and to understand them in the context to which 
their form of life belongs.  One aspect of attempting to understand the other involves 
acknowledging a deficiency of sorts on our part; that there is something about the 
other that stands beyond our current understanding of the world.  Ricoeur identifies a 
similar demand to extend our understanding, in order to accommodate the alien and 
strange, as part of the task of translation.  The activity of translation – wherein we 
“serve two masters, the foreigner in his strangeness, the reader in his desire for 
appropriation” (Ricoeur, 2006: 22-23) – is therefore involves comparable challenges 
to those faced by interpreters of action in the human and social sciences, wherein we 
often attempt to understand and articulate something about people whose lives and 
beliefs may differ significantly from our own.45  This necessarily involves 
maintaining a level of fidelity towards those we are trying to understand; an attempt 
to preserve the “strangeness” of the other, rather than merely subsuming anything 
alien under categories of experience familiar to us from our own lives and thus 
obliterating the differences that we wished to understand.   
As Peter Winch writes in relation to anthropological accounts of the Azande 
people: “Since it is we who want to understand the Zande… it appears that the onus 
is on us to extend our understanding so as to make room… rather than to insist on 
seeing it in terms of our own [experience]” (Winch, 1964: 319).  We can perhaps 
relate this idea to Ricoeur’s notion of “linguistic hospitality” (Ricoeur, 2006: 10, 23).  
This refers to the demand on the translator to “make space” in their language for the 
foreign text.  Similarly, the interpreter of action has to try and “make space” for the 
                                               
45 Ricoeur even says on several occasions (quoting George Steiner’s After Babel) that “to understand 
is to translate” (Ricoeur, 2006: 11, 24, 28). 
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world-view and self-understanding of those she is seeking to understand as part of 
the work of interpretation.  This “onus” on the interpreter to approach action openly 
is an important aspect of the “responsibility” we face as interpreters of action – a 
responsibility towards the fidelity of our interpretations, and to not simply impose 
our own meanings upon those we nominally hope to understand.  The epistemic 
humility involved in this kind of understanding is not something for which an 
“absolute” conception of the text can account, as the task of “making space” for the 
other within discourse presupposes that there is something there to be understood 
and not simply the ever fluctuating play of différance.46 
This is what undergirds the text for Ricoeur in contrast to Derrida: the idea 
that discourse has reference to a “world” and, therefore, is always “about something” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 198).  For Ricoeur, the referential dimension of the text (as a 
paradigm of discourse) stands in stark contrast to the possibility of an “absolute” 
text.47  But at the same time we need not assume that the referential dimension of 
discourse should necessarily lead to the kind of “metaphysical reappropriation” that 
Derrida seeks to guard against.  Interpreting a text involves arguing for and 
arbitrating between different possibilities of meaning, none of which has any 
“absolute” or “theological” privilege over every other.  As Ricoeur writes, “[i]t is 
always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, 
to arbitrate between them, and to seek for an agreement, even if this agreement 
                                               
46 Derrida, of course, whilst praising Claude Levi-Strauss for his use of structuralism within 
anthropology, criticises him for clinging to “a sort of ethic of presence, an ethic of nostalgia for 
origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of presence and self-presence in speech” 
and consequently of tacitly imposing this ethic of “natural innocence” upon the people within whom 
he claimed to find this “innocence” (Derrida, 1978: 292).  Even this notion of “epistemic humility”, 
then, for Derrida, can perhaps be thought as a form of “violence”. 
 
47 For Ricoeur, the possibility of the “absolute” text is restricted to particular texts, and not endemic to 
writing in general: “Only a few sophisticated texts satisfy the ideal of a text without reference. They 
are texts where the play of the signifier breaks away from the signified. But this new form is only 
valuable as an exception and cannot give the key to all other texts which in one manner or another 
speak about the world” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 201). 
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remains beyond our reach” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 213).  Interpretations of this sort remain 
open to challenge and reinterpretation, all of which contributes to the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of the text.  We do not escape différance and reach the hallowed 
land of the signified, but then any claim to do so would be an invalid reification of 
meaning that fails to do justice to the text itself.  In this sense, at least, Ricoeur and 
Derrida are in agreement. 
Derrida, however, is interested in the text purely as the stage of différance, 
and the challenge this poses to traditional Western metaphysics.  Derrida emphasises 
nothing but what he perceives as the failed attempt to attain a false “metaphysical” 
truth in textual interpretation.  For Derrida, therefore, the question of how we 
understand texts is misplaced, based upon an illusion that the analysis of the text in 
terms of différance works to dispel.  Ricoeur, by contrast, is interested in the 
interpretation of texts as a paradigm of understanding “at and through distance” 
(Ricoeur, 1981d: 143).48  This “distance” is not simply the contingent distance of 
historical and cultural difference, but more fundamentally the distance between 
“event” and “meaning” in discourse (Ricoeur, 1976a: 12).  Within this dialectic the 
event of discourse is its occurrence: the instance of speech, writing or action by 
which meaning is conveyed.  But, for Ricoeur, it is only in being appropriated as 
meaning that discourse is realised.  This realisation of discourse as meaning is only 
fulfilled when it is taken by an understanding subject to refer to a world outside of 
itself.  The fixation of discourse in writing – the distance introduced between the 
“event” of writing and the text being appropriated by a reader – is paradigmatic of 
this dialectic of event and meaning insofar as the text embodies this condition of 
distanciation. 
                                               
48 “La fonction herméneutique de la distanciation” [1975]. 
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The autonomy of the text, for Ricoeur, lies in this gap between the event of 
discourse and its actualisation in meaning.  Under the condition of fixation, the 
meaning of the text-as-discourse escapes being determined by the horizon of its 
eventuation, and as such its meaning cannot be simplistically or wholly identified 
with either the historical or psychological circumstances of its eventuation.  Instead 
we must take into account the situation in which the text is actualised as discourse by 
the reader. 
But nor is the meaning of the text to be identified definitively with the way in 
which it is read and appropriated by its interpreters.  Any single reading will 
typically represent only a partial actualisation of the text, depending on how the 
reader construes the text – what Ricoeur describes as the “perspectivist aspect” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 212) of text construal – and the accompanying specificity of the 
“world” thereby disclosed for the reader by the text-as-discourse in this situation.  
The autonomy attributed by Ricoeur to the text means that it cannot have any single 
or final meaning in a metaphysical sense, but instead has a history of meaning – a 
history of being interpreted and understood – beginning with its production and 
continuing for as long as it is read and understood in new ways and in new 
situations: continuing for as long as the text is capable of referring to something 
outside of itself and disclosing a world to the reader.  
Distanciation should not therefore be conceived first as a “problem” for 
discourse, a gap that we struggle to cross between the event of discourse and some 
definite and determinate meaning somewhere just out of reach.  Nor should it be 
thought to obliterate the referential dimension of discourse, and thereby justify 
treating the text as “absolute” in the sense of Barthes or Derrida.  Distanciation for 
Ricoeur is rather the precondition of critical understanding.  Under the condition of 
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fixation we can hold the meaning of discourse in a state of suspense and submit it to 
reflective and critical attention.  Ricoeur argues that the paradigm of the text 
therefore “reintroduces a positive and… productive notion of distanciation” 
(Ricoeur, 1981d: 131).  For Derrida the text as a stage of différance demonstrates the 
impossibility of attaining metaphysically stable and transcendent truth. But for 
Ricoeur the text is more interesting as a paradigm of understanding at a distance, and 
therefore of our struggle to attain contingent but valid truth within the interpretive 
human sciences.  It is this vision of the text which is drawn upon in “The Model of 
the Text”.49 
 
2.4: The Limits of the Text 
 It is important to recognise, however, that “the text” is intended as a limited 
paradigm.  In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur frames his project by claiming that 
textual hermeneutics can work as a model for interpretive practices within the human 
and social sciences “inasmuch as their object displays some of the features 
constitutive of a text as text”, and asks “to what extent” it is possible to make this 
identification (Ricoeur, 1981h: 197).  No matter, then, how similar the “fixation” of 
discourse in the text might seem to be to the “objectification” undergone by human 
action as it is appropriated as an object within the human and social sciences, it is 
vital that we do not uncritically conflate the two.  To do so would be to lose sight of 
the “as if” involved in the analogy being drawn by Ricoeur, in favour of uncritically 
                                               
49 It is worth noting at this point that Ricoeur’s account of “the text” is not supposed to be definitive 
of anything and everything we might want to call a text, nor is it the only valid or interesting way of 
thinking about “texts”.  The “text” is not a metaphysical entity that captures the essence of all actual 
things we might wish to call a “text”. It is a construct which allows us to identify some particular 
phenomena (i.e. the fixation of discourse as a work/the objectification of action as an “object” etc.), 
the applicability and validity of which needs to be judged on a case by case basis. 
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subsuming meaningful action under the rubric of the literary text, no matter what 
differences there might be between them. 
It is even more important that we recognise these differences given what we 
might term as a “linguistic bias” within the discourse of the human and social 
sciences.  The discourse of the human and social sciences, in which action is 
constituted as an object and then interpreted or articulated, is primarily linguistic.  It 
consists heavily of written accounts, descriptions and interpretations of human 
behaviour and action, and other verbal discussions and exchanges regarding the 
same.  Because of the pervasiveness of linguistic discourse within the human and 
social sciences, it is perhaps tempting for interpreters to think of meaningful action 
purely in terms of linguistic meaning, and consequently believe that nothing is lost 
or changed when we attempt to express or analyse the meaning of action via 
linguistic discourse.  But action, although inclusive of linguistic behaviour, does not 
consist entirely or even primarily in language-use.  We should, therefore, be aware 
that there may be some aspects of meaningful action that may remain difficult, or 
even impossible, to represent purely linguistically. 
In this regard it is imperative to remember that non-verbal media such as 
photography and film – “non-verbal” in the sense that, unlike written accounts, they 
are media which are not exclusively or even primarily linguistic – can be important 
documents of action, and can often play an important role as sources within the 
human and social sciences.  Part of their importance lies in their capacity to present 
action to us in a form other than that of the dominant mode of discourse within the 
human and social sciences, offering us ways of looking at action of which purely 
linguistic accounts of human action may not be capable.  If we are to avoid being 
dominated by the “linguistic bias” of the human and social sciences, it is important 
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that we remain open to what non-verbal sources such as these can offer us as 
interpreters, and how different methods of representing and objectifying action can 
inform our understanding and analysis of action. 
Nevertheless, insofar as non-verbal media of these kinds can be said to “fix” 
action as an object of inquiry, to some extent they may also be thought of as “texts” 
of action.  As I have argued, Ricoeur understands and presents “the text” as 
discourse under the condition of fixation, and not therefore inherently something 
limited to writing.  Insofar as it is possible to fix meaningful action as an object 
without resorting to literary description, such documents of action may also be 
thought of in terms of “the text” as it is defined by Ricoeur.  In “The Model of the 
Text”, however, Ricoeur does not distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic 
methods for the representation of meaningful action, and if we are to count 
photographs, films and other non-verbal records as “texts” – without losing sight of 
what they uniquely offer us an interpreters of action – it is imperative that we also 
work to recognise the difference between these non-verbal “texts” and the literary 
texts which have a more central place within Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy.50 
 
2.4.1: Chatman on Film and Literature 
In order to begin exploring the issue of the difference between “verbal” and 
“non-verbal” texts, I will examine film theorist Seymour Chatman’s distinction 
between “description” in literature and “point of view” in film as modes of 
representation.  Chatman identifies one of the most important distinctions between 
literary texts and film as being between the ways in which each represents action.  
                                               
50 Audio recordings and statistical analysis are, of course, vital resources widely used by researchers 
in the social sciences that differ importantly from “literary” texts, but in what follows I have chosen to 
limit myself to discussing the differences between literary and visual representations of action 
(primarily film) as a contrast to the possible “linguistic bias” of the human and social sciences. 
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Literature, in which events and characters are typically presented primarily through 
written language, is identified by Chatman with “description” as a presentational 
technique.  By contrast, film primarily relies upon visual images in order to present 
its subject matter to its audience, a presentational method defined by Chatman as 
offering a “point of view” (Chatman, 1981: 119) to the viewer.  Although not 
something addressed by Ricoeur directly, looking more closely at the ways in which 
non-verbal media can be used to “fix” action will help us to understand both the way 
in which Ricoeur uses “the text” as a paradigm for the objectification of action in the 
human and social sciences and the caution we must take when extending this model 
beyond the realm of “literary” texts. 
As well as identifying the dominant modes of presentation within each 
medium, Chatman distinguishes between the different ways in which these media are 
capable of representing action.  In offering a description of events, the action being 
described in the literary novel is “interrupted and frozen” in order to establish the 
relevant detail about the action in the form of a “tableau vivant” (Chatman, 1981: 
119).  In comparison to this, film offers a dynamic presentation of action in which 
the entire scene is proffered to the view from a particular point of view as an ongoing 
sequence.  And aside from not having to “freeze” the action in order to present it, 
film, along with photography, also differs from verbal or literary description insofar 
as it is not forced to select particular details or aspects of a scene or action and can 
instead represent a scene in its entirety.  Chatman therefore describes film as 
possessing a “plenitude of visual details” and “an excessive particularity” (Chatman, 
1981: 122) compared to literary description. 
Although these distinctions between the capacities of film and literature are 
designed primarily with narrative artworks in mind, we can also consider how they 
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might apply to the use of non-verbal media to record and document action in the 
human sciences.  Video and photographic records have had a role to play in the 
human sciences as sources of information for almost as long as the technology has 
existed.  They serve as invaluable methods by which to document and preserve 
records of human behaviour and culture.  Their value, as much as anything, comes 
from the fact that they “show” rather than “say”; they record action in a manner 
distinct from that of verbal and literary descriptions or accounts, and in a style which 
putatively avoids the way in which linguistic descriptions are necessarily selective 
about the details they recount.51  So whilst, of course, a filmed record of action is 
also perspectival – it is shot from a particular “point of view” in which some aspects 
of action will be brought to the fore and others obscured at their expense – there can 
be little doubt that such records of action possess a greater degree of what Chatman 
describes as the “plenitude of detail” inherent to film as a medium.  
The relevance of this to the human and social sciences lies in the way it 
allows us to preserve the “excessive particularity” of action.  At a fairly fundamental 
level this is useful for evidencing and supporting our interpretive claims, as we can 
point to those aspects of the relevant filmic or photographic records that might 
support our conclusions.  This then allows us to witness some evidence of 
interpreters’ claims, allowing us to assess their construal of events against the 
evidence upon which they have based it.  Importantly, it also means that subsequent 
interpreters are not limited to only assessing and criticising those aspects of an action 
considered relevant or meaningful by those who have previously described and 
interpreted it.  The plenitude of detail caught within non-verbal records of action 
thereby works as an antidote to the specificity of linguistic description, potentially 
                                               
51 The selectivity of description within the human and social sciences is discussed in greater depth in 
section 4.1 of chapter four of this thesis. 
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allowing subsequent interpreters access to details that may have been otherwise 
overlooked or misunderstood.  Non-verbal media therefore offer a very different, and 
potentially very important, dimension to the interpretive practices of the human and 
social sciences. 
But as valuable as these kinds of sources may be, especially in regards to 
presenting human action in a way that can offer a plenitude of detail that linguistic 
description arguably lacks, they are not inherently superior modes of representation, 
nor should they be thought to undermine the importance of linguistic descriptions of 
action within the human and social sciences.  The trade-off that accompanies the 
richness and plenitude of detail that, for example, filmic or photographic records of 
action provide is that these modes of representation frequently lack specificity.  For 
this reason, Chatman claims that “it requires a special effort for films to assert a 
property or relation. The dominant mode is presentational, not assertive. A film 
doesn’t say, ‘This is the state of affairs,’ it merely shows you that state of affairs” 
(Chatman, 1981: 124).  A film of some series of events can provide us with access to 
much more detail than most linguistic descriptions can, but because of this it can be a 
struggle to direct our attention towards specific details or to assert specific relations 
between different elements present within the recording. 
Non-verbal records of action, in this regard, still demand interpretation or 
articulation to some degree before we can utilise them as sources within the 
primarily linguistic discourse of the human and social sciences.  Minimally, it is 
often necessary to have some idea of the context within which an action is taking 
place before we can understand it.  Purely non-verbal records of action, such as a set 
of photographs or a video, can often struggle to communicate a sense of this context 
beyond what is immediately evident in the record at hand.  Like a verbal or textual 
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description, recording action via any non-verbal medium involves a certain amount 
of abstraction; a photograph is typically a single frame of a single moment in time 
and film has the limits of its framing and excludes anything that happens before or 
after recording.  Given this, it is often necessary to at least have a title, date or 
caption which tells us something else about the scene and the events being 
represented, something which exceeds what it is possible to capture in the recording 
itself. 
 
2.4.2: The Ax Fight 
A useful example of how non-verbal media demand interpretation or 
articulation, and the effect that the presentation and related supplementary 
information can have on how we understand the events portrayed in such media, can 
be seen in the anthropological film The Ax Fight [1975] (Asch and Chagnon, 2006). 
The film, made by ethnographic filmmaker Timothy Asch and anthropologist 
Napoleon Chagnon during a stay in the Yanomami village of Mishimishimabowei-
teri in 1971, depicts a conflict between residents and visitors from a neighbouring 
village.  The fight begins when a woman from the village (Sinabimi) receives a 
beating from one of the visitors (Mohesiwa) in the gardens having refused to provide 
him with plantains.  From this point on the situation escalates, with numerous other 
participants getting involved and a threat of more serious violence beginning when 
Sinabimi’s husband and brother-in-law run into the fray wielding an axe and a 
machete.  The intervention of older men from both sides of the conflict gradually 
dissipates the violence – though not before Mohesiwa’s brother has received a heavy 
blow to the back with the dull side of an axe – culminating in a hostile standoff and 
continued verbal provocations. 
84 
 
 The film The Ax Fight provides us with a document of these events, but does 
so in three distinct parts.  After an initial scene-setting title screen, we are first 
presented with the unedited footage as it was recorded at the time (beginning at 
00:01:02, and finishing at around 00:12:50).52  This footage is raw, unaccompanied 
by any commentary bar a few comments from Asch, Chagnon and their team 
captured on the soundtrack, and it is difficult to identify precisely why the fight is 
taking place, why it escalates so rapidly, or what the different loyalties between the 
participants might be.  The second section, following on from this, aims to offer an 
explanation of what we have just witnessed.  This section begins with a title screen 
(00:12:53) which sets out some of the circumstances surrounding the event.  Having 
initially been told that the fight broke out over the discovery of an incestuous 
relationship, the titles continue to inform us that they “learned that several former 
members of the village were visiting” but that they also had “old enemies in the 
village, so the situation was volatile.”  We then return to the footage, over which 
Chagnon’s voice can be heard offering an explanation of events as they unfold.  The 
film employs arrows superimposed over the footage to help the viewer identify key 
protagonists mentioned in the voiceover (starting around 00:16:30).  Chagnon 
explains that the conflict is occurring between two factions and explains the way in 
which elder male relatives from Mohesiwa’s side of the conflict eventually form a 
protective cordon around the fallen man, allowing the physical violence to gradually 
diffuse (00:21:10). 
 Chagnon’s commentary over the footage is followed in turn by an image of a 
flow chart documenting a “simplified structure of conflict in terms of marriage and 
descent” with the voiceover describing this in terms of “three lineages” split between 
                                               
52 Numbers in brackets indicate running time (hours:minutes:seconds) on the 2006 DVD version of 
The Ax Fight released by Documentary Educational Resources. 
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“two villages” (00:21:54).  Chagnon uses this chart to explain the relationships and 
loyalties that exist between key figures in the conflict, and describes the fight as an 
“expression of hostility” (00:23:08) rooted in these conflicting lineages.  Finally, we 
are presented with titles introducing a “final edited version of the fight” (00:24:10).  
This edited version aims to present a more coherent version of the fight based upon 
the preceding analysis.  It does this by cutting the footage down to the key moments 
in which the conflict between different lineages is most evident, and by intercutting 
footage of the initial club fight with images of one of the female villagers shouting at 
the visitors (00:24:58) taken from after the fight had dissipated in the raw version of 
the footage.  This works to help establish the importance of tribal loyalties in the 
conflict at a much earlier stage than is evident in the raw footage.  The film 
concludes with another title screen stating that “[s]everal days after the fight, some 
of the visitors began leaving. Tensions were temporarily relieved” (00:29:00).  This, 
once more, implies that it was the tensions between different lineages present in the 
village at one time that provided the primary cause for the outburst of violence. 
 It is perhaps this three-stage structure that makes The Ax Fight such a 
fascinating example for our purposes, as it deliberately demonstrates how the 
apparently chaotic actions taking place in the raw footage can be given sense using a 
variety of editing techniques.  Foremost among these is the use of titles screens, 
graphics and voiceover to provide supplementary information.  The entire second 
section of the film is dedicated to using these resources in order to pick out key 
figures, establish their relationships and to provide contextual information which 
allows the viewer to make sense of the events they see before them.  The edited 
version of the film too is constructed in such a way that places a focus upon certain 
aspects of the events as they unfolded in real time, and which emphasises the 
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importance of the features of the scenario identified by Chagnon in his explanation.  
The way in which editing and supplementary information – such as graphics, 
voiceover and text – can work together to suggest a particular interpretation of the 
events represented is also evident in the final title screen that describes the aftermath 
of the fight, and which works to reinforce the connection between conflicting 
lineages and violence that is presented in the edited version of the footage. 
 Over the thirty minutes of the film as a whole we are presented with a 
compelling document of a fight in a Yanomami village, one which presents us with 
both an interpretation of those events and a document of how film can be used to 
present us with a particular version of the events recorded.  That there is an 
important difference between the “raw” unedited footage and the final presentation 
of events with which The Ax Fight culminates seems obvious.  Even without the 
accompanying commentary, the edited version of the film uses filmic techniques to 
select and present certain aspects of the fight and excludes others.  However, it is not 
only the selectivity of the editing process that can effect how we understand a 
videoed document of human action, nor is it only the supplementary information 
which is included in (or alongside) the presentation of such a document.  We also 
have to be aware that when supplementary or explanatory information is included, it 
will inevitably involve excluding other information which may have the potential to 
alter our understanding of what is presented.  The Ax Fight can prove illustrative in 
this regard too. 
 From the very outset of the film, when the title screen states that “[l]arge 
Yanomami villages are volatile and the slightest provocation can start a violent 
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outburst” (00:00:42), the viewer is primed to think of Yanomami society as violent.53  
This presents violent conflict as something indigenous to Yanomami culture, and 
leads us to understand the fight documented primarily as an expression of this 
culture.  This characterisation of Yanomami society is, however, disputed.  R. B. 
Ferguson, for example, claims that the idea of Yanomami society as inherently 
violent is an example of the “anthropological dogma that people are ready and 
willing to go to war for any purpose that their culture valorizes” (Ferguson, 1995: 9).  
Contrary to this, Ferguson claims that the violence documented amongst Yanomami 
people “is not an expression of Yanomami culture itself. It is, rather, a product of 
specific historical situations: the Yanomami make war not because Western 
influence is absent but because it is present, and present in certain specific forms” 
(Ferguson, 1995: 6).  Ferguson places a particular emphasis on understanding the 
role played on “antagonistic interests in the acquisition of steel tools and other 
Western manufactures” (Ferguson, 1995: 7) in understanding the occurrence and 
patterns of Yanomami warfare. 
 For Ferguson, the widely documented violence of Yanomami culture is 
“explainable largely as a result of antagonisms related to scarce, coveted, and 
unequally distributed Western manufactured goods” (Ferguson, 1995: 8).  The 
inequalities introduced into Yanomami society and between competing groups of 
Yanomami people by the presence of desirable steel tools – such as the machetes and 
axes used during the fight documented by Chagnon and Asch, and which were 
originally supplied to the villagers by them – means that individuals and groups from 
rival villages are more likely to come into conflict in order to acquire, protect or 
control the distribution of these resources.  It may thus be contact with Westerners, 
                                               
53 This perspective on Yanomami society is one closely associated with Chagnon, whose influential 
1968 book on Yanomami society is subtitled “The Fierce People”, an epithet now widely associated 
with the Yanomami people. 
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and not something inherent to Yanomami society itself, which “has resulted in a 
lowered threshold for war – a warlike disposition that makes violence more likely” 
(Ferguson, 1995: xii). 
 This is not to say that Chagnon’s account of the fight was fundamentally 
erroneous in the details presented, or in the emphasis placed upon the relationships 
between the antagonists involved.  Nor would Ferguson argue as such.54  Having not 
done any fieldwork with the Yanomami of his own, Ferguson draws upon Chagnon’s 
work heavily in his analyses and when he describes the incident documented in The 
Ax Fight he broadly emphasises the same factions and events as Chagnon.  Ferguson 
writes that the visitors had “refused to leave when they should have” and that they 
were “closely tied to a faction within the main village” who had encouraged their 
kinsmen to stay permanently on the basis that “increased numbers would give them 
greater leverage over everything that went on in the village”.  This “constituted a 
challenge to the dominant factions, of or allied to Moawa [headman of the main 
village]” and eventually escalated into the conflict captured on film by Chagnon and 
Asch (Ferguson, 1995: 328). 
 For Ferguson, however, this conflict between factions is inseparable from the 
unequal distribution of Western goods, particularly axes and machetes, bought into 
the group by anthropological researchers.  Ferguson goes on to recount Chagnon’s 
later encounter with Moawa upon his return to Mishimishimabowei-teri in 1972.  On 
this occasion “trouble was brewing” over the issue of “the distribution of the 
anthropologist’s Western goods”.  Although Chagnon had previously to deal with 
                                               
54 Ferguson criticises totalising theory in anthropology on the basis that that “too often contending 
theorists have each portrayed his or her particular research interest as if it were the whole story, as if 
the positing of psychological, institutional, and material bases of war were somehow incompatible” 
(Ferguson, 1995: 7).  He also qualifies his theory of the Western influence on Yanomami conflict 
when he says that “to emphasize the violence-generating impact of Western contact is in no way to 
deny that completely autochthonous factors may also lead to war” (Ferguson, 1995: 57). 
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many demands from the villagers, this time Moawa wanted to have all of the goods 
“or at least control their distribution”.  This culminated in Moawa threatening to kill 
Chagnon for not distributing his machetes, given in payment for blood samples, to 
those whom Moawa had directed (Ferguson, 1995: 331).   Herein we perhaps see 
how the distribution and demand for steel tools such as machetes and axes could 
contribute to both inter- and intra-village conflict amongst the Yanomami in a 
manner not at all evident in The Ax Fight as it is presented. 
 To reiterate, it isn’t that the divisions and relationships identified by Chagnon 
aren’t important, only that by excluding supplementary information regarding the 
distribution of Western goods and the potential impact this might have on the 
relationships documented, we perhaps only get a partial picture of what is happening.  
Along these lines Ferguson argues that the “tribal loyalties” characteristic of 
conflicts such as the one documented in The Ax Fight can “provide definition to 
existing hostility” but “are not the cause of the conflicts” (Ferguson, 1995: 370).  
Minimally, we might wish to argue that the presence of the Westerners and their 
valuable manufactured goods contributed to an instability between competing 
factions, and thus to the conflict which ensued.  This, however, is not a possibility 
presented or entertained in the version of events offered to the viewer by The Ax 
Fight.  The contrast between these two interpretations of the significance of what has 
been captured on film – on the one hand, Chagnon’s interpretation of the fight as an 
expression of a conflict of loyalties within an intrinsically violent culture, and on the 
other hand Ferguson’s interpretation wherein the presence of anthropologists is an 
extrinsic factor contributing to that violence – is marked, even if the events 
themselves are not in dispute.  Here, once again, we are confronted forcefully with 
90 
 
the difference that the inclusion (or exclusion) of supplementary information can 
make to how we understand the action presented to us in “non-verbal” documents. 
To this extent at least, non-verbal records of action are still subject to many 
of the same considerations as linguistic descriptions of action.  We need, for 
example, to be aware of the socio-historical context in which the action documented 
originally occurred and the methods used in the recording.  We need to be aware of 
any history of interpretation that may accompany and precede our reception of these 
documents.  And we need, perhaps most importantly, to be aware of the theoretical 
and doxic presuppositions that we bring to these documents of action as interpreters.  
So whilst non-verbal sources can offer us much that purely linguistic descriptions of 
action cannot, the specificity available to us within linguistic discourse is a necessary 
complement to the plenitude of detail afforded to us by media such as film and 
photography. 
This privileging of linguistic discourse is why it is possible to posit a 
“linguistic bias” within the human and social sciences.  But this “bias” is only 
pernicious if we do not recognise it as such, and consequently consider all 
experiential meaning as merely a form of inarticulate linguistic meaning.  Such a 
move is deeply reductive, and undermines the value of any attempt to articulate the 
meaning of action in linguistic terms.  Rather, we must recognise that bringing 
meaningful action to linguistic discourse poses a particular kind of challenge and that 
in doing so we risk obscuring or distorting some aspect(s) of that which we are 
trying to articulate.  Considering all objectification of action under the rubric of “the 
text”, even non-verbal documents such as films and photographs, causes similar risks 
of obscurity and distortion.  A photograph is not a literary text, and we need to be 
aware of this alterity if we are to understand how such sources might play a role 
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within the interpretive practices of the human and social sciences.  If “The Model of 
the Text” is to inform our practices as interpreters of action, it must be able to 
respond to this injunction. 
In “The Model of the Text”, where Ricoeur discusses the “objectification” 
and “fixation” of action, he does not explicitly address the issue of non-linguistic or 
non-verbal documents as distinct from literary descriptions and accounts of action, 
nor the possibility of there being a “linguistic bias” prevalent within the discourse of 
the human and social sciences.  This is something that must be expanded upon by 
those looking to follow Ricoeur’s suggestions in “The Model of the Text”, and 
vigilance is required if textual hermeneutics is to inform our understanding of 
interpretive practices in the human and social sciences without unwittingly reifying 
any linguistic bias which does exist. 
However, it does not necessarily follow from Ricoeur’s conception of “the 
text” as discourse under the condition fixation that non-verbal records of action are 
merely a species of linguistic texts, and that we can simplistically understand the 
former in terms of the latter.  Ricoeur’s interest in the text and textual interpretation 
is designed to draw attention to some of the ways in which discourse is meaningful 
under the condition of “fixation”, and how this in turn plays an important role in 
understanding the validity of textual interpretation.  Action documented by non-
verbal means is still action that has been “fixed”, still action objectified and received 
at a distance from the situation in which it originally occurred.  It is this distanciation 
that allows us to approach the action documented as an object of critical 
interpretation, and we must augment our appropriation of these non-verbal resources 
with the same level of critical caution as we would adopt when dealing with 
linguistic descriptions of meaningful human action. 
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Insofar as meaningful human action is “fixed” as an object of inquiry within 
the human and social sciences, considering these non-verbal documents of action in 
terms of the text can still prove fruitful in many regards.  But in order to understand 
the specific value of these non-verbal “texts” it is important that we strive to 
recognise the ways in which these kinds of media differ from purely linguistic 
descriptions, and how they might work to both complement and resist any linguistic 
bias present within the practices and discourse of the human and social sciences. 
  
 
2.5: Conclusion 
Ricoeur argues in “The Model of the Text” that the interpretation of action 
involves understanding at a distance in a manner analogous to that of textual 
interpretation, not least due to the condition of “alienating distanciation” which 
“renders possible the objectification which reigns in the human sciences” (Ricoeur, 
1981d: 131).  In taking action as an object of inquiry, whether represented verbally 
or non-verbally, we distance ourselves from our pre-reflective understanding and the 
lived experience of that action, allowing us to reflect critically upon it and thereby to 
clarify our understanding of it.  The paradigm of “the text”, as conceived by Ricoeur, 
provides us with a resource by which we might attempt to understand the way in 
which action is constituted as an object of interpretation, and consequently the kind 
of interpretive claims we can make as part of the inquiry into meaningful action. 
Equally important, however, is that Ricoeur’s text as a paradigm of discourse 
under fixation provides a framework by which we can arbitrate between the 
“multiplicity” of meanings that Derrida considers irreducible, but without having to 
make appeal to any “final” or “transcendent” signified.  This, ultimately, is the 
ability to make a contingent but valid and non-arbitrary claim to truth; an 
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interpretation of meaning given from within a particular socio-historical context 
without any claim to this “truth” being absolute or exhaustive.55  For Ricoeur, this is 
the primary value of textual hermeneutics as a paradigm for the interpretation of 
action in the human and social sciences, and it is a possibility that emerges insofar as 
the text is conceived of as a paradigm of discourse.  By drawing a contrast between 
Ricoeur’s text-as-discourse and the idea of the “absolute text” as imagined by 
Barthes or Derrida, we make explicit both the importance of Ricoeur’s particular 
construction of the text to the project outlined in “The Model of the Text”, and the 
reasons for Ricoeur’s eagerness to distance himself from the “ideology” of the 
absolute text. 
                                               
55 Ricoeur, for example, argues that even if “objectifying knowledge” always falls short of the kind of 
“absolute” objectivity towards which scientific thought often aspires, it is nevertheless possible to 
achieve a kind of “relative autonomy” within our inquiries via objectification and the introduction of 
critical distance (Ricoeur, 1981i: 243-44). 
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Chapter Three: The Sprachlichkeit of Action 
 
Within the human and social sciences there is a need to constitute meaningful 
action as an object of critical inquiry whilst remaining cautious not to distort or 
misrepresent it.  There is an accompanying need, therefore, to try to understand the 
extent to which meaningful action lends itself to objectification and the role that our 
methods of objectification might play in how we understand and interpret action.  In 
this chapter I examine the notion of “meaningful action” in relation to Ricoeur’s 
essay “The Model of the Text” with the twofold aim of outlining how we might 
understand action as meaningful, and how this conception of meaningful action can 
be brought to linguistic discourse as an object of reflection within the social and 
human sciences.  I also take into consideration the way in which our understanding 
of action as meaningful might help to determine the kind of objectivity towards 
which inquiry into meaningful human action may aspire. 
In this chapter I will argue that Ricoeur’s appeal to speech-act theory in “The 
Model of the Text” risks obscuring the role of representation and linguistic 
description in constituting action as an object.  I will then articulate a way in which 
we can understand the relationship between meaningful action and its linguistic 
expression by making an appeal to the linguisticality – the Sprachlichkeit – of action, 
arguing that our experience of action as meaningful is inseparable from the modes of 
expression we find for “experiential meaning”, and in particular from the language in 
which we bring meaningful action to discourse.  Finally I will consider the 
possibility that an interest in action at the level of its “meaning” detracts from the 
“objectivity” of inquiry, but ultimately will argue contrary to this that any form of 
objectivity suited to the human and social sciences must be capable of recognising 
action as meaningful. 
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3.1: Meaningful Action & Speech-Acts 
“The Model of the Text” is an essay primarily concerned with outlining the 
ways in which the text can work as a paradigm for the interpretation of meaningful 
action in the human and social sciences.  In this essay, the objectification of action is, 
for Ricoeur, analogous to the fixation of discourse in writing.  In order to articulate 
this fixation he draws upon the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin.  Ricoeur writes that 
in making this appeal to speech-act theory he is “giving the word ‘meaning’ a very 
large acceptation” so as to cover “all the aspects and levels of the intentional 
exteriorisation that makes inscription of discourse possible” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 200).  
For Ricoeur, the different “levels” of the speech-act defined by Austin in How to Do 
Things with Words allow us to understand both the different levels at which action is 
meaningful, and the ways in which the exteriorisation of these different layers of 
meaning lends itself to inscription.  I will now briefly examine the use made by 
Ricoeur of speech-act theory in order to articulate the way in which action lends 
itself to objectification, and indicate some of the problems that arise from this 
approach.  
In How to Do Things with Words Austin distinguishes between some of the 
various things that we do in uttering a performative sentence.  The first of these is 
the “locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a 
certain sense and reference”.  Ricoeur refers to this level of meaning as the 
“propositional act”.  In addition to this Austin also identifies “illocutionary acts such 
as informing, ordering, warning… utterances which have a certain (conventional) 
force”.  The final level of the speech-act identified by Austin is the “perlocutionary 
act”, defined as “what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as 
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convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading” (Austin, 
1962: 108).   
Ricoeur claims that these different aspects of the speech-act provide us with a 
resource for articulating the way in which the dialectic of event and meaning in 
discourse can become fixed in writing (Ricoeur, 1981h: 200).  They lend themselves 
to fixation insofar as the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of a 
speech-act represent an “exteriorisation” that can be captured, to differing extents, in 
terms of linguistic and grammatical codes and conventions.  In particular, Ricoeur is 
interested in the “locutionary” and “illocutionary” aspects of speech-acts.56   
According to Ricoeur, the locutionary act “exteriorises itself in the sentence” 
in the sense that a sentence asserts particular relations between particular terms.  The 
locutionary act is therefore preserved by writing insofar as we identify the utterance 
as having some particular and identifiable sense and reference that can be expressed 
in a written sentence.  The “illocutionary act”, meanwhile, is described as being 
“exteriorised through grammatical paradigms”.  This is to suggest that the 
illocutionary act is captured via the features of a sentence indicative of its 
grammatical mode.  Ricoeur lists the “indicative, imperative, and subjunctive modes, 
and other procedures expressive of illocutionary force” as examples of the 
grammatical paradigms within which the illocutionary act is captured in writing, 
though he also recognises that prosody plays an important role in the illocutionary 
                                               
56 Ricoeur largely marginalises the “perlocutionary” aspect of discourse, describing it as “the least 
inscribable aspect of discourse”. He argues that the perlocutionary aspect of discourse is also “what is 
the least discourse in discourse. It is the discourse as stimulus.” As such it is also the least 
“meaningful” aspect of discourse, confined instead to working “energetically” upon the “emotions 
and affective dispositions” of my interlocutor (Ricoeur, 1981h: 200). Were we to pursue Ricoeur’s 
appropriation of speech-act theory further, however, we may wish to ask whether discourse as 
“stimulus” might not sometimes be of interest to the interpreter of action, and whether the possibility 
of “fixing” the “perlocutionary” force of action might not therefore be of more importance than 
Ricoeur seems to suggest. 
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force of speech and concedes that “illocutionary force is less completely inscribed in 
grammar” than propositional meaning (Ricoeur, 1981h: 199-200). 
 Based upon this analysis of the way in which different aspects of the speech-
act lend themselves to exteriorisation in writing, Ricoeur goes on to argue that it is 
possible to conceive of action as similarly structured.  In a manner analogous to the 
way in which the fixation of oral discourse in writing is “made possible by a 
dialectic of intentional exteriorisation immanent to the speech-act itself”, Ricoeur 
argues that within action there exists “a similar dialectic” which “prepares the 
detachment of the meaning of the action from the event of the action” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 204). 
There are, however, good reasons to be wary of uncritically identifying 
meaningful action too closely with the narrower realm of speech-acts.  Austin, for 
example, claims that speech-acts contrast with “ordinary physical actions” insofar as, 
within physical action, “the minimum physical action… being a bodily movement, 
[is] in pari materia with at least many of its immediate and natural consequences” 
(Austin, 1962: 112).  This refers to the way in which the immediate consequences of 
physical actions are most commonly physical effects: e.g. if I clap my hands 
together, a noise is produced.  In contrast to this, Austin argues that the 
consequences of such a speech-act are “not normally other acts of saying 
something”, but are instead frequently manifest in terms of people doing rather than 
saying something.   
Austin describes this difference in kind between the speech-act and its effects 
as a “natural break in the chain, which is wanting in the case of physical actions” 
(Austin, 1962: 112).  This natural break, for Austin, marks the speech-act as 
importantly distinct from physical action.  Ricoeur, of course, is not primarily 
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concerned with the idea of “minimum physical action”.  Ricoeur argues, contrary to 
Austin’s distinction, that action considered as meaningful is subject to convention in 
a manner similar to language and, in particular, to the speech-act.57  This is because 
understanding action as meaningful, rather than simply as a chain of physical events, 
involves engaging with the established structures of meaning and practice by which 
an action has some particular meaning. 
This is perhaps most overtly evident in the case of ceremonial or ritual action.  
For example, we cannot even begin to understand religious rites such as the Christian 
Communion if we reduce the actions performed therein to their purely physical 
dimension.  The Eucharist, for the believer, is an act of worship and of communion 
with God.  This, however, is far from overtly evident on the surface of the actions 
that comprise the liturgy.  The rite of Communion, for example, is an important part 
of liturgical practice within many Christian denominations, and revolves around the 
symbolic re-enactment of the Last Supper of Jesus Christ in which consecrated bread 
and wine are shared with the congregation by a priest, but if we were to describe this 
in purely physical terms – as merely a protracted distribution of wafers and wine – 
we could in no way claim to have understood what we have witnessed.   
This distinction is exploited for literary effect by Leo Tolstoy in his novel 
Resurrection.  Therein Tolstoy has his narrator describe the rituals of Communion 
from a perspective which deliberately alienates the events described from their 
symbolic resonance.  Thus, he describes the way in which “the priest, having robed 
in a peculiar, strange and very inconvenient garment of gold cloth, cut and arranged 
little bits of bread on a saucer, and then put most of them into a cup with wine, at the 
                                               
57 Ricoeur writes, for example, that “to understand what a promise is, we have to understand what the 
‘essential condition’ is according to which a given action ‘counts as’ a promise” and that this “covers 
both the ‘matter’ (propositional content) and the ‘quality’ (the illocutionary force)” of the action at 
hand (Ricoeur, 1981h: 205). 
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same time repeating various names and prayers” (Tolstoy, 1966: 180).  And although 
Tolstoy’s narrator identifies the connection between the sacraments and the events of 
The Last Supper, there is an air of anthropological detachment in his description of 
the “supposition” that “the bits of bread cut up by the priest and put into the wine, 
when manipulated and prayed over in a certain way are transformed into the body 
and blood of God” (Tolstoy, 1966: 181). 
Tolstoy achieves this by describing the rites of Communion in primarily 
physical terms.  The “manipulations” performed by the priest are represented not in 
terms of the ceremonial preparation and consecration of an offering to God, but 
primarily in physical terms.  The priest is described as “uniformly raising his arms 
and holding them aloft… then sinking to his knees and kissing the table and the 
objects on it” and as having “picked up a napkin in both hands and rhythmically and 
smoothly waved it over the saucer and the golden cup” (Tolstoy, 1966: 181).  
Tolstoy strips the priest’s actions of their symbolic meaning, presenting them instead 
as empty physical gestures incapable of achieving their supposed aims.  By doing so 
Tolstoy is offering a criticism of the perceived hypocrisy of organised religion, 
suggesting that the ritual surrounding worship is merely procedural, and thus 
obscures the fact that its practitioners do not live by the values of which their 
liturgical practices are supposedly representative.  This critical intention, of course, 
depends precisely upon the fact that we would ordinarily understand the actions 
described as meaningful; Tolstoy subverts our familiar understanding of the 
Eucharist as an act of worship enmeshed in Christian tradition by presenting us with 
a “minimal” version of these actions, divested of the symbolic meanings by which 
we would usually understand them.  The representation of Communion in terms of 
the “minimum physical action” involved is thus deliberately inadequate. 
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We need not, however, restrict ourselves to ceremonial or ritualised action 
such as this in order to understand how describing action in terms of its “immediate 
physical effects” deprives it of its meaningful dimension.  Rather, and as Ricoeur 
argues elsewhere, understanding human action as meaningful involves recognising it 
as “at once a certain configuration of physical movements and an accomplishment 
capable of being interpreted in terms of reasons for acting which explain it” 
(Ricoeur, 1992: 66).  We must, therefore, attempt to understand action in relation to 
the conventions and structures of meaning that allow us to understand it as 
something to which a motive can be attached, and as something attributable to a 
responsible agent, and not merely as a physical event with purely physical 
consequences. 
The noise produced when I clap my hands together, for example, is a 
physical effect of the physical action.  Understanding this as a meaningful action, 
however, demands that we consider why I may have done so, and in what context the 
action is performed.  If I am a teacher trying to attract the attention of an unruly 
class, the sharp, loud noise produced by clapping my hands together may serve to 
command the attention of my charges and allow me to continue with my work as an 
educator.  If, later in the day and looking to unwind after work, I decide to go to the 
theatre and am party to a dramatic performance of the highest quality, I might join 
with the audience in offering the performers a round of applause, once more 
exploiting the possibility of producing a noise by clapping my hands together.  These 
latter circumstances differ from the former, however, in that I am no longer looking 
to command the attention of an audience of disobedient students, but am now part of 
an audience looking to express their collective admiration for what they have just 
witnessed. 
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There may, of course, be important physical differences between the way in 
which I clap my hands in the former case and the latter, and this physical difference 
may be integral to the difference in meaning between the two outwardly similar 
actions.  We cannot, however, reduce this difference in meaning to the physical 
differences involved in the performance of these actions.  We must also take into 
account considerations such as the different environments in which the two different 
actions are performed, and the difference of intention between using the noise 
produced by a handclap to attract the attention of others and participating in an 
ovation.  Recognising this difference, and discerning between these alternative 
possibilities, is at least as much an aspect of understanding my behaviour as an 
action as perceiving the physical effects caused by my bodily movements.  The 
“physical” and the “meaningful” dimensions of action are, however, inseparable, and 
it is insofar as the conventionally established structures of meaning are identifiable 
within the physical dimension of an action that its meaning is manifest.  It is 
therefore the “conventional” nature of meaningful action that means that, like the 
speech-act, it is possible to identify an action as meaningful, and likewise that opens 
meaningful action to the possibility of fixation in the sense discussed by Ricoeur. 
Herein we begin to encounter a slightly paradoxical aspect of Ricoeur’s 
appropriation of Austin’s work on speech-act theory. As evidenced by Austin’s 
reference to the “natural break” between speech-acts and their effects, part of the 
reason Austin develops his theory of the speech-act is to distinguish between action 
in general and speech-acts in particular.  In conceiving of action in terms of its 
meaning, however, Ricoeur subverts this distinction.  Understood in terms of its 
meaning, “physical” action cannot be reduced to its physical manifestations, but has 
also to be considered as a form of meaningful trans-action.  This is why, although 
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clapping my hands together has a set of immediate physical consequences, 
understanding the significance of this action and the effect it is likely to have upon 
those around me demands that we pay attention to the situation in which it is enacted 
and my motivations for doing so.  Likewise, if we are to understand the actions of 
the priest performing Mass, and the way in which the congregation understand and 
responds to these actions, we need to be aware of the traditions and institutions of 
which they are part.  In cases such as these we can see how the natural break 
identified by Austin might also apply to actions other than speech-acts. 
However, as well as undermining the distinction Austin wishes to make 
between speech-acts and action in general, Ricoeur’s use of speech-act theory in 
order to characterise the meaning of action leaves us very little grasp of how 
linguistic meaning and the meaning of action might be importantly different from 
one another.  Ricoeur’s identification of meaningful action with the speech-act 
therefore carries with it the risk of presupposing the linguistic structure of 
meaningful action.  This presupposition is arguably evident in Ricoeur’s claim that 
action is “propositional”.   
The propositional nature of meaningful action, according to Ricoeur, is 
primarily evident via “action-sentences” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 204).  The “action-
sentence” is importantly distinct from the speech-act.  A speech-act is a performative 
sentence, an example of which would be the sentence “Shoot her!” uttered as an 
order.  An action-sentence, by comparison, is a description of some particular action: 
“The officer shouted ‘Shoot her!’ to the soldier”, for example.  So while the 
conventional dimension of the speech-act is evident insofar as the speech-act is 
already structured linguistically, the posited conventional quality of the wider 
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category of meaningful action is, according to Ricoeur, evident insofar as it is 
reflected in the ways in which action is captured by description.  
 What remains largely untouched upon by Ricoeur, however, is the 
constitutive role that description plays in the meaningfulness of action.58  An action-
sentence is always an example of action already described in some particular way, 
and it is impossible to separate out the question of the meaning of an action-sentence 
from this act of description.  Consequently, it is far from clear to what extent the 
structure of meaningful action identified by Ricoeur as being “mirrored” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 205) in action-sentences may actually be a property of the way in which we 
describe action linguistically.  In order to support his claims about the “propositional 
structure of action” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 204), Ricoeur appeals to the work of Anthony 
Kenny in Action, Emotion and Will.  But although Kenny does say that he aims to 
“clarify the concept of action by considering the special logical properties of the 
finite verbs which we employ to support actions” (Kenny, 2003: 106), this is still 
some distance from the claims about the “structure” of action to which end Ricoeur 
attempts to employ Kenny’s arguments in support. 
 The parts of Kenny’s work drawn upon primarily by Ricoeur are chapter 
seven of Action, Emotion and Will in which he attempts to draw “a broad distinction 
between actions and relations” (Kenny, 2003: 119), and chapter eight in which he 
works to draw distinctions between various action verbs and their use to describe 
“states”, “performances” and “activities” (Kenny, 2003: 120-30).  And though such 
an inquiry is undoubtedly valuable for clarifying our use of the language of action, 
and perhaps even indicates that there may be certain things about action that call for 
linguistic representation, or suggest that the ways in which we speak about action 
                                               
58 The role played by description in constituting meaningful action as an object of inquiry is discussed 
in greater depth in the fourth chapter of this thesis.   
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help to determine how we understand it as meaningful, this does not equate to 
Ricoeur’s claim that the “propositional” structure of action has been “clearly and 
demonstratively expounded” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 204) in Kenny’s work.  It is far from 
clear, based upon Ricoeur’s arguments, what the relationship between action-
sentences and the action they purport to describe is supposed to be, beyond a 
putative “mirroring” between the two.   
Certainly, in order for Ricoeur to defend his claims about the “structure” of 
action, he at least needs a more thoroughgoing account of the relationship between 
meaningful action and the languages in which it is described and articulated.  We 
cannot, therefore, use the structure of action-sentences as evidence of a (similar) 
structure within action itself unless we have good reason to think that meaningful 
action is the kind of thing which can be articulated thusly without the meaning of 
action being merely subsumed under the meaning of the sentences in which it is 
expressed, and even then we must be very careful not to overlook the role that 
description plays in presenting action in some particular and determinate way.  
Along these lines, the sociologist John Thompson observes that “if anything may be 
said to have a ‘propositional content’ that can be identified and reidentified as the 
same, then it is surely these [action-]sentences and not the actions which they 
describe” (Thompson, 1981a: 126).  We should not, therefore, confuse meaningful 
action with its verbal representation.  The meaning of an action, after all, is 
something we intuitively understand as part of our day-to-day experience of the 
world around us, independently of its potential for “objectification” via description.59 
Ricoeur, of course, is careful to point out that within “The Model of the Text” 
he is discussing action under the condition of fixation, taken as an object of inquiry 
                                               
59 If, for example, J.L. Austin were to approach me “gently swinging a big stick” (Austin, 1962: 118), 
I would not get far in life if I needed this to be described for me before I could get out of the way. 
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within the human and social sciences.60  The fact that we have an understanding of 
action independently of its availability to us as an “object” of reflection needn’t in 
itself be a problem for Ricoeur.  But insofar as speech-act theory and action 
sentences are supposed to help articulate the way in which action is susceptible to 
fixation in the first place, it is arguable that Ricoeur ends up begging the question.  
By finding evidence for the linguistic structure of meaningful action in the ways in 
which it is “mirrored” in action-sentences, he risks conflating meaningful action with 
its linguistic expression.  This leaves us almost entirely unclear as to whether there 
might be important features of the meaningfulness of action that cannot be 
represented linguistically, and whether certain aspects of the meaning of action 
might therefore be lost under the condition of “fixation” which is integral to the 
textual paradigm.61  
Ricoeur’s appropriation of speech-act theory serves a particular purpose by 
emphasising the way in which the meaningfulness of action is to some extent 
conventional in a manner similar to linguistic meaning, and the way in which the 
“exteriorisation” of meaningful action can in turn lend itself to the objectification of 
action via a process of fixation analogous to the inscription of spoken discourse in 
writing.  But, insofar as it fails to acknowledge either the possibility that there are 
aspects of the meaningfulness of action that defy linguistic description or the 
constitutive role played by description in the objectification of action, it remains 
deeply problematic.  Ricoeur’s recourse to speech-act theory, then, falls short of the 
                                               
60 Ricoeur goes so far as to say that “[m]eaningful action is an object for science only under the 
condition of a kind of objectification which is equivalent to the fixation of discourse by writing” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 203). 
 
61 Possible points of disanalogy between text and action of this kind are discussed in greater detail 
elsewhere in this thesis.  For example, the potential for visual representations of action to preserve a 
“plenitude of detail” lost within linguistic description is addressed in chapter two of this thesis 
(section 2.4) and the ethnomethodological principle of recognising action as an ongoing and dynamic 
phenomenon that resists objectification is discussed in chapter five (section 5.4 onwards). 
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desired end of helping us to understand how meaningful action lends itself to being 
fixed as an object of interpretive inquiry.  In order to better understand the 
limitations of and possibilities afforded by “The Model of the Text” to the human 
and social sciences, it is necessary to consider the “meaningfulness” of action in 
greater depth. 
 
3.2: Thick & Thin Description 
 A very useful initial distinction to make is Gilbert Ryle’s formulation of the 
difference between “thick” and “thin” descriptions of action.  This broad 
discrimination between two ways in which it is possible to describe action 
immediately confronts us with the importance of description to how we understand 
action as meaningful.  Ryle’s famous example of the difference between thick and 
thin description involves winking: 
Two boys fairly swiftly contract the eyelids of their right eyes. In the 
first boy this is only an involuntary twitch; but the other is winking 
conspiratorially to an accomplice. At the lowest or the thinnest level 
of description the two contractions of the eyelids may be exactly 
alike…Yet there remains the immense but unphotographable 
difference between a twitch and a wink. (Ryle, 1968)   
 
By describing what the second boy does as a “wink” we are drawing upon a set of 
socially established, if usually tacit, codes and conventions by which we can judge 
certain contractions of the eyelid to be a wink and as something qualitatively 
separate from an involuntary twitch.  A description which captures this difference is 
what Ryle refers to as a “thick” description.  The “thin” description, on the other 
hand, simply refers to the physical phenomena involved in the twitch/wink and 
makes no more nuanced distinction. 
 Furthermore, Ryle introduces a third winker who parodies the clumsy wink 
of the second boy.  Ryle observes once again that there is a vital difference between 
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the “thin” and “thick” description we might offer of the parodist’s action: “The 
thinnest description of what the… parodist is doing is, roughly, the same as for the 
involuntary eyelid twitch; but its thick description is a many-layered sandwich, of 
which only the bottom slice is catered for by the thinnest description” (Ryle, 1968).  
To understand this third wink as a parody we need not only to draw upon the codes 
and conventions that distinguish the wink from the twitch, but also those that make 
sense of the concept of parody: in this case by self-consciously exaggerating the 
clumsiness of the original winker.   
According to Ryle, this difference cannot be captured in the “thin” physical 
description of the contracting eyelid alone.  We could, perhaps, claim that it would 
be possible for us to tell that there was a difference between the twitch/wink/parody 
simply by comparing photographs of the three, even if it would not be easy to 
describe what the qualitative difference was between them.  Indeed, it may prove 
very difficult to attempt to delineate the difference between thick and thin 
description as cleanly as this simplified version of Ryle’s example suggests.  The 
“thickness” of a description is more intricately related to the physicality of what is 
being described than is perhaps suggested by referring to the “bottom layer” of a 
description being the “thinnest”.  The careful exaggeration involved in parodying a 
wink, for example, gives us some indication of how the nuances of the physical 
“thin” description are essential to us being able to articulate and understand the 
action being described “thickly”. 
Even so, we can certainly make sense of the distinction between describing 
an object or an action in terms of its physical appearance and in terms of it being an 
action with some particular meaning.  A wink is different from a twitch in part 
because it is an intentional action subject to intersubjectively agreed standards of 
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success and failure: if we were to contract both eyelids whilst attempting to wink, for 
example, we would have failed.  In contrast to this, it is meaningless to say that a 
twitch has failed.  A thick description attempts to capture some meaningful aspect of 
an action in this fashion.  Already here we are forced to engage with the 
“conventional” quality of action that Ricoeur attempts to articulate via speech-act 
theory.   
However, by engaging with action on the “thick” level of meaning, and as 
indicated by the fine line that exists between a wink and its parody, we are also 
confronted with the potential for ambiguity in how we understand the particular 
action at hand.  To identify and describe a wink as a parody involves drawing upon a 
different set of conventions and circumstantial features rather than simply describing 
it as a clumsy wink, and certainly more so than describing either purely in terms of 
being a contraction of the eyelid.  This possibility for offering alternative 
descriptions which subtly alter how we understand the meaning of action will 
typically grow along with the complexity of the action or actions that we are 
describing.  A single linguistic representation of an action may therefore be 
insufficient to capture its meaning, and even a number of descriptions may only 
constitute an approximation of the action.  So although the possibilities of 
understanding opened to us are to a large extent constrained by the action itself, 
meaning that there are always going to be a finite number of legitimate possible 
descriptions we can make of an action,62 we can nevertheless begin to see how the 
description of action can be integral to our understanding of it as meaningful. 
 
 
                                               
62 We would not ordinarily, for example, understand the action of Ryle’s wink-parodist as expressive 
of a deep and profound yearning for freedom without a fairly extensive back story being offered to fill 
in the gaps. 
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3.3: “Linguistic” & “Experiential” Meaning 
While Ryle’s distinction captures an important difference between 
understanding action in “thick” terms as meaningful and in “thin” terms purely as a 
physical event, we need still to consider in greater depth what it is about how we 
understand action that gives it this “thickness”.  Charles Taylor’s comments on the 
nature of the meaning of action provide a useful starting point for this task, and also 
serve to return us to the important distinction between the meaning of action and 
“linguistic meaning”.  This latter distinction is of vital import for Ricoeur’s project 
in “The Model of the Text”. 
Ricoeur discusses the way in which action may be fixed as an object of 
inquiry, and draws an analogy between this and the fixation of discourse in texts.  
However, his appeal to speech-act theory in order to support this claim, as I have 
argued, risks conflating meaningful action with the action-sentences in which it can 
become an object.  What is required is reason to believe that action – which is 
typically experienced as meaningful prior to any objectification it might undergo – is 
the kind of thing which can be objectified and brought to linguistic discourse without 
its meaning being lost or distorted to the point where we are simply imposing 
meanings upon action within our descriptions and interpretations.  Taylor’s account 
of meaningful action in the human sciences points to some important characteristics 
of meaningful action in this regard, and in doing so offers useful traction on how it is 
possible to bring meaningful action to the discourse of the human and social 
sciences. 
Taylor identifies three features in particular as characteristic of the 
“meaning” of human action.  The first of these is that, insofar as action is 
meaningful, it is meaningful for an understanding subject: “it is not the meaning of 
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the situation in vacuo, but its meaning for a subject, a specific subject, a group of 
subjects, or perhaps what its meaning is for the human subject as such” (Taylor, 
1979: 32).  This condition recognises that human behaviour can only properly be 
recognised as meaningful action insofar as it is understood as subjectively and 
intersubjectively meaningful by one or more individuals in some social environment, 
and that understanding the meaning of action requires that we have some 
understanding of meaningfulness for someone and in a specific social context. 
Taylor’s second characteristic of meaningful action is that it is always 
possible to make a distinction between the “given element – situation, action, or 
whatever – and its meaning” (Taylor, 1979: 32-33).  The “given element”, in this 
context, refers to the physically observable elements of some particular action in a 
concrete situation.  The distinction being made here is to some extent an abstraction.  
Taylor points out that although we can always characterise an action in terms of its 
“given element”, the two are nevertheless not “physically separable” if we are to 
identify the action as an action compared to a mere physical phenomenon.  We can 
bracket the meaning of an action, and thus offer “two descriptions” of the given 
element of an action, either purely in terms of its physical manifestation or in terms 
of its “meaning for the subject” (Taylor, 1979: 33).  But this always remains a 
possibility of describing the same phenomenon in two different ways, and as such 
can only amount to a temporary bracketing of meaning.   
Finally, the third feature of the meaning of action identified by Taylor is that 
“things only have meaning in a field, that is, in relation to the meaning of other 
things.”  The “field” of meanings described by Taylor refers to the background of 
intersubjectively and institutionally constituted conventions of practice and social 
meaning against which meaningful human interaction occurs.  This highlights the 
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essentially social nature of meaningful action, insofar as there is “no such thing as a 
single, unrelated meaningful element” of action (Taylor, 1979: 33).  This emphasis 
upon “fields” of meaning and the distinction between “given element” and 
“meaning” works to show us that, in order to identify an action as meaningful, we 
must also engage with the wider field of meanings to which it belongs.  Depending 
on how we understand these different elements within a field of meaning as relating 
to one another, we bring different aspects of the meaning of an action to the fore in 
the descriptions and interpretations we make of it. 
All objectification within the human and social sciences involves a certain 
level of abstraction, as it involves stepping back from the stream of experiences in 
which we are pre-reflectively immersed and identifying some course of events as a 
determinate sequence of actions.  Depending on which features of the course of 
events in question have been selected as significant and which we might have 
omitted or marginalised, the way in which action is represented as a determinate 
sequence of this kind will to some extent delimit the possibilities of understanding 
that are disclosed to us as interpreters.  We need, therefore, to be conscious of the 
way in which action is represented as an object of reflection, even prior to any 
explicitly “interpretive” engagement we might have with action. 
The issues of how action lends itself to objectification and the difference 
between linguistic meaning and our experience of action as meaningful are ones that 
Taylor is careful to address.  Under Taylor’s account, action is meaningful insofar as 
it is embodied or articulated within a network of meanings in a way that makes it 
available for understanding by some subject.  He is aware, however, that this 
definition of meaning is close to many definitions of linguistic meaning.  With this in 
mind, he attempts to distinguish between the kind of meaning he considers as 
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specific to action – what he refers to as “experiential meaning” – and linguistic 
meaning by claiming that linguistic meaning is “of signifiers and… about a world of 
referents” (Taylor, 1979: 34).  Taylor here draws attention to the way in which a 
linguistic statement is about something beyond itself, whereas action as we 
experience it in our day-to-day lives simply has meaning as part of our ongoing 
activities and social inter-actions.63  Given this difference, it is important to 
understand the way in which experiential and linguistic meaning are related to one 
another, and how it is that we can bring meaningful action into linguistic discourse 
as an object of reflection. 
 
3.4: The Sprachlichkeit of Action 
Taylor claims that the possibility of bringing meaningful action to linguistic 
discourse lies in the ground shared in common by both linguistic and experiential 
meaning: that both “kinds” of meaning are rooted in “[t]he range of human desires, 
feelings, emotions, and hence meanings” that are definitive of human experience of 
life as meaningful.  These aspects of human experience are themselves, according to 
Taylor, “inseparable from the distinctions and categories marked by the language 
people speak” (Taylor, 1979: 36-37).  We cannot, therefore, think of there being two 
radically distinct kinds of meaning.  While both “linguistic” and “experiential” 
meaning are different from one another in a number of important ways, and while it 
is important not to lose sight of these differences, both emerge from and are 
                                               
63 We may wish to be wary of the extent to which this distinction simplifies both our experience of 
language and action.  The illocutionary and perlocutionary elements of the speech-act, for example, 
demonstrate one way in which linguistic meaning cannot be reduced to simply designating something 
outside of itself.  Similarly, the notion of textual reference developed by Ricoeur is not one in which 
we think of the text as pointing to something beyond itself, but of disclosing something before us as 
readers. 
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inextricably part of how human beings understand themselves, other people and the 
world and societies of which they are part. 
It would be wrong, therefore, to claim that linguistic and experiential 
meaning could be entirely heterogeneous.  Given this, Taylor writes that “human 
behavior seen as action of agents who desire and are moved, who have goals and 
aspirations, necessarily offers a purchase for descriptions in terms of meaning” 
(Taylor, 1979: 38).  The descriptions we might offer of meaningful human action 
remain, in a sense, abstractions insofar as they isolate and fix a course of events that 
we experience as meaningful only within the broader context of a life as it is lived.  
But the language in which this “objectification” of action takes place is an integral 
part of, and has its basis in, the same realm of human concerns and interests as those 
by which our actions and experiences are meaningful. 
A similar relationship between linguistic and experiential meaning is 
sometimes expressed by reference to the “linguisticality” of experience.  In 
Gadamerian terms, the linguistic condition of experience – Sprachlichkeit – refers to 
the “intimate unity of language and thought” (Gadamer, 1993: 402) definitive of 
human experience of the world.  Gadamer argues that such an “intimate unity” must 
be a precondition of the possibility of conscious experience itself, and that 
understanding is a fundamentally verbal phenomenon.64  The idea that our 
experience and understanding are the kind of things which find expression in 
language, and that our “meaningful” experience of the world is therefore intimately 
related to the possibility of bringing experience to language, is an important 
influence upon Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy.  Ricoeur, however, conceives 
                                               
64 Gadamer’s version of Sprachlichkeit, however, makes no distinction between what we have termed 
“linguistic” and “experiential” meaning, claiming rather that linguistic expression “shares in the pure 
ideality of the meaning that communicates itself in it” (Gadamer, 1993: 392). 
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Sprachlichkeit in more modest terms than those of Gadamer’s prioritisation of 
language as the universal medium of all understanding, allowing instead for the 
possibility of a more complicated and reciprocal relationship between “experiential” 
and “linguistic” meaning.65 
For Ricoeur, linguistic understanding is neither the primary nor exclusive 
form that our experience of the world as meaningful might take place.66  Rather, the 
possibility of speaking meaningfully and achieving understanding within verbal 
discourse is first premised upon our meaningful engagement with the world, 
including but not limited to linguistic phenomena.  At the same time, however, the 
possibility of engaging in linguistic discourse (both verbal and textual) constitutes an 
important dimension of many of the practices and experiences in which we find 
ourselves as participants, and our “experiential” and “linguistic” understanding of 
these cannot therefore be easily separated from one another.  Human relationships, 
for example, are not meaningful because we have various ways of talking about and 
categorising them, but our experience of them as meaningful is effectively 
inseparable from the various symbolic mediations – including linguistic discourses – 
which we inherit, adopt and create in order to communicate and understand these 
experiences. 
Neither “experiential” nor “linguistic” meaning as we typically understand 
them can be conceived of in isolation.  Both are rooted in the way we live our lives 
                                               
65 Even limiting ourselves to the relatively narrow realm of textual interpretation, Gadamer’s position 
would seem to fail to reflect our experience of understanding something as meaningful.  As argued by 
Deborah Cook in her paper “Reflections on Gadamer's Notion of Sprachlichkeit”, the “understanding 
of words may well take place outside of the particular language game we are playing and be 
extralinguistic” (Cook, 1986: 90).  Given this, Cook argues that Sprachlichkeit should instead be 
considered “a derived phenomenon… the externalized and communicable forms understanding and 
tradition… take once the reader is ready to share it with others” (Cook, 1986: 91). 
 
66 Ricoeur claims, for example, that “hermeneutic philosophy begins with the experience of art, which 
is not necessarily linguistic”, and that “[t]exts, documents and monuments represent only one 
mediation [of historicised experience] among others” (Ricoeur, 1981c: 117). 
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with, for and amongst one another, in a world with many established practices and 
ways of living into which we are born and within which we have to find our way.  So 
while experience, for Ricoeur, retains “an expressibility in principle” (Ricoeur, 
1981c: 115) insofar as the languages we speak and understand are an integral part of 
our experience of the world around us, this is balanced against the presupposition 
that the “linguistic order” itself refers back “to the structure of experience” (Ricoeur, 
1981c: 118).  Within this framework it is possible to maintain the distinction 
between “linguistic” and “experiential” meaning, but without having to conceive of 
them as radically heterogeneous to one another.  The relationship is rather a circular 
one in which language is only meaningful against a background of meaningful 
experience, but wherein our experience is developed and articulated via the kind of 
symbolic mediation we find in language.67 
Thus, linguistic and experiential meaning are both intentional human 
phenomena rooted in the human condition, and neither of them would be as we know 
it without the other:  if it were not grounded in meaningful experience, language 
would be an empty play of signs; similarly, our experience of the world would be 
condemned to remain inarticulate if it were not for the kind of symbolic mediation 
we find in language.  The potential for the objectification of human experience, and 
particularly in bringing experience to language, is therefore an integral part of the 
way in which we experience life as meaningful.  By objectifying action we step back 
from it as it is experienced immediately, and instead reflect upon it as meaningful.  It 
is this act of reflection that Ricoeur describes as “the appropriation of our effort to 
exist and of our desire to be by means of the works which testify to this effort and 
this desire” (Ricoeur, 1989a: 17). 
                                               
67 Ricoeur writes, for example, that “[e]xperience can be said, it demands to be said. To bring it to 
language is not to change it into something else, but, in articulating and developing it, to make it 
become itself” (Ricoeur, 1981c: 115). 
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Taking action as an object of reflection is therefore an important means by 
which we as understanding subjects appropriate the meanings of our actions as our 
own, and by which we seek to explicate our understanding of action.  One of the key 
ways in which we do this, especially within the context of the discourse of the 
human sciences, is by bringing action to language.  This is still an abstraction of 
sorts from our pre-reflective experience of action, but not an illegitimate one. 
Ricoeur claims that discourse “attempts, in all its usages, to carry an 
experience to language, a manner of inhabiting and of being-in-the-world, which 
precedes it and demands to be said” (Ricoeur, 1995: 38).  It is the “surplus of sense 
in living experience” (Ricoeur, 1981c: 119) which hermeneutic interpretation seeks 
to explicate, via the kind of objectification that takes place in description.  It is 
possible that Ricoeur is taking the “expressibility” of meaningful action for granted 
when he presents his idea of meaning in terms of the speech-act, simply using the 
speech-act as a way of categorising some of the ways in which action is meaningful 
and how this might be captured linguistically.68  But if he is doing so he is not only 
offering a drastically simplified version of the relationship between action and 
language, but risks over-estimating the adequacy of description and obscuring 
precisely those elements of meaningful action that are most difficult, or even 
impossible, to articulate in language. 
Due to the richness of experience, it is unlikely that any single interpretation 
or description of action will capture everything there might be to say about it.  We 
need, therefore, to first acknowledge the complicated relationship between 
                                               
68 The ubiquity of Sprachlichkeit for Ricoeur is, for example, perhaps evident when he writes that 
“[e]very hermeneutics… culminates in the concept of Sprachlichkeit” (Ricoeur, 1981b: 78).  We may 
then, to some extent, be justified in believing that the concept of Sprachlichkeit is taken for granted in 
the background of his comments regarding action and the speech-act, but even if this is the case it 
nevertheless demands explication before we can understand how the speech-act might begin to inform 
our understanding of the objectification of action. 
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meaningful action and our attempts to articulate this in language before we can hope 
to use linguistic and textual paradigms in order to explore and understand 
meaningful action.  But, despite this, the “linguisticality” of action – the way in 
which action lends itself to expression and objectification in language – is of vital 
importance insofar as we wish to gain an explicit, critical and reflective 
understanding of the way in which action has meaning in our lives.  It is this 
Sprachlichkeit of experience which permits the possibility of articulating meaningful 
action in language, and therefore of “fixing” action as an object of inquiry via the 
detour of description. 
The purpose of this chapter has so far been to examine how “meaningful” 
human action might lend itself to fixation.  Ricoeur’s appeal to speech-act theory 
attempts to do this by arguing for a de facto “mirroring” between the structure of 
meaningful sentences and meaningful action, but in doing so risks conflating the 
two.  I have instead drawn upon the Sprachlichkeit of meaningful action as a way of 
articulating the relationship between meaningful action and its linguistic expression, 
doing so on the basis that the meaning of both action and language is rooted in the 
practices, intentionality and lived experiences of human existence.   So although the 
meaning of action is not subsequent to or drawn from language, our understanding of 
action as meaningful is inseparable from the linguistic practices in which human 
experience is discussed and articulated.   
If it is possible to “fix” action via linguistic description, I suggest, it is 
because both language and action are meaningful as part of wider human experience 
within the world and society.  However, the notion of this Sprachlichkeit being the 
condition for bringing meaningful action to linguistic discourse leaves largely 
underdetermined the particular form these linguistic expressions will take, and thus 
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maintains a place for description as an active dimension of the objectification and 
interpretation of action.  Articulating the relationship between action and language in 
terms of Sprachlichkeit therefore allows us to understand how action might lend 
itself to objectification in language, but without the stronger claim to have 
discovered any particular structure of action “mirrored” in these very linguistic 
expressions of action.  
 
3.5: Meaningless Action 
The possibility of bringing meaningful action to linguistic discourse as an 
“object” of inquiry is a vital premise within “The Model of the Text” and the attempt 
Ricoeur makes to apply textual hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful 
action therein.  However, the “fixation” of action as an object of inquiry, for which 
Ricoeur argues that the text is an appropriate model, is not necessarily always 
centred upon the idea of meaning in the way that both “The Model of the Text” and 
my own appeal to Sprachlichkeit are.  Some thinkers, particularly within those areas 
of sociology and psychology influenced by positivism, advocate a conception of 
human action in which the “meaning” of action is considered insignificant, and even 
as an obstacle to the kind of objectivity to which scientific inquiry should aspire.  
Rather, they hope to be able to explain human behaviour by appeal to objective and 
observable categories, independent of reference to the self-understanding of those 
being observed.  If we are to appeal to the “linguisticality” of action in order to 
support Ricoeur’s aim of using textual hermeneutics to illuminate the interpretive 
practices of the human and social sciences, it is important that we do not take the 
meaningfulness of action for granted, and are able to justify our interest in the 
“meaning” of action against the challenge potentially posed to this by positivism. 
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Within psychology one such “positivistic” approach is behaviourism, in 
which action is considered not as an intentional phenomenon, but as a set of physical 
regularities that occur in response to the environmental conditions in which they are 
manifest.  The proposed advantage of this kind of approach to studying human 
behaviour is that it renders the language in which the analysis of action takes place 
morally neutral and objective, thereby allowing us to examine behaviour with the 
kind of rigour commonly associated with the natural sciences. 
The most prominent proponent of behaviourism of this kind is arguably B.F. 
Skinner. Skinner’s behaviourism accounts for action in terms of “operant 
conditioning”: the way in which behaviour is reputedly caused by “reinforcement” – 
in which the consequences of some behaviour cause it to occur with greater 
frequency – and “punishment” – in which behaviour has consequences that cause it 
to occur less frequently.  Under a behaviourist account of action “the environment 
performs the functions previously assigned to feelings and introspectively observed 
inner states of the organism” (Skinner, 1974: 248).  According to Skinner it is the 
environmental conditions that determine our behaviour, and, by comparison, the 
subjective experience we have of “motives and purposes are at best the effects of 
reinforcements… when a person is ‘aware of his purpose,’ he is feeling or observing 
introspectively a condition produced by reinforcement” (Skinner, 1974: 56-57). 
 Skinner’s behaviourism stands in obvious opposition to the way in which we 
have so far discussed behaviour as being meaningful.  Even if the meaning of an 
action has a certain level of “autonomy”69 and cannot be reduced purely to subjective 
intention, the meaning of action is still inevitably framed in terms of being purposive 
and having human significance. The language of intentionality, and our other 
                                               
69 The “autonomy” of action is discussed by Ricoeur in “The Model of the Text” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 
206-209), and in more detail in the second chapter of this thesis. 
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“everyday” ways of discussing action, therefore still play an irreducible part in 
understanding and analysing the meaning of any action.  In contrast to this, Skinner 
claims that our preoccupation with inner states and subjectivity has simply “stood in 
the way of the inspection of more important things” (Skinner, 1974: 165).  For 
Skinner, there is “no evidence of… inner causes… except the behaviour attributed to 
them” (Skinner, 1974: 159).  We should therefore focus purely on observable 
behaviour if we want to have an “objective” understanding of human action, and 
couching our inquiry in terms of inner or mental states can only cloud this 
observation.  The objectivity proper to scientific inquiry, for the thoroughgoing 
behaviourist, can only be achieved by discussing behaviour purely in terms of the 
way that empirically observable behaviour is affected by empirically observable 
environmental conditions. 
 A similar emphasis upon objectivity, and the accompanying marginalisation 
of our “everyday” conceptions of the meaning of action, is evident in the 
sociological positivism of Emile Durkheim.70  Durkheim argues that sociological 
inquiry has to aspire to the same kind of objectivity achieved by the natural sciences.  
As such, the starting point of his work was to attempt to define the proper object of 
sociology.  This involves identifying trends in social behaviour that exist 
independently of the behaviour of any particular individual.  Durkheim referred to 
these as “social facts”, and defined a social fact as “any way of acting, whether fixed 
or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint”, or something 
in society “which is general over the whole of a given society whist having an 
                                               
70 It is worth, however, distinguishing Durkheim’s exclusion of psychological facts from sociology 
from Skinner’s reductionist approach.  Durkheim rejects psychological concepts – including the 
“everyday” concepts which characterise our experience of action as meaningful – because he thinks 
that social facts are not psychological phenomena. Skinner, by comparison, is not looking for any 
such distinction and argues instead that psychological phenomena can be explained purely in terms of 
the tenets of behaviourism. 
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existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations” (Durkheim, 1982: 
59).  Within this model, we explain social action in terms of the social facts which 
exert their power upon us as individuals.  The coercive power of social facts is in 
turn seen as evidence of their objective existence, and as such means that they 
“cannot be confused… with psychical phenomena, which have no existence save in 
and through the individual consciousness” (Durkheim, 1982: 52).  By comparison, 
such psychical phenomena are merely “crudely formed concepts” (Durkheim, 1982: 
60) that work to confuse any attempt at scientific inquiry into social phenomena. 
For Durkheim the solution to this confusion lies in abandoning our everyday 
understanding of the meaning of social phenomena in favour of a more “scientific” 
form of discourse in which social phenomena are “considered in themselves, 
detached from the conscious beings who form their own mental representations of 
them” (Durkheim, 1982: 70).  Durkheim refers to studying social phenomena in this 
way as studying them “from the outside” (Durkheim, 1982: 70), which in this sense 
refers to a desire to limit properly sociological discourse to discussing that which is 
publically observable and empirically measurable.  Consequently there can be no 
room for speaking about action in terms of the intentions or motives that accompany 
our experience of social phenomena: if social facts originate outside of the 
individual mind, outside of the realm of psychology, then to speak of how they are 
experienced and felt psychically can only confuse matters.  In contrast to this, by 
focussing on the external and observable aspects of social phenomena, Durkheim 
believes that “in order to be objective science” sociology “must start from sense-
perceptions and not from concepts that have been formed independently from it… It 
must therefore create new concepts and to do so must lay aside common notions and 
the words used to express them” (Durkheim, 1982: 81). 
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Although they are importantly different in a number of ways, the work of 
both Durkheim and Skinner is marked by the belief that the way to achieve 
scientific objectivity in the study of human action is to eliminate the kind of 
intentionalist or mentalistic discourse that surrounds and is used to make sense of 
action in everyday life, and to emulate the methods of the natural sciences.  It is 
perhaps misleading to claim that these conceptions of action are “meaningless”.  
Psychology and sociology, whether on the scale of the individual or of society, are 
both deeply concerned with explaining human behaviour, and therefore must believe 
that action can be understood in some form or another, and therefore have some 
kind of “meaning” when considered within the correct context. 
But it is undeniable that both behaviourism and sociology influenced by 
positivism, in the forms outlined above, do not conceive of action as meaningful in 
the way we would recognise in our day-to-day lives, or even as something within 
which subjective and intersubjective meaning are a relevant factor for understanding 
at all.  The elimination of meaning in this manner is motivated by the 
understandable desire to make the study of human behaviour as objective as 
possible.  However, the elimination of everyday meaning in favour of explanatory 
concepts and terminology specific to their fields of study arguably creates more 
problems than it solves, and ultimately could be seen to make such approaches to 
the study of human action and behaviour untenable. 
One thinker who has argued to this effect is Peter Winch.  Winch claims that 
any approach to explaining action that does not at least engage with how agents 
understand their own behaviour is doomed to fail.  He objects, for example, to the 
identification of various different purification rituals with one another as an example 
of a single social phenomenon on the basis that this represents an “illegitimate” 
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abstraction (Winch, 1990: 106) that fails to capture the contextual sensitivities that 
make any action precisely what it is.  Winch argues, by contrast, that it is via 
reference to the “system of ideas or mode of life” (Winch, 1990: 108) of which an 
action is part, expressed by our everyday conceptions of meaning, that we identify it 
as the particular action that it is.  Likewise, in “The Model of the Text” Ricoeur is 
careful to emphasise that recognising the “motivational” and “purposive” 
dimensions of action are central to understanding action qua action, and not simply 
as behavioural phenomena.  Given this, he argues that any explanation we offer to 
make sense of action must be the kind that can “afford a motive understood as a 
reason for… and not as a cause” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 213-14).  Human action, for 
Ricoeur, should always be framed within the “subjective” language of purpose and 
motivation if it is to be recognised as action, and is therefore irreducibly a 
meaningful phenomenon. 
It is not simply that the objectivity aspired to in the work of thinkers such as 
Skinner and Durkheim fails to fully do justice to the phenomena they purport to 
explain, but that it is impossible to identify an action as an action without reference 
to the kind of intentional concepts that such approaches hope to eliminate in the 
name of objectivity.  The problem we face is that any attempt to achieve the kind of 
objectivity associated with the natural sciences within the human sciences will 
necessarily involve at least tacitly drawing upon the “crudely formed concepts” that 
we might have otherwise hoped to marginalise.71  A similar observation is entailed 
by Ryle’s distinction between thick and thin description, in which it is only possible 
to identify some physical – some empirically observable – event as an action by 
                                               
71 Ricoeur makes broadly similar criticisms of Skinner’s behaviourism when he claims that 
behaviourism overlooks the “conditions of possibility of a discourse about human action” (Ricoeur, 
1973: 170), on the basis that “the network of concepts which we use to speak of human action in 
ordinary language is not the conceptual framework of either behaviourism or mentalistic psychology” 
(Ricoeur, 1973: 167). 
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drawing upon socially established conventions of meaning, and that any attempt to 
understand action that fails to account for this will necessarily end up 
misunderstanding action.  
We should not, however, necessarily dismiss the work of thinkers such as 
Skinner and Durkheim out of hand. Although the explanatory methodologies 
described above prove, upon closer critical inspection, to be deeply problematic, the 
emphasis on the importance of objectivity in the study of human action is something 
we must take seriously.  It is important for us to be able to distinguish between 
“good” and “bad” interpretations of action, and to be able to submit both human 
action and the interpretation of human action to critical analysis.  It is a desire for 
objectivity which informs such thinking.  However, and as Winch demonstrates, 
there is a fundamental difference between natural and human phenomena insofar as 
any science of human or social phenomena must be able to account for the way in 
which action is meaningful for the agents of action as well as the observer.  It is 
clear, therefore, that if we wish to achieve objectivity in the human and social 
sciences, we must look for a form of objectivity more suited to the subject matter at 
hand. 
Ricoeur’s textual model for the interpretation of action, via his reformulation 
of the dialectic of “explanation” and “understanding”, provides us with one way of 
conceiving such a form of objectivity.72  It is by means of the fixation of action as an 
object of inquiry that the possibility of explanation arises, but only as part of a 
broader interpretive process in which action is understood as fundamentally 
                                               
72 E.g. Ricoeur’s discussion of the same in relation to the interpretation of meaningful action in “The 
Model of the Text” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 209ff.) The relationship between explanation and understanding, 
thus conceived is also presented within my discussion of Ricoeur’s interpretive theory in the first 
chapter of this thesis (sections 1.2 and 1.3.2). 
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embedded within intersubjectively established frameworks of meaning.73  Herein, 
relying as it does upon temporarily suspending our accedence to the given meaning 
of an action, explanation remains an objective approach to the analysis of action, but 
without having to position ourselves as fundamentally “outside” of that which we are 
seeking to understand.   
To explain action according to this model does not therefore involve rejecting 
the “everyday” and “mentalistic” concepts by which we typically understand action 
as meaningful in our lives, but attempting to explicate the conditions under which 
action is understood in the way that it is (including that of which we would usually 
remain unaware).  As such, explanation in terms of “social facts” or “environmental 
conditions” within the interpretation of action could not, as it is in the positivist 
tradition, be conceived of as an explanation of the causes of action, but rather as an 
explanation of some of the factors that allow us to make sense of an action as 
meaningful.  Thus Ricoeur’s model of interpretation allows for the possibility of 
meeting two of obligations faced by interpreters of action: to recognise action as 
intentional and meaningful for those to whom it is attributable, but also to engage 
critically and consider how alternative explanations and critical perspectives can 
inform our understanding of meaningful action. 
The mediation of our interpretive understanding by explanation is described 
by Ricoeur as a “rectification” to subjective approaches in which the meaning of 
action has primacy, but not as a replacement.  The objectivism of thinkers such as 
                                               
73 Ricoeur even remains open to the possibility that a broadly behaviourist method of explanation 
could have a role to play in the study of action, claiming that “the philosophical task is not to deny the 
concept and project of a technology of behaviour, but to locate it correctly within a larger framework” 
(Ricoeur, 1973: 172-173).  May Brodbeck’s essay “Meaning and Action” (Brodbeck, 1963), by taking 
“thick” verbal expressions of action as part of the behavioural data of interest, could be seen to 
represent an attempt to incorporate the meaning of action into a behaviourist framework.  Whether 
this adequately acknowledges the character of “meaning” in action, or preserves the “neutrality” of 
behaviourism, is perhaps still questionable. 
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Skinner and Durkheim obscures the way in which engaging with human action is, by 
definition, to engage with the meaning of action as it is captured by the “common 
notions” and “crudely formed concepts” in which it is expressed by those to whom 
the action is attributable.  Explanation, as conceived by Ricoeur, has the potential to 
supplement and even transform our understanding of action as a meaningful 
phenomenon, but is irreducibly rooted in the very meaningfulness of action as it is 
experienced by human beings in social environments.  Any attempt to objectify 
action which involves excluding this aspect of its meaning is therefore untenable.  It 
is, contrary to this, precisely the inseparability of the meaning of action from the 
language in which we articulate this meaning – the Sprachlichkeit of action – that 
provides us with the possibility of constituting action as an object of reflective 
inquiry of which it is possible to offer an explanatory account. 
 
3.6: Conclusion 
 How meaningful action is constituted as an object of inquiry, and how this 
influences our understanding of the action at hand, is an important consideration for 
the interpretive human and social sciences.  Ricoeur attempts to articulate the way in 
which meaningful action can be brought to discourse in this manner by making 
appeal to speech-act theory.  In doing so he claims that meaningful action shares a 
structure with the speech-act, and argues that it is this structure that lends meaningful 
action to objectification.  As I have argued, this approach is problematic, especially 
in regards to the way in which it obscures the role of representation and linguistic 
description in constituting action as an object within the human and social sciences.  
An appeal to the Sprachlichkeit of action is, in a sense, a more conservative way of 
trying to articulate this same notion, in that it does not commit us to the idea that the 
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experiential meaning of action shares a fundamental “structure” with linguistic 
meaning, and that we can see this structure “mirrored” in action-sentences. 
Rather, I wish to claim only that our experience of action as meaningful is 
inseparable from the modes of expression we find for “experiential meaning”, and in 
particular from the language in which we bring meaningful action to discourse.  This 
formulation of the way in which meaningful action lends itself to objectification 
preserves the importance of recognising the richness of experiential meaning, and 
therefore also the way in which different aspects of the meaning of action can be 
brought to the fore, or left obscure, depending on the ways in which we describe and 
interpret action.  Ricoeur’s hermeneutic model of the interpretation of meaningful 
action must, therefore, be capable of incorporating a reflective self-awareness of the 
way in which the fixation of action as an object within the human and social sciences 
can play a constitutive role in how we subsequently come to interpret its meaning.  
Engaging thoroughly both with the problems posed and the opportunities of 
understanding afforded by the fixation of action in this manner is a vital part of 
understanding the meaningfulness of action as an object of inquiry within the human 
and social sciences. 
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Chapter Four: Critical Description and Tradition 
 
 
 Within the interpretive human and social sciences action is often represented 
through discourse.  This allows the construction of descriptive, explicatory and 
critical accounts of the way in which people act and interact with one another.  
Linguistic discourse – both oral and written – plays an integral role in how the 
human and social sciences constitute meaningful action as an “object” of inquiry.  In 
“The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur sees the “objectification” of action as a 
precondition to any reflective or critical understanding of action, and claims that this 
process of objectification is equivalent to the fixation of discourse in the text.  On the 
basis of this he further argues that the text can serve as a paradigm for action under 
the condition of objectification, and that textual hermeneutics can therefore provide a 
model for the interpretation of action in the human and social sciences.   
However, the constitution of action as an object of critical reflective inquiry 
demands that we offer some particular and determinate account or representation of 
the action we are seeking to understand.  In offering such an account we inevitably 
favour certain features of the action we are representing, and exclude or marginalise 
others.  The features of action that we choose to focus upon depend on value 
judgments concerning what is most significant or central to the meaning of the action 
at hand.  The way in which we choose to represent and “fix” action as an object of 
inquiry can therefore play an important constitutive role in how we interpret action 
as meaningful. 
In this chapter I discuss how the description of action within the interpretive 
human sciences is to some extent an “interpretive” activity, and the way in which the 
practices of interpreters within the human and social sciences must therefore take 
account of the constitutive dimension of description as part of the interpretation and 
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understanding of action as an object of critical inquiry.  I will argue that within “The 
Model of the Text” itself Ricoeur fails to adequately come to terms with the role 
played by description within the interpretation of action, but also that Ricoeur’s 
textual model of the interpretation of meaningful action, by emphasising the 
importance of the objectification of action to the interpretive task, provides us with a 
useful resource for acknowledging and understanding the role played by description 
as part of the constitution of action as an object of inquiry. 
 
 
4.1: The Objectification of Action 
In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur addresses the question of how textual 
hermeneutics might serve as a model for the interpretation of action in the 
Geisteswissenschaften.  The term “Geisteswissenschaften” denotes a category of 
subjects encompassing both the social and human sciences, and is traditionally set in 
opposition to the natural sciences, or the “Naturwissenschaften”. However, any 
conception of the interpretation of meaningful action that claims to be uniformly 
applicable across the various disciplines covered by the term Geisteswissenschaften 
could not but give rise to a seriously inadequate approach to the study of meaningful 
human behaviour.  Different disciplines within the human and social sciences focus 
upon action in different ways, and their interpretive methodologies and frameworks 
serve to draw attention to different aspects of action.  There are, of course, plenty of 
overlaps between different academic disciplines.74  But unless we pay attention to 
the ways in which the different human and social sciences make different 
interpretive demands and make use of different interpretive schemata, we are 
                                               
74 Ethnography and anthropology, for example, are intricately related to one another even if they have 
different particular concerns. 
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unlikely to develop an effective methodology for the interpretation of meaningful 
action.   
The climate of thought, established interests and standardised methods within 
any interpretive discipline will, to some extent, serve to direct the nature of the 
inquiry in which its practitioners engage.75  The different interests and techniques 
that inform the direction of interpretation will, to some extent, also influence the 
judgements made by the interpreter regarding the meaning of any given set of 
actions.  In addition to exerting an influence over this explicitly interpretive activity, 
however, the framework within which an interpreter works can also play a role in 
how she comes to describe action.  “The Model of the Text” does not address the 
issue of how different social groups, academic disciplines and individual interpreters 
might “fix” action as an object in different ways.  Nor does Ricoeur attend to the 
way in which different descriptions and descriptive methods might serve to 
illuminate or obscure different aspects of action in different ways.  If “The Model of 
the Text” is to have any applicative relevance, then it must be supplemented by an 
account of the way in which the constitution of action as an object of interpretation 
is itself affected by the different interpretive concerns prevalent within different 
interpretive disciplines. 
The importance of “objectification” to reflective inquiry into the meaning of 
action is recognised by Ricoeur within “The Model of the Text” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 
203), and is a central part of the analogy he draws between the interpretation of texts 
and the interpretation of action.  In our lives, and as we experience it on a moment-
                                               
75 E.g. Weber writes that “the problems of the social sciences are selected by the value-relevance of 
the phenomena treated” (Weber, 1949: 21). “Value-relevance”, in this context, refers to “the 
philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific ‘interest’ which determines the selection of a 
given subject-matter and the problems of an empirical analysis… together with historical experience, 
[this] shows that cultural (i.e., evaluative) interests give purely empirical scientific work its direction” 
(Weber, 1949: 22). 
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by-moment basis, human action is typically transient and passing: I will wave to 
greet a friend passing me in the street, they will return my salutation and we will 
continue on with our respective lives, the meaning of our interaction effectively 
exhausted in its enactment as a transaction.  The vast majority of human behaviour is 
transitory in this manner, and passes unremarked upon and with little conscious 
consideration.  When we reflect upon action, however, we introduce an element of 
distance from the immediacy of our pre-reflective engagement with the world, taking 
some particular entity or series of events as an “object” of reflection.  Within the 
human and social sciences this “objectification” takes place far more explicitly, with 
some particular action or set of actions selected and represented as an object of 
inquiry.  It is this “fixation” of action as an object that Ricoeur considers analogous 
to the fixation of discourse in the text. 
 When description is involved in the objectification of meaningful action, it is 
also an act of composition and construal.  In making a description of some particular 
action, we attempt to account for those features of the situation at hand that allow us 
to understand it as meaningful.  In doing so we also inevitably overlook a number of 
things that we might consider incidental or insignificant to understanding the action 
we are describing.  However, because description is selective in this manner, 
different descriptions will sometimes pick up upon different aspects of the situation 
at hand, or differ in terms of how they perceive different elements of the situation as 
relating to one another.  This, in turn, can exert an influence over our subsequent 
interpretive activities and consequently our understanding of the action at hand.  It is 
therefore important that we recognise the way in which different interpretive 
interests can play a constitutive role in how we come to perceive and understand the 
action in which we are interested. 
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The task of describing and accounting for a public protest, for example, could 
potentially be approached in a number of different ways depending on the 
interpretive framework within which its interpretation is undertaken.  A sociologist 
influenced by the Frankfurt School might consider the protest as a form of 
“provocation” with the goal of the “immediate mobilization of many individuals for 
the sake of mobilization itself” (Habermas, 1971: 26), and consequently argue that 
the actions of the protestors should be interpreted within a framework of political 
and ideological conflict as an attempt to politicise the public sphere.  Without 
necessarily disagreeing with this characterisation of the aims of the protest, a 
sociologist influenced by ethnomethodology might nevertheless attempt to make 
sense of the same event by observing the way in which the organisation and meaning 
of actions within the protest can be understood as a product of the “ongoing 
accomplishments of organized artful practices” (Garfinkel, 1967: 11) evident in the 
transactional behaviour of the protestors.  An historian offering an account of the 
same protest might, alternatively, take an interest in the ways in which this particular 
protest can be seen as part of a historical tradition of public protest, and concentrate 
primarily on a narrative which might be told connecting contemporary protest to 
protests that have preceded it. 
  Each of these approaches to the interpretation of our hypothetical protest is 
capable of helping us to understand the actions involved therein, but the way in 
which each approach does this involves looking for and prioritising different aspects 
of the situation at hand.  In each case the observer in question will likely concentrate 
on different aspects of the protest taken as a whole, attributing greater or different 
significance to certain features over others depending on the way in which they 
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attend to the concrete situation at hand.76  The kind of attention we, as interpreters, 
bring to the table within interpretation has the potential to influence not only the 
conclusions we draw from our observations, but also the descriptions we make of 
action understood as an object of inquiry.   
The importance of how we attend to action to our understanding of it is 
something of which Ricoeur shows awareness, even in his earliest work.  In the 
introduction to Freedom and Nature, for example, Ricoeur writes about the way in 
which empirical psychology works via “the reduction of acts (with their 
intentionality and their reference to an Ego) to facts” (Ricoeur, 1966: 10), and that 
this reduction is only “made legitimate by the type of interest represented by the 
constitution of empirical science as a science of facts” (Ricoeur, 1966: 11).  Ricoeur 
argues, however, that understanding voluntary action is impossible under a 
mechanistic schema such as this, and that understanding action as intentional thus 
demands “a change of attitude, for a passage from the ‘natural’ viewpoint to the 
‘phenomenological’ attitude” (Ricoeur, 1966: 221).77  Here we see Ricoeur 
concerned with the different ways in which it is possible to attend to action, and the 
consequences this has for how we understand it.   
The distinction made in this case is between action understood merely in 
terms of observable behaviour via a “mechanistic” conceptual schema, and action 
understood as meaningful and as attributable to a responsible agent.  This, however, 
                                               
76 Which, it is important to remember, is not to say that each of these approaches have to be exclusive, 
or that their respective attempts to represent the protest or the actions of the protestors as an “object” 
of reflection amount to describing something different in kind in each case. More often than not, 
different approaches to describing and interpreting some course of events, such as our hypothetical 
protest, will be able to complement one another and make explicit some aspect of that which is being 
described which other approaches might otherwise take for granted or overlook completely. 
 
77 Ricoeur also discusses the tendency of empirical psychology to turn “acts” into “facts” in Freud 
and Philosophy.  Therein he writes that psychoanalysis and positivistic psychology “diverge from the 
very beginning, at the level of the initial notion of fact and of inference from facts” (Ricoeur, 1970: 
359). 
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and as gestured towards in the above examples of how we might understand a 
protest, far from exhausts the different ways in which we can attend to and describe 
action, and the notion of how we attend to action is something which is left largely 
unaddressed in “The Model of the Text”.  We must, therefore, devote further 
attention to the objectification of action, glossed over by Ricoeur in “The Model of 
the Text”, in order to understand how the textual model might inform our 
interpretive practices within the human and social sciences. Only by correcting 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic model as it is presented in “The Model of the Text” through 
the addition of an explicit awareness of the role played by “disciplinary prejudice” in 
the fixation of action as an object of inquiry, can we hope to gain a better sense of 
the role played by description within interpretive inquiry.   
 
4.1.1: “Leaving a mark” and the Problem of Description 
In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur identifies the objectification of action as 
a matter of its “preservation”, analogous to the way in which spoken discourse is 
fixed and preserved via inscription in writing.  In order to make sense of this analogy 
between the inscription of discourse as writing and the “fixation” of action, he makes 
appeal to the way in which “[w]e say that such-and-such event left its mark on its 
time” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 205).  This metaphor of action “leaving a mark” on time, for 
Ricoeur, points towards the way in which action can persist beyond the moment of 
its eventuation in a manner analogous to the persistence of discourse in the text.  It is 
upon “social time” that action is inscribed, and this is manifest in a number of ways 
including formal records of action, the “informal analogue of these formal records 
which we call reputation”, and even history itself (Ricoeur, 1981h: 207).  Action has 
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“left a mark” when it contributes to one of these many and varied “documents of 
human action” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 206). 
At this point Ricoeur does not specifically have action considered as a formal 
object of the human and social sciences in mind.  Although scholarly work is 
undoubtedly one important way in which meaningful action is recorded and made 
available to be understood, it remains but part of a wide spectrum of ways in which 
human action is “inscribed” and “fixed” within social time.  When Ricoeur mentions 
“history”, he has in mind not “Historie” but “Geschichte”.78  And the records via 
which human action becomes a “document” are not primarily the original research of 
sociologists and ethnographers working out in the field, but “those which are kept by 
institutions like employment offices, schools, banks, and the police” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 207).79  Ricoeur’s appeal to the metaphor of “leaving a mark” is intended as a 
gesture towards the way in which action can have enduring significance within our 
everyday existence, and that understanding the ways in which action is meaningful 
involves engaging with the “documents” within which action is fixed and recorded.80  
It therefore precedes any question of how action might be “inscribed” as part of the 
work of any particular individual, group or institution. 
                                               
78 The important distinction here is between history understood as academic inquiry into past events 
by historians (Historie), and history understood as the accumulated and largely pre-theoretical 
understanding we have of life as it was lived in the past (Geschichte).  Given that Ricoeur identifies 
history as something which precedes and exceeds “the archives which are intentionally written down 
by the memorialists” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 207), it would seem to be the latter conception of history that 
he intends at this point. 
 
79 Although it is also worth noting that these same “institutional” records are commonly used as 
resources by researchers within the human and social sciences. 
 
80 Ricoeur arguably risks obscuring the fact that most human action never gets recorded as a 
“document” in this manner, and is in fact best understood as meaningful in terms of being a transient 
and transactional event enacted within some social setting. This difference between reflective and pre-
reflective understanding of action is discussed in greater depth in chapter five of this thesis via the 
lens of ethnomethodology. 
 
 
136 
 
But even if this helps to explain the apparent looseness of Ricoeur’s account 
of the “inscription” of action, it does not make it any less problematic in terms of 
understanding how different methods of objectification may influence our 
understanding of action.  This preliminary account of the “inscription” of action 
upon time, designed only to provide prima facie support for Ricoeur’s claim that 
meaningful action can (and does) become “fixed” in a manner analogous to the 
fixation of discourse in texts, does not acknowledge the way in which even these 
“documents” of action presuppose some kind of selective attention, nor the fact that 
the methods and techniques by which records and documents of action are produced 
can affect how we understand them.  Insofar as the human and social sciences seek 
to understand meaningful action, they must also determine how the “fixation” of 
action may affect our understanding of it, lest they fail to account for our own 
activities as interpreters of action.  
Ricoeur’s attempt to articulate the way in which action lends itself to 
inscription in terms of the speech-act, as I have previously argued,81 risks conflating 
action with the language in which action is described, thus obscuring the role that 
description plays within the human sciences.  I have instead suggested that we 
should think of the way action lends itself to objectification in terms of its 
Sprachlichkeit; the way that the meaning of action is amenable to linguistic 
expression.82  Whilst Ricoeur’s appropriation of speech-act theory led him to claim 
to have isolated a “structure” underlying meaningful action, in virtue of which it 
could then be objectified, an appeal to Sprachlichkeit takes the possibility of 
expressing meaningful action in linguistic descriptions to be inextricably tied to the 
modes of expression we find for “experiential meaning”.  The notion of 
                                               
81 Chapter three, section 3.1 of this thesis. 
 
82 Chapter three, section 3.4 of this thesis. 
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Sprachlichkeit therefore preserves an in principle expressibility for meaningful 
action, but without claiming to have discovered any particular “structure” held in 
common with language underlying the possibility of its expression.  This, in turn, 
leaves room for us to recognise the important constitutive role played by description 
in how action is presented to us as an object of interpretation within the human and 
social sciences. 
Identifying any example of human behaviour as an “action” per se involves 
engaging with it as meaningful: to recognise some gesture as a wave, for example, 
involves being able to distinguish it as a meaningful gesture, distinct from someone 
merely flailing a hand around in an effort to ward away a fly.  Even in our everyday 
lives, offering an account of some action relies upon engaging with some existing 
system of meanings by which we recognise any particular action as itself, and within 
which our descriptions of action make sense.  Some level of understanding must, 
therefore, precede any overt form of interpretation in which we might engage.   
Similarly, the possibility of describing action presupposes that we have some kind of 
understanding of what we are describing, a starting point upon which our description 
is based.  Any description we give of an action will involve drawing upon these 
presuppositions about its meaning and the pre-acceptance of certain discursive 
frameworks or modes of being within which the description makes sense.  This 
poses no problem in our day-to-day lives. If we wish to give an account of action to 
someone, it is precisely the ability to fall back on a shared system of meanings that 
makes communication possible. 
When we engage critically with action, however, we need to be able to 
explicate the cultural and social presuppositions against which our descriptions are 
made, and to understand the ways in which these presuppositions might shape both 
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our descriptive and interpretive activities.  We may also, as interpreters of action, 
have reason to focus on particular aspects of action and employ some particular 
descriptive schema to this end.  In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur discusses 
human action as “a limited field of possible constructions” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 213), 
and touches upon the importance of construing the “motivational basis” and 
“desirability-characteristics” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 214) of action as part of its 
representation and interpretation.  Beyond this, however, he gives no indication of 
the kind of concerns which we might bring to bear upon the descriptive fixation of 
action as an object of inquiry.  This may simply be because, in “The Model of the 
Text”, Ricoeur is discussing the interpretation of action at a fairly abstract level and 
doesn’t wish to delimit the possibilities of description open to interpreters working 
within different and varying fields of inquiry.83 
However, the broad scope of application intended within “The Model of the 
Text” hardly discharges the necessity of engaging with the methods by which action 
is constituted as an “object” in practice.  Elsewhere84 Ricoeur does demonstrate a 
greater sensitivity towards the importance of methods of representation to how we 
understand meaningful human action within particular forms of inquiry.  In 
particular, Ricoeur demonstrates a sustained interest in the role that narrativity has to 
play in how we understand historical events.  Even this, however, does not represent 
                                               
83 Again, it is also perhaps important here that we take the intellectual climate within which “The 
Model of the Text” was composed into account.  The “abstract” level at which Ricoeur addresses the 
objectification of action here may be related to the fact that at the time of writing “The Model of the 
Text”, Ricoeur was engaged in an ongoing debate regarding the place of structural analysis within the 
human and social sciences, and thus was less interested in focussing upon particular methods of 
objectification than he was upon the relationship between structuralism and hermeneutics conceived 
as broad philosophical approaches to understanding and analysing human action. 
 
84 E.g. In “The Narrative Function”, for example, Ricoeur writes that “historicity comes to language 
only so far as we tell stories or tell history” (Ricoeur, 1981j: 294). This idea, and the relationship 
between our understanding of time and narrativity, is developed further within his three volume work 
Time and Narrative.  Ricoeur also touches upon the selectivity inherent to the representation of action 
in Memory, History, Forgetting, where he states that “there is interpretation at all levels of the 
historiographical operation” including at the “documentary level with the selection of sources” 
(Ricoeur, 2004: 235). 
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a targeted attempt to articulate a framework for the description of human action in 
any particular field of inquiry. 
Such a project is perhaps more obviously evident in the work of sociologist 
John B. Thompson who, influenced in part by Ricoeur’s hermeneutic thought, 
sketches a conceptual framework for understanding the social structuration of action 
which identifies certain aspects of social contexts – e.g. spatio-temporal settings, 
distribution of capital and other resources, institutionalised rules and conventions etc. 
– as particularly important for grasping “the social features of the contexts within 
which individuals act and interact” (Thompson, 1990: 150).  An adequate description 
of human action is, for Thompson, one which attends most closely to those features 
of a social setting that help constitute it as a “social context” of this sort.  By 
providing a framework such as this, Thompson provides a resource for engaging in a 
particular kind of interpretive inquiry, but also, to some extent, for construing action 
in accordance with particular schematised interests relevant to the kind of inquiry in 
which the interpreter is engaged. 
Practitioners within the social and human sciences, as well as engaging with 
the conventions and practices of the social groups which they study are also always 
engaged with the traditions, conventions and practices of their own academic 
discipline.  It is against the background of these inherited standards of practice and 
traditions of thought that the individual interpreter of human action – whether 
sociologist, anthropologist, historian or philosopher – comes to engage with and 
describe particular cases of meaningful action, and in light of which they attempt to 
make sense of what they observe.  Such disciplinary prejudices can, if drawn upon 
without care, end up distorting our understanding of that which we are interpreting 
by leading us wrongly to subsume the phenomena we observe under unsuitable 
140 
 
conceptual categories.  Disciplinary prejudices, however, also serve as the ground 
upon which critical inquiry takes place.  It is important, therefore, that we attempt to 
take into account both the conceptual network upon which the description of action 
is premised, and the way these descriptions work to both permit and delimit the kind 
of interpretations of action that we might make. 
 
4.1.2: Gadamer and Prejudice 
 The notion of “prejudice”, in this context, does not primarily refer to the 
psychology of the individual researcher, nor does it necessarily imply any form of 
institutional discrimination in the negative sense typically associated with the word 
“prejudice”.  It is instead the idea that our understanding is shaped by ideas inherited 
from the traditions of thought in which we are engaged, the existence of which 
precedes the exercise of our own judgement.  The notion of “disciplinary prejudice” 
in this context, therefore, refers to the idea that inquiry within the human sciences 
involves engaging in an intellectual tradition, and that practitioners within different 
academic disciplines are influenced by the work and theory that precedes them.  The 
productive potential of these prejudices is recognised by Gadamer in Truth and 
Method, where he argues that prejudices of this kind can be “productive of 
knowledge” (Gadamer, 1993: 279) insofar as they lay the groundwork for 
judgement. 
“Prejudice” of this Gadamerian kind is an idea with which Ricoeur is 
familiar.85  Within “The Model of the Text”, however, there is no explicit reference 
to the role played by prejudice within interpretation.  In what follows I will draw 
upon this Gadamerian sense of “prejudice” in order to articulate how prejudice 
                                               
85 Ricoeur discusses it most explicitly when he is dealing directly with the philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer; e.g. in the essay “Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology”, where Ricoeur confronts the 
hermeneutic approach of Gadamer with the more overtly “critical” philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. 
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affects understanding, and to suggest how an awareness of prejudice needs to be 
incorporated into Ricoeur’s textual model not only as part of the interpretation of 
action, but also at the level of the initial “fixation” of action as an object of inquiry. 
Prejudice in the sense at hand can be productive of knowledge because “our 
attitudes and behaviour” are unavoidably shaped by the attitudes and behaviour of 
those who have preceded us, by what Gadamer refers to as “tradition”.  The 
centrality of tradition as a productive element of understanding means that, for 
Gadamer, tradition has an “authority” (Gadamer, 1993: 280) that we can and must 
rely upon as part of the exercise of our own judgement.  The legitimacy of this 
authority, however, requires that tradition does not persist merely “because of the 
inertia of what once existed”, but that it is “affirmed, embraced, cultivated” and 
taken over freely by those to whom it has fallen.  He accordingly describes the 
preservation of tradition as an “act of reason” (Gadamer, 1993: 281).  Arguably, 
Gadamer is unduly optimistic about the amount of reason involved in the 
continuation of tradition, and there are plenty of traditions and customs that seem to 
survive primarily through momentum of belief.  Hannah Arendt, for example, takes a 
more cautious attitude towards the notion of “prejudice”, arguing that “genuine” 
prejudice “conceals some previously formed judgement which originally had its own 
appropriate and legitimate experiential basis, and which evolved into a prejudice 
only because it was dragged through time without its ever being re-examined or 
revised” (Arendt, 2005: 100-01). 
When the element of reason is missing from our engagement with prejudice – 
when we fail to engage critically with the traditions to which we belong – prejudice 
is no longer productive of knowledge, and instead takes on the negative sense with 
which we are more commonly acquainted in our day-to-day lives.  In persisting as 
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“prejudice”, ideas and judgements which once had legitimate application become 
abstracted from these conditions and instead work to distort our engagement with the 
world around us, and to preclude the exercise of our own judgement.  It is 
undeniable that such naïve recourse to prejudice will at least sometimes lead us into 
error, and it is for this reason that Gadamer emphasises that the authority of tradition 
as legitimate only on condition that it is cultivated and renewed by those who 
participate in it.86  
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of tradition as a precondition of the exercise 
of our own judgements and as part of how we understand the world around us means 
that we cannot overlook the role played by disciplinary prejudice as part of the 
description and interpretation of meaningful action.  The false hope that we might 
finally “free” ourselves from every form of prejudice is one that merely allows our 
prejudices to dominate our thought uncontrolled.  The ideal of “objectivity”, 
conceived of as a complete freedom from prejudice, is therefore counterproductive to 
understanding because it blinds us to the “productive” dimension of prejudice: “A 
person who believes he is free of prejudices, relying on the objectivity of his 
procedures and denying that he is himself conditioned by historical circumstances… 
will fail to see what manifests itself by their light” (Gadamer, 1993: 360).  We need, 
instead, to be aware and vigilant of the power that “prejudice” has over us so that we 
might understand the way in which our intellectual and cultural prejudices influence 
our engagement with meaningful action. 
 
 
                                               
86 The very notion of an academic discipline is perhaps one of the more paradigmatic examples of 
how such “authoritative” tradition can function: Practitioners of any academic discipline develop and 
respond to the work of those who precede them, but do so critically and in order not simply to 
preserve a tradition, but to correct it, renew it, contribute something further to it and, by this, maintain 
its legitimacy as a tradition upon which others might draw. 
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4.1.3: Tradition and the Description of Action 
The role played by “prejudice” within the interpretation of meaningful action 
means that it is vital that the methodologies of the human sciences incorporate a 
level of self-reflective criticism.  Ricoeur does argue that the interpretive encounter 
is marked in part by “a moment of distanciation in the relation of the self to itself” 
within which “a critique of the illusions of the subject” becomes an essential part of 
interpretive understanding (Ricoeur, 1981d: 144).87  Engaging with and 
acknowledging the existence of prejudice within the human and social sciences and 
the influence this has upon our own understanding of meaningful action is an 
important part of this self-critical process.  For the “disciplinary prejudices” inherited 
from the intellectual traditions with which we engage to be productive of knowledge, 
this kind of self-critical awareness must be incorporated into the interpretive process.  
On an overtly interpretive level it is important for an interpreter to realise how their 
interpretations of meaning might be influenced by the disciplinary prejudices that 
provide the ground for their analysis.  By doing so the interpreter can place her 
judgements regarding meaning within an interpretive context, specifying the 
presuppositions upon which their interpretation is based and delimiting the 
conditions under which this interpretation is valid. 
The recognition of disciplinary prejudice as productive should therefore 
precede any overtly interpretive activity in which we might engage.  This is because 
the object of the human sciences is constituted in relation to the modes of thought 
and intellectual traditions of which we are part.  Even identifying something as a 
potential object of inquiry relies, to a certain extent, upon the “prejudices” we inherit 
from the intellectual traditions of which we are inheritors, and an important role 
                                               
87 The significance of self-critique to Ricoeur’s interpretive model and to the validity of hermeneutic 
interpretive claims is discussed in greater depth in the sixth chapter of this thesis (section 6.3.1). 
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played by “tradition” within the human sciences lies in “in choosing the theme to be 
investigated, awakening the desire to investigate, gaining a new problematic” 
(Gadamer, 1993: 282).  We cannot, therefore, hope to prevent “prejudice” from 
playing a role in the objectification of action, as recommended by advocates of 
“reflexive” thought such as the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.88   
Rather, what is important is that we are aware of the way in which the 
“objectification” of action is to some extent schematised by the interests and 
prejudices of the discipline in which we are working.  We must be aware of both 
what these prejudices might bring to the fore and, as a counterpart, what they might 
obscure in our descriptions of action.  Ricoeur advocates the importance of self-
critique within interpretation and associates this possibility with the “distanciation” 
of which he considers the text paradigmatic, even going so far as to say that the 
distanciation that arises with the fixation of discourse as a text is a “fundamental 
condition for the recognition of a critical instance at the heart of interpretation” 
(Ricoeur, 1981b: 91).  So even when Ricoeur does not explicitly mention prejudice, 
we can perhaps still associate the call for self-critique in part with the demand for 
vigilance of “prejudice” within interpretation. 
Despite this, however, Ricoeur does not explicitly confront the role that 
prejudice may play in the constitution of texts, or, more importantly for our present 
purposes, in the “objectification” of action.  It is at this level, when the interpreter 
may be actively involved in the description of the action they are also interpreting, 
that a similar sensitivity towards prejudice has to accompany our descriptive 
activities.  More broadly, it is important that description is recognised as part of the 
                                               
88 Bourdieu, for example, emphasises the neutralisation of prejudice within objectification: “What has 
to be constantly scrutinized and neutralized, in the very act of construction of the object [of 
sociological inquiry], is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems and… 
categories of scholarly judgement” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40). 
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interpretive process itself rather than something pre-interpretive.  The choices we 
make within descriptive activity serve to guide and partially delimit the 
interpretations we may then make of the action described, and we must therefore 
aspire to be aware of how “prejudice” might influence these choices. 
 This is by no means a claim that the description of action is arbitrary or 
voluntaristic, or that any description could be considered “adequate” so long as it 
acknowledges the “prejudices” that have helped to generate it.  An untenable 
description or interpretation of action is still untenable, even if we specify the 
prejudices that have led us into error.  Minimally, the description of meaningful 
human action will be delimited by the “brute facts” observed.  The descriptions we 
offer of action will also, to a large extent, be circumscribed by the social and cultural 
conventions of meaning with which we are engaging.  We must, for example, be 
careful to acknowledge the self-understanding of those for whom action is 
meaningful; our description of what we are interpreting should at least be 
recognisable to those we are describing.89 
The descriptions we make of action should also aspire to be recognisable as 
an “object” according to the conventions of the intellectual tradition within which we 
are working.  At any given time the interpreter of action will, as a result, be 
struggling to meet a number of different demands arising from different places as to 
what constitutes an “adequate” description of action.  The self-critical attitude that I 
am arguing should accompany the description and interpretation of action cannot, 
therefore, rest with merely acknowledging prejudice; it must also incorporate a sense 
                                               
89 We can perhaps compare this obligation to fidelity with the “vow of faithfulness” (Ricoeur, 2006: 
4) Ricoeur argues is integral to the task of translation.  In both cases we may wish to present 
something from a culture potentially distant from that with which we are familiar (whether action, 
beliefs, or foreign texts) and render it in such a manner that it is understandable to those for whom 
these things are strange and alien.  In both cases, however, we must be careful not to distort that 
which we are “translating” in such a way that understanding is lost. 
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of how the presuppositions at play within disciplinary prejudices relate to the 
concrete situation at hand and of the conflicts and distortions that can arise from this.  
The responsibility on the part of the interpreter of action to remain vigilant in this 
manner is part of the work of interpretation and can help maintain the “productive” 
character of prejudice. 
Insofar as description is thought to be pre-interpretive, it is at the level of 
description that the influence of disciplinary prejudice and theoretical presupposition 
is most likely to go unremarked.  But insofar as description is recognised as the 
active composition of something as an object of reflective inquiry, the description of 
action has also to be recognised as interpretive.  I therefore believe that the 
descriptive constitution of action as an object of reflective inquiry must be 
considered as a part of a wider interpretive process, and that this wider interpretive 
process should at all times endeavour to incorporate a level of critical self-awareness 
into its practices.  We must also, therefore, reject the idea that the role played by 
disciplinary prejudice within interpretation is a matter distinct from any practical 
engagement with action, and is therefore best reserved for discussions of 
methodology and conceived as a separate enterprise from the interpretive encounter 
itself.  By marginalising the position of disciplinary prejudice within our interpretive 
practices we fail to engage with the role that they play in the constitution of the 
object of our inquiry, and consequently risk taking for granted the potentially 
contentious presuppositions that we use to picture and understand human action.   
 
4.2: Homo Sociologicus 
 In order to illustrate this point, I will examine Ralf Dahrendorf’s notion of 
“homo sociologicus” and the way in which it tacitly draws upon certain sociological 
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prejudices in order to develop a particular picture of social being.  Dahrendorf, in an 
essay of the same name, uses the term homo sociologicus to refer to the manner in 
which man is understood and conceptualised by classical functionalist sociology.  
Dahrendorf  does explicitly state that this act of conceptualisation is a fictionalisation 
of man as we would ordinarily understand him, necessitated by the demands of 
inquiry; “[e]very discipline… must reduce its huge subject matter to certain elements 
from which may be systematically constructed… a structure in whose tissue a 
segment of reality may be caught” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 4).  But, simultaneously, he 
insists that this “fictionalised” version of man is “more than a metaphor. His roles 
are more than masks that can be cast off, his social behaviour more than a play from 
which audience and actors alike can return to the ‘true’ reality” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 
14). 
The concepts of sociology are fictions, but only insofar as they are devices 
that serve to tell us something real about some aspect of ourselves and the world of 
which we are part.  Sociological fictions, then, are not intended to be fabrications, 
but simplifications which focus upon some narrow realm of human experience and 
elevate this in order that we might better understand it.  By focussing purely upon 
the human being as a player of social roles, Homo sapiens is thus reconstructed as 
the fictional homo sociologicus.  The sociological construct is, therefore, a fiction, 
but is based upon some perceived reality of human social existence – the idea that 
we adopt and play “roles” as part of our lives with and amongst others – and from 
which we might therefore hope to learn more about our own reality as social beings. 
But the relationship between the fiction of homo sociologicus and the “real” human 
of our day-to-day experience is a complicated one.  Looking at this relationship in 
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more detail will help illuminate some of the reasons why both the description and 
interpretation of human action involve engaging with disciplinary prejudice. 
According to Dahrendorf, we recognise a person as a social being by 
identifying the roles she plays and the position that she, as a role player, occupies in 
relation to other social role players.  Social roles of this sort are defined as “quasi-
objective complexes of prescriptions for behaviour which are in principle 
independent of the individual… binding on the individual, in the sense that he cannot 
ignore or reject them without harm to himself” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 19).  Homo 
sociologicus, therefore, is a creature defined purely by the roles that society would 
have it play, a creature of conformity, and a creature potentially quite unlike that 
with which we are familiar from our day-to-day experience.  Yet, despite this 
unfamiliarity, homo sociologicus is a sociological concept that purports to tell us 
something about ourselves as social beings.   
This is a dilemma recognised by Dahrendorf: “by reconstructing man as 
homo sociologicus… sociology creates for itself once again the moral and 
philosophical problem of how the artificial man of its theoretical analysis relates to 
the real man of our everyday experience” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 7).  Specifically, 
Dahrendorf sees this aporia as existing between socialised man – defined in terms of 
the constraints placed upon his behaviour by the social roles he plays – and our 
understanding of man as a free individual.  In order to identify homo sociologicus 
with ourselves, we must somehow explain how to relate individual freedom with the 
bondage of social life: “The individual must somehow take into himself the 
prescriptions of society and make them the basis of his behaviour; it is by this means 
that the individual and society are mediated and man is reborn as homo sociologicus” 
(Dahrendorf, 1973: 38). 
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How much importance we invest in the conflict between social being and 
individual freedom, however, depends in part upon the extent to which we accept the 
idea of constrained social being represented by homo sociologicus.  The picture of 
social being presented in Homo Sociologicus is one shaped at least in part by the 
presuppositions of a certain type of sociological theory, deriving some of its main 
conceptual categories from a tradition of thought in which social cohesion and 
socialisation is understood primarily in terms of the “constraints” placed upon 
individuals by society. 
Dahrendorf himself, in “In Praise of Thrasymachus”, identifies this with a 
“conflict” approach to understanding social cohesion, and as one of two dominant 
modes of thought in sociology, traceable as far back into the past as the conversation 
between Thrasymachus and Socrates in the opening book of Plato’s Republic, and 
passed on and developed via Hobbes and a sociological tradition that emphasises 
power, conflict, constraint and sanction as definitive of social organisation 
(Dahrendorf, 1968b).  Dahrendorf opposes this approach to sociology to a tradition 
he identifies with Socrates and Rousseau, within which social cohesion is understood 
in terms of consensus and equilibrium – the exercise of a “general will” – rather than 
conflict and the struggle for power.  Even within this latter tradition of thought, 
however, the notion of “constraint” is frequently central to the way in which the 
individual relates to the social consensus.90 
The importance of understanding homo sociologicus within “the context of 
observation and theory in which homo sociologicus emerges” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 
                                               
90 One paradigmatic example of the role played by constraint in a sociology of this latter kind would 
be Emile Durkheim’s notion of “social facts” which have an “objective” reality, apart from our 
subjective psychology, and which function by compelling me as an individual to act in accordance 
with “obligations which are defined in law and custom and which are external to myself and my 
actions” (Durkheim, 1982: 50). 
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14) is something Dahrendorf acknowledges.  But the role granted to the almost 
pervasive notion of “constraint” within this picture means that socialised being is 
inevitably set on a collision course with freedom.  The notion of “constraint” as 
definitive of social being therefore functions as a (productive) prejudice inherited 
from the sociological tradition of which Dahrendorf is a part.  The prejudice is 
productive insofar as it allows the sociologist to focus upon particular aspects of the 
way in which the individual functions as part of society.  
But by identifying social life purely with the necessity of conforming to 
socially determined constraints, and the threat of facing “sanctions” should we 
deviate from the behaviour endemic to the roles we are playing, social being is set up 
in dichotomous opposition to the idea of a perfectly free and autonomous human 
individual, unfettered by anything.91  Minimally, it would seem that this idea of the 
free individual is supposed to reflect our felt autonomy; the belief that we are always 
in control of our own actions and are free to choose what we do, rather than have it 
dictated to us by social expectations.  It is by placing socialised being at one extreme 
of this polar opposition between “constraint” and “freedom” that Dahrendorf is led to 
draw conclusions such as “socialization invariably means depersonalization” 
(Dahrendorf, 1973: 39). 
This opposition between free and socialised being, however, is ultimately 
untenable.  At the very least, it is necessary to recognise that the relationship 
between freedom and constraint is more complex than seems to be presupposed in 
the construction of homo sociologicus.  The problem is not simply one of trying to 
reconcile freedom with the constraints of society in the individual.  Far more 
fundamentally, and before we can engage constructively in such a debate, it is 
                                               
91 Dahrendorf at one point even describes human behaviour, without the constraints provided by the 
“established and inescapable expectations” of society, as characterised by “the randomness of chance” 
(Dahrendorf, 1968c: 167). 
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necessary to acknowledge the different ways in which freedom and constraint can be 
understood as relating to one another; that our individual autonomy exists in relation 
to constraints that are placed upon us and the limits of our own being, and that social 
constraint only makes sense within a context in which people are capable of 
recognising, negotiating and redefining the socially constituted behavioural 
expectations that bind them.  Our freedom to act in any particular way emerges in 
relation to established ways of acting and being.  And the normative power of social 
expectations can only be understood when conformity is not automatic, but within a 
society of individuals freely acting and making decisions about the best way to fulfil 
their social roles and obligations; about whether and how to conform, or deviate and 
face sanction. 
Dahrendorf does acknowledge that there is some level of reciprocity between 
the individual and society when he writes of homo sociologicus that “if society 
shapes his personality, he can help shape society.  Role expectations and sanctions 
are not unalterably fixed for all time”.  This would seem to indicate that freedom and 
constraint can be defined in relation to one another productively, rather than 
necessarily as diametrically opposed.  This, however, leads to a notion of freedom 
that exists only within the constraints of social life, and one that can “scarcely help to 
render homo sociologicus more compatible with the man of our everyday 
experience” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 40). 
The apparent inflexibility of this dichotomy arises largely out of the belief 
that society is first characterised by prescribed forms of behaviour to which we 
characteristically conform.  This characterisation of social being makes most sense in 
relation to the threat posed by legal sanction, or to institutionalised “roles” in which 
there are more strictly fixed procedures for how to behave, or in which there are 
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well-defined limits upon the range of behaviour acceptable in that role, and in which 
there is a system in place for the imposition of sanctions.  The less a social setting 
fits this description, the less directly relevant the constraint model of social 
behaviour becomes.  Minimally, therefore, a sociological construct such as homo 
sociologicus should be complemented by a specification of the scope of its intended 
application. 
When applied to different aspects of society, or even society “as a whole”, 
the idea of a “social role” could instead be conceived of as a positive rather than a 
privative thing; as a paradigmatic model of some particular way of being, some 
particular social role, which can be adopted to a greater or lesser degree and which 
provides individuals with pre-established ways of behaving and of interacting with 
other individuals.  We may even wish to think of a “social role” as something 
capable of guiding our actions by confronting us with “norms” of behaviour for 
individuals playing some role, similar to the way in which Ricoeur claims the text 
refers by projecting a “world” and confronting the reader with different possibilities 
of being, and thus as something which offers us a “positive” picture of how we 
might act as social beings, and not something which determines our actions via 
“constraint”.  We can thus imagine the idea of a “social role” as an objectification of 
some particular set of behaviours considered as the norm for a given social context, 
and to which the autonomous individual is free to conform completely, reject or 
adapt in relation to the specific circumstances of their own lives.92  Within this we 
                                               
92 This is, of course, merely a sketch of how hermeneutic thought might inform the sociological 
notion of a “social role”, set up primarily as a contrast to the version implied within the constraint 
approach, and would require further development beyond the scope of this thesis before it could have 
any real application within sociological research.  Ricoeur does not make this suggestion himself, 
though should we pursue the idea we might wish to relate this idea to his conception that ideology is 
“linked to the necessity for a social group to give itself an image of itself, to represent and to realise 
itself” (Ricoeur, 1981i: 225). 
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might still face sanctions under certain circumstances, but only should our behaviour 
deviate so significantly from that modelled by the role that our actions undermine the 
social function that a role is supposed to fulfil (a father who deliberately kills his 
children, for example, is unquestionably a bad father and would be punished 
accordingly).  
Beyond these fairly loose conditions, however, a role could be understood as 
something which legitimises a particular way of being within society without 
necessarily working via the explicit threat of sanction.  A social role, rather than the 
effect of sanctions, could be thought of as something which projects a “world” or a 
sketch of a particular way of being with which the individual can engage in different 
ways.  In this regard, the social does not have to be placed in opposition to freedom. 
We adopt many roles freely, and within these loosely defined roles there are several 
possible paths we can follow and opportunities for forging new paths ourselves.93  
Our freedom and autonomy can thus, in fact, be thought of as being constituted in 
conjunction with the possibilities of being that the social roles we play open up 
before us, rather than as being a fundamentally irreconcilable oppositional term in a 
dichotomy between “freedom” and “conformity”.94 
                                               
93 Dahrendorf does elsewhere acknowledge that homo sociologicus, as he has defined it, privileges 
conformity at the expense of recognising the way in which “people are often free to put their 
individual stamp on their roles” (Dahrendorf, 1968a: 102), citing Hans Paul Bahrdt and Robert 
Merton as examples.  Even within the work of these thinkers, however, social being is considered 
primarily in terms of constraint. 
 
94 A similarly dialectical approach to the idea of freedom, in which human freedom is understood in 
relation to those factors which constrain and determine the exercise of our freedom, is developed by 
Ricoeur in the 1962 article “Freedom and Nature” (it is this article to which I am referring on this 
occasion, although a similarly dialectical approach to human freedom is developed in greater depth in 
the book of the same name).  Ricoeur differs significantly from Dahrendorf from the outset by 
discussing freedom as opposed to nature, and by identifying human society not with constraint but 
with “an existence deliberated upon, preferred and chosen” which has been “wrenched from a natural, 
that is to say an unfree, existence” (Ricoeur, 1974: 26).  Freedom, on this account, is freedom from 
having our lives and action determined by our human nature, our instincts and the facticity of our 
existence. However, Ricoeur’s analysis of this notion of freedom shows how it remains rooted in our 
“nature”, in particular our desires, and writes that “reflective choice always follows from some non-
reflective moment, some inchoate act, tendency or inclination which deserves the name of 
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To view social existence in terms of constraints, in the manner from which 
homo sociologicus emerges, is one way of conceptualising social life among others, 
but should not be thought of as the only viable account of how individuals exist and 
act in society in every circumstance.  Unless we are aware of the theoretical 
presuppositions and disciplinary “prejudices” from which this vision emerges, it is 
easy to become blind to alternative possibilities.  We risk, for example, only 
identifying those aspects of a “social role” that seem to exercise a constraint over the 
individual as definitive of meaningful action within that role.  This influences not 
only our understanding of action, but, insofar as we are unaware of the way in which 
such a disciplinary prejudice directs our thought, also our capacity to recognise and 
describe something in terms of its meaning. 
We can perhaps see how this might occur within Homo Sociologicus when 
Dahrendorf writes that a “scale assigning numerical values to all possible negative 
sanctions… might be very useful in classifying role expectations” (Dahrendorf, 
1973: 51).  Here, from the very moment a methodology for the identification of 
social phenomena is developed, theoretical prejudices serve to dictate the kind of 
phenomena in which the researcher will be interested.  By, for example, classifying 
social roles and role expectations in relation to the place that they occupy on a “scale 
of sanctions”, we immediately rule out the possibility of identifying social roles in 
terms of their “positive” rather than “privative” functions.  Dahrendorf’s 
commitment to quantitative classification is also a result of a disciplinary prejudice 
                                                                                                                                     
spontaneous will or natural freedom” (Ricoeur, 1974: 35).  We are thus capable of appropriating the 
“non-reflective” aspects of our natures and choosing how we respond to them and how we incorporate 
our desires into our lives as we live them. This dialectical analysis of the relationship between 
freedom and nature thus undermines the initial presentation of “freedom” and “nature” as 
irreconcilable opposites in favour of what Ricoeur describes as “the recovery of nature as desire in 
freedom as project” (Ricoeur, 1974: 36). It seems more than reasonable to imagine adopting a 
similarly “dialectical” approach to the dichotomy of “freedom” and “social constraint”, similar to the 
one I have attempted to outline above, wherein our freedom is manifest in the different ways in which 
we appropriate and respond to the constraints placed upon us by social “norms” and “roles”. 
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in favour of quantification as a way of ensuring the objectivity of sociological 
analysis.  This, however, risks limiting meaningful action to being understood only 
in terms of the pre-determined categories by which it is quantified.  Such a 
classificatory methodology can therefore lead us to exclude any feature of 
meaningful action which doesn’t already conform to the categories by which we seek 
to quantify it, or to see social roles only in terms of their “constraining” function 
even if this is not necessarily the best way to understand the situation at hand. 
Dahrendorf, as we have said, acknowledges the status of homo sociologicus 
as a theoretical construction.  He warns against the “dogmatic” sociologist who 
“describes man as an aggregate of roles, and unthinkingly goes on to claim that he 
has discovered the nature of man” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 61).  Similarly, he claims that, 
should sociological theory be appropriated and used in a manner we consider 
morally repellent, “we may impute guilt by omission to the sociologist who, in full 
awareness of the damage done by his theories, washes his innocent hands in the pure 
logic of scientific discovery” (Dahrendorf, 1973: 80).   
The sociologist, for Dahrendorf, has a responsibility to guard against such 
misappropriation and to make it clear that sociological models of human beings are 
theoretical constructions made in line with the presuppositions of a particular 
academic discipline, and should not be thought to conflict with or undermine the 
dignity or freedom of the person.  He emphasises that the remit of homo sociologicus 
is purely that of sociological inquiry, and appeals to “[t]he individual as a moral 
being, as a living protest against the vexation of society” (Dahrendorf, 1968a: 105) 
as a counterpart to the conformity of homo sociologicus, a necessary complement to 
our overall picture of humanity.  Drawing upon Kant, Dahrendorf even argues that 
homo sociologicus and the “transcendental freedom” of humanity serve to point 
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towards two fundamentally different aspects of humanity; “the two characters of 
man are an expression of essentially different possibilities of knowledge” 
(Dahrendorf, 1973: 63).95 
For Dahrendorf, the sociologist’s responsibility to acknowledge disciplinary 
prejudice is, to a large extent, a moral one.  It encompasses a responsibility to guard 
against the reification of sociological constructs when they are appropriated outside 
the limited field in which they have validity.  But, inspired by the desire to find the 
“best” methodology for the social sciences, Dahrendorf ends up pre-determining 
what counts as the “proper” object of study for sociology; i.e. the way in which 
power, conflict and constraint constitute society and the individual in society.  This 
depends upon a need to preserve a particular abstraction of man, homo sociologicus, 
as the object proper of sociology.  Dahrendorf is ready to satisfy this need even if it 
means renouncing both the “realism” of sociological inquiry and the possibility that 
other categories or approaches to sociological inquiry might tell us something that a 
constraint-focussed approach cannot.96  This, however, involves deliberately 
overlooking the complexity of social phenomena in favour of clarity, overlooking 
“truth” in favour of “method”. 
Clarity, however, demands more than abstraction and simplification.  
Abstraction and idealisation are, to a certain extent, inevitable consequences of the 
kind of objectification undergone by social phenomena when they are constituted 
and “fixed” as an object of reflective inquiry, and have an important role to play in 
                                               
95 Italics added for emphasis. 
 
96 It should perhaps be noted that Dahrendorf’s rejection of what he describes as his previously 
“tolerant view” that different sociological approaches might work alongside one another or in 
conjunction with one another is made specifically in reference to what he characterises as the 
“equilibrium” approach to social theory, typified for Dahrendorf by the functional structuralism of 
thinkers such as Talcott Parsons (Dahrendorf, 1968b: 149-50). 
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the study of human action.97  But in order that they may do so it is not enough to 
simply state that they are abstractions, that they were never intended to be “realistic” 
and that they only tell us about homo sociologicus.98  As I have argued, free and 
socialised being are not “essentially different”, but instead are intimately related to 
one another. Understanding either in isolation should involve at least attempting to 
engage with the other, and understanding what is lost or reified in abstracting one 
from the other.  Without this effort we risk allowing the unspoken presuppositions – 
the disciplinary prejudices – upon which homo sociologicus is based to contribute to 
the reification of a dichotomy between “absolute” freedom and conformity that 
might not exist. 
We need to be able to place these abstractions within a context in which they 
make sense, both in terms of their own aims and in terms of how they relate to the 
“real” phenomena they purport to describe.  We need to be able to say what the 
presuppositions that underlie these abstractions are, what aspects of social being are 
being captured by these abstractions and how this might relate to the observations 
and interpretations of action we make in particular cases.  This cannot simply be a 
meta-theoretical or methodological concern that precedes analysis, or a “moral” 
responsibility that arises when our ideas are misappropriated somewhere down the 
line.  The issue at hand is one of “responsibility”, but this is not something 
subsequent to interpretation.  It is a responsibility that arises from interpretive 
activity and which the interpreter of action must attempt to meet as part of their 
                                               
97 This is not to say that arbitrary abstraction or uncontrolled reification have any place in the human 
and social sciences. Problems arise only if the practices of abstraction and idealisation become more 
prominent than the phenomena they are intended to explain or clarify. 
 
98 Dahrendorf would possibly reject this as a misunderstanding of his project.  For Dahrendorf, 
sociology, as a science, demands the clarity of abstraction.  Descriptions which aim to tell us 
something about the “real” human creature, for Dahrendorf, are therefore a form of “philosophical 
anthropology” and not sociology proper (Dahrendorf, 1968a: 95). 
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work.  Unless we incorporate an element of reflectivity and an awareness of 
disciplinary prejudice into the methods the human and social sciences, we run the 
risk of reifying our theoretical “constructions” in such a manner that other 
possibilities of understanding the object of our inquiry become nigh on 
imperceptible.  We need therefore to consider the effect of “disciplinary prejudice” 
at each stage of our analysis – including the “descriptive” level at which action is 
constituted as an object of inquiry – and to carry an awareness of this with us – a 
hermeneutic consciousness of prejudice as a constitutive factor in our understanding 
– in order that we do not lose sight of how different hermeneutic frameworks might 
be more or less suited to different tasks, and in relation to different social 
phenomena.   
This is not to say that there is no place for homo sociologicus in sociological 
inquiry.  It is a construct that focuses our attention upon part of social existence – the 
way in which our actions as individuals are shaped by social norms and constraints – 
and does so powerfully, allowing us to better understand the way in which the 
individual relates to society under certain presumed conditions.  If we lose sight of 
this act of fictionalisation, however, and become captivated by the power of our own 
constructions, we also lose sight of the fact that our theories make up but one 
“segment” of social reality.99  By explicitly placing our theoretical constructions 
within critical, historical and social contexts, and by incorporating self-criticism as a 
part of our descriptive and interpretive methodology, we identify them as particular 
“interpretations” of reality, informed by certain presuppositions of meaning and 
                                               
99 Nor is the effect of disciplinary prejudice necessarily, or even typically, limited to the construction 
of ideal models or archetypes which are then used to interpret reality; disciplinary (or cultural) 
prejudices of one kind or another can inform interpretive analysis without these being part of any 
systemised historical “model” (e.g. the pervasive culture of “Orientalism” in Western thought notably 
criticised by Edward Said). 
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histories of interpretation.  We need to contextualise our interpretive activity so that 
others might understand our reasoning, understand where abstractions have been 
made and how these might relate to some aspect of human life.  It is for this reason 
that the descriptions of action we make within the human sciences must be “critical”. 
To be “critical” in this fashion the human and social sciences must aspire to a 
culture within which hermeneutic consciousness and interpretive “vigilance” of the 
kind described here can be incorporated into its interpretive practices.  It must do so 
in order that the “prejudices” of the human and social sciences can play a productive 
role in our understanding, and so that the interpretation of meaningful action is 
capable of recognising its own contingency and the limits of its own validity.  
Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics and “The Model of the Text” are capable of 
providing an important framework within which such a culture of vigilance could 
grow and prosper, even if this is not a possibility explored explicitly by Ricoeur 
himself.100 
By explicitly identifying the objectification of action as a precondition of its 
interpretation we become more attentive to how the description and representation of 
action influences how we understand it.  Insofar as it allows us to recognise 
description as interpretive, the textual model provides a framework within which 
interpreters can understand and incorporate disciplinary prejudice as part of their 
practices, rather than being dominated by its reified forms.  The “critical” description 
of action is an important part of this, as it works to undermine the reifying powers of 
language and theory by placing our activities within an historical and disciplinary 
                                               
100 Although, of course, “The Model of the Text” also has to recognise both the limits of its own 
validity and the ways in which other models of understanding can complement and challenge these 
limits if it is to do so. This thesis represents a broad philosophical attempt to engage with this task, 
albeit still at a fairly abstract level. 
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tradition that can itself be questioned.  This, rather than empty abstraction, is where 
the possibility of “objectivity” in the human sciences lies. 
 
4.3: The Reception of Action as a Text 
 In addition to composing original descriptions and interpretations of action, 
interpreters throughout the human and social sciences will often have reason to deal 
with accounts, records and interpretations of action composed by others.101  Just as 
with our own descriptions and interpretations of action, the received accounts that 
we turn to as sources are historically and socially contingent; we have a 
responsibility to read them critically because understanding and interpreting 
meaningful action also involves understanding the circumstances under which it has 
become “fixed” as an object of reflection, and how these circumstances relate to, or 
potentially distort, the meaning of the action at hand.   
The reception of pre-composed accounts, descriptions and interpretations of 
action demands also that we are aware of the history of interpretation – the 
Wirkungsgeschichte – that precedes our reception of the descriptions of action at 
hand.102  I take this to apply to both contemporary and historical lay-accounts of 
action used as sources within the social and human sciences, and to the descriptions 
and interpretations of action composed within the academic community.   Such 
accounts of action are often appropriated and reinterpreted in situations potentially 
far removed from those in which they were originally composed.  Thus, if we hope 
                                               
101 I have left this question until now because it is relatively well established that practitioners of the 
human and social sciences should be sensitive to the reliability of their sources, and take possible bias 
into account in their interpretations of these sources.  To say that we should read critically is hardly 
controversial (even if we do not always achieve this in practice). 
 
102 The concept of Wirkungsgeschichte is elaborated in more depth in chapter one, section 1.1.2 of this 
thesis. 
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to use them as sources within our interpretive analyses, accounts of action composed 
within the disciplinary traditions of which we are inheritors demand that we read 
them critically in the same way as we would lay or historical accounts.  The 
obligation to take a reflective and critical attitude towards accounts of action in the 
human and social sciences is therefore one that should be shared at both the level of 
the composition and at the level of reception of “texts” of action. 
Perhaps the most striking examples of disciplines in which the interpreter of 
action must rely upon received accounts are those of history and archaeology, in 
which human action is only ever understood at a temporal distance.  Interpreters in 
these disciplines engage with received historical accounts of action and the “traces” 
of action – artefacts and documents – which are used as evidence from which an 
account of human action can be composed.  The importance of critical analysis in 
this context arises because, like any description of action or account of its 
significance, historical texts are products of a particular socio-historical situation, 
composed for particular purposes, and for a particular audience.103  Even, therefore, 
if we are not concerned specifically with endemic “disciplinary” prejudice, it is vital 
that we approach such received accounts and representations of action critically and 
attempt to take potential bias into account as part of our understanding of them. 
And although the relevance of such a “critical” attitude is perhaps most 
pronounced when we encounter accounts of action composed in societies very 
removed from our own, either historically or culturally, even the reception of 
contemporary lay-accounts of action requires that we read critically before we 
                                               
103 Some historical accounts of action, for example, may have been composed to fulfil a 
propagandistic role: The Bayeux Tapestry, though undoubtedly an invaluable historical resource, was 
never designed to provide a balanced account of the Battle of Hastings; e.g. Edward Freeman, in “The 
Authority of the Bayeux Tapestry”, writes that “though the Tapestry perverts the story less than any 
other Norman account it is still essentially a Norman account. The main object of the work is plainly 
to set forth the right of William to the English Crown” (Freeman, 1997: 14). 
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interpret the action they purport to describe.  That an account of action given by 
someone with whom we identify or share a cultural background might seem 
immediately familiar or plausible to us does not mean that it is any less a product of 
the socio-historical conditions of its production, or the ends to which it may have 
been composed.  In approaching any account of action, we need first to try and 
understand the way in which it is framed by the wider social context of which it is a 
part.104 
 
4.3.1: Critical Reading and Freud’s Totem and Taboo 
The consequences of failing to read “critically” can be profound.  Failing to 
remain aware of the way in which our readings are influenced by our interests, 
prejudices and the intellectual traditions which precede us can, for example, lead us 
to read “selectively” in such a manner so as to only pick out those aspects of our 
reading that support our presuppositions, and thus blind ourselves to any other 
possible readings.  In Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur offers a critical account of 
Freud’s Totem and Taboo, arguing that his uncritical and selective appropriation of 
ethnological texts means that “taken as a scientific document, Totem and Taboo is 
simply a huge vicious circle” (Ricoeur, 1970: 208).  In particular Ricoeur is critical 
of the “scientific myth” (Ricoeur, 1970: 198) constructed by Freud in order to 
explain the origins “of social organization, of moral restrictions and of religion” 
(Freud, 1955: 142).   
Freud indulges in this genealogical exercise because he needs to be able to 
explain the origins of social prohibition as the “external” element of our psyche.  
This notion of there being an external element of the psyche refers to the way in 
                                               
104 However, taking a “critical” stance towards one’s sources is not necessarily an attempt to 
undermine the veracity of such an account, but only the exercise of a will to question that veracity. 
163 
 
which prohibitions impressed upon us by our parents in our childhoods, and the way 
in which these prohibitions conflict with our unconscious desires, play a vital role in 
the formation of our Ego.  Prohibition, however, “does not succeed in abolishing the 
instinct. Its only result is to repress the instinct... and banish it into the unconscious. 
Both the prohibition and the instinct persist” (Freud, 1955: 29).  The ambivalent 
attitude which results from this repression leads to these instinctual desires to “find 
substitutes – substitute objects and substitute acts – in place of the prohibited ones” 
(Freud, 1955: 30).  This process of substitution, whereby our repressed desires burst 
forth and find an outlet in something other than that at which the desire is truly 
aimed, is evident for Freud in the obsessional behaviours of neurotic patients.105 
Freud, however, does not believe that these moral prohibitions originate with 
our parents, even if they are the primary source of authority within our early 
childhoods.  In order to explain how “external” prohibitions play such an active part 
in our psychic lives, Freud must then account for how it is that moral institutions 
persist across time and are transmitted from one generation to the next as part of our 
cultures.  He is, nevertheless, keen to avoid purely “sociological” explanations, and 
denies that “direct communication and tradition” could possibly be “enough to 
account for the process” (Freud, 1955: 158).  He thus posits “the existence of a 
collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as they do in the mind of an 
individual” (Freud, 1955: 158), and an accompanying “unconscious understanding… 
of all the customs, ceremonies and dogmas left behind by the original relation to the 
                                               
105 In Totem and Taboo, Freud uses the example of a “touching phobia” (Freud, 1955: 27).  He writes 
that this kind of phobic behaviour has it roots “in very early childhood” when “the patient shows a 
strong desire to touch [their genitals]”.  This urge is in turn “promptly met by an external prohibition 
against carrying out that particular kind of touching” (Freud, 1955: 29), eventually leading the patient 
to develop obsessive behaviour in respect to making physical contact with some otherwise innocuous 
object. Freud references an unnamed “household article” in his example, but also cites “washing 
mania” – wherein the patient is compelled to wash obsessively as an act of “purification” as a 
common symptom of such phobias (Freud, 1955: 28). 
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father” which “may have made it possible for later generations to take over their 
heritage of emotion” (Freud, 1955: 159).  However, in order to explain this scenario 
– and the notion of the “original relation to the father” – Freud is led to imagine a 
historical origin for the development moral prohibition, back to which we can trace 
the entire development of human culture and civilisation. 
Freud reaches this conclusion by identifying the process of prohibition and 
substitution discussed above as manifest in the taboos prevalent within totemism; 
particularly within the taboos against killing the totem animal (representative, for 
Freud, of the father), and against incest (in particular against sex with the mother or 
those of the mother’s bloodline).106  These prohibitions, according to Freud, are the 
“most ancient and important taboo prohibitions” (Freud, 1955: 31) and thus must 
testify to “the oldest and most powerful of human desires” (Freud, 1955: 32).  These 
prohibitions against incest and patricide, for Freud, testify to the universality of the 
Oedipal complex – the claim that the universal fate of humankind is “to direct our 
first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous 
wish against our father” (Freud, 1976: 364).  That these “primal” desires are 
prohibited even in “primitive”107 totemic cultures leads Freud to argue that “the 
earliest human penal systems” may thus “be traced back to taboo” (Freud, 1955: 20).  
This identification of totemic taboo with the origins of institutionalised morality 
                                               
106 The idea that the totem animal could be identified with the father is rooted in the observation that 
“primitive men... describe the totem as their common ancestor and primal father” (Freud, 1955: 131).  
The emphasis upon the mother’s bloodline within prohibition of incest is identified by Freud as 
related to the idea that there are “grounds for thinking that totem prohibitions were principally 
directed against the incestuous desires of the son” and that thus that, in terms of belonging to a totem, 
“descent through the female line is older than that through the male” (Freud, 1955: 5, fn. 1).  There 
are, needless to say, many reasons why we should remain sceptical about these identifications, but for 
our purposes it is enough for the moment to recognise that Freud made them in the course of his 
analysis of the psychical origins of social/moral prohibition. 
 
107 Freud’s understanding of aboriginal people as cannibalistic “savages”, and the identification of 
“primitive” indigenous peoples as fundamentally childlike, were deeply held cultural prejudices of his 
era, perhaps especially among those such as Freud who had no first hand experience of the people he 
was discussing. Arens’ The Man-Eating Myth provides a compelling analysis of the origins and the 
dubious validity of the anthropological and cultural prejudice of the “cannibal savage”. 
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means that, for Freud, the Oedipal complex is “revealed both as an individual drama 
and as the collective fate of mankind, as a psychological fact and as the source of 
morality, as the origin of neurosis and as the origin of civilization” (Ricoeur, 1970: 
188). 
In order to support this position, however, Freud draws upon a number of 
diverse sources – including various ethnological accounts of totemism and sacrificial 
rites, along with the Darwinian notion of the “primal horde” – and constructs a story 
about a particular moment in history within which the origins of human morality are 
rooted.  Freud imagines a “primal horde” headed by a “violent and jealous father 
who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up” 
(Freud, 1955: 141).  At some point, however, these banished sons – who, like the 
Oedipal child, both fear and envy their father – band together in order to both kill 
and devour their father “and so made an end of the patriarchal horde” (Freud, 1955: 
141).  In the wake of this act of patricide, however:  
the tumultuous mob of brothers were filled with the same 
contradictory feelings which we can see at work in the ambivalent 
father-complexes of our children... They hated their father, who 
presented such a formidable obstacle to their craving for power and 
their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too... A sense of 
guilt made its appearance... What had up to then been prevented by 
his actual existence was thenceforward prohibited by the sons 
themselves... They revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the 
totem, the substitute for their father; and they renounced its fruit by 
resigning their claim to the women who had now been set free. They 
thus created out of their filial sense of guilt the two fundamental 
taboos of totemism, which for that very reason inevitably 
corresponded to the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. 
(Freud, 1955: 143) 
 
According to Freud, the consequences of this action and subsequent renunciation 
were far-ranging, and “must inevitably have left ineradicable traces in the history of 
humanity” (Freud, 1955: 155).  He claims that it led to the instantiation of the “totem 
meal” – within which the totem animal, representative of the father, is sacrificed and 
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eaten communally by members of the clan – which is described by Freud as is 
“perhaps mankind’s earliest festival” and thus as “a repetition and a commemoration 
of this memorable and criminal deed” (Freud, 1955: 142).  It is this “historical” 
enactment of the Oedipal complex, and the subsequent emotional ambivalence of the 
patricidal brothers, from which the institutionalisation and socialisation of 
prohibition originates, and of which all psychical conflict is in some sense a re-
enactment. 
 Ricoeur, however, claims that in this attempt “psychoanalysis is condemned 
to have recourse to an ethnology that is fanciful, at times fantastic, and in any event 
always secondhand” (Ricoeur, 1970: 188).  As Ricoeur puts it, in order to reach this 
conclusion one has “only to combine” the relevant elements of “Frazer, Wundt, 
Darwin, Atkinson, and Robertson Smith” (Ricoeur, 1970: 207).  This, however, 
involves a very careful selection of sources which support this picture of humanity’s 
past, along with an exclusion of anything which does not fit this model, and an 
equally careful work of composition in order to bring this patchwork of ethnological 
fragments together into a presaging of the Oedipal myth so central to Freud’s 
psychoanalytical theory.  Ricoeur thus claims that it is: 
difficult to resist the impression that the Oedipus complex, 
deciphered in dreams and the neuroses, is what enabled Freud to 
select from the available ethnological materials just those factors that 
allow for the reconstruction of a collective Oedipus complex of 
mankind in the sense of an actual event that occurred at the beginning 
of history. Identification with the totem and ambivalence in its regard 
are reified, so to speak, in what is now a literal, and not a symbolic, 
interpretation. (Ricoeur, 1970: 207-8) 
 
It is thus Freud’s uncritical appropriation of ethnological texts, prejudiced by his 
commitment to the universal psychological reality of the Oedipal myth, that leads us 
towards this picture of a “primal parricide” which Ricoeur describes as “merely an 
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event constructed out of ethnological scraps on the pattern of the fantasy deciphered 
by analysis” (Ricoeur, 1970: 208). 
 Freud was, to some extent, aware that this story might “seem fantastic” 
(Freud, 1955: 141), but nevertheless maintained that his account to be historically 
accurate and claimed in his defence against critics of his historicism only that “it 
would be as foolish to aim at exactitude in such questions as it would be unfair to 
insist upon certainty” (Freud, 1955: 142-3, fn. 1).  Ricoeur rejects this positivistic 
version of the account, suggesting that we would instead be better served by 
“interpreting it as myth” (Ricoeur, 1970: 208).  For our purposes here, however, it is 
enough to note that Freud’s construction of this historical/scientific “myth” depends 
heavily upon a very selective approach to reading his sources premised upon a 
concern to confirm his preliminary hypothesis and not upon the open-minded yet 
critically aware approach to the reception of texts which I have suggested should be 
part of a hermeneutic approach to interpretation. 
The consequences of this cannot be limited to the positing of a historical 
turning point in the history of human psychology, but also to all that this entails.  If 
we accept Freud’s account, for example, we find ourselves committed to a particular 
view of human history, religion, art and morality wherein all of the many and varied 
phenomena that fall under these broad categories are somehow to be considered as 
derivative of this original Oedipal crisis.  This obscures the potential for 
understanding the institutionalisation of human morality in terms other than those of 
Freud’s psychological theory, and thus delimits the number of possible 
interpretations of human culture, history and action available to us in a manner 
which cannot possibly be justified by the circular reading of the Oedipal myth back 
into human history as it is presented in Totem and Taboo.  Within Freud’s work we 
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may therefore perceive an extreme example of how our reception of texts within the 
human and social sciences can subsequently influence how we understand and 
interpret human action, and the accompanying necessity of reading critically and 
carefully if we are to avoid the kind of biased reading practiced by Freud on this 
occasion. 
 
The work involved in the interpretation of action occurs both at the level of 
its composition and at the level of its reception, and at each stage these activities 
need to be critically informed.  Critical responsibility within the social and human 
sciences is therefore shared between both writers and readers belonging to the 
communities within which texts of action are circulated, read and commented upon.  
Ricoeur does not explicitly discuss the necessity of critical reading (or description) in 
“The Model of the Text”.  However, the critical distance recognised by Ricoeur as 
central to interpretive practice applies both to the composition and the reception of 
these “texts” of action.  By attempting to recognise the “textuality” of received 
accounts of action, we can hope to achieve a kind of critical distance similar to that 
identified by Ricoeur within the objectification of action.  In both cases, by 
identifying the object of our inquiry as a “text” of action we can begin to 
comprehend the role played by cultural and disciplinary prejudice in how we 
understand and interpret the action at hand.  The “critical” description of action for 
which I have argued as a supplement to Ricoeur’s proposal of a textual hermeneutics 
of action should therefore be taken as a complement of the already well-established 
practice of critical reading prevalent within the human and social sciences. 
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4.4: Conclusion 
One of the greatest strengths of “The Model of the Text” is its recognition of 
the centrality of objectification to interpretive practice.  By objectifying action, we 
introduce a level of reflective distanciation within which interpretation can take 
place.  Without this initial act of objectification, without being able to step back from 
action and consider it from a critical perspective, interpretation risks being reduced 
to either the naïve acceptance of some given meaning or the equally naïve imposition 
of one’s own presuppositions of meaning.  Ricoeur, however, fails to pursue the 
importance of objectification as far as he might, and “The Model of the Text” pays 
little attention to the role played by description in the constitution of action as an 
object of critical inquiry.  If we are to engage fully with the important role played by 
objectification, and the centrality of this to the possible application of textual 
hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful action, it is necessary for us to go 
further than Ricoeur did in this regard. 
I have argued for the importance of having a “critical” understanding of the 
way in which prejudice influences the description and understanding of action to the 
practices of the interpretive social and human sciences.  By “critical” in this context I 
mean primarily that one should be able to reflect upon the way that descriptions and 
interpretations of action are informed by disciplinary prejudice and the socio-
historical context in which these activities take place.  I have placed a particular 
emphasis on the importance of maintaining a “critical” attitude as part of the 
description of action within the social and human sciences. 
It is important to realise that the description of action is not, so to speak, a 
passive transcription of something given. Rather, it involves the activity of some 
individual or group of individuals working together in order to bring meaningful 
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action to linguistic discourse.  The descriptions they make will, to some extent, 
depend upon the framework in which the description is made.  It is also the level of 
interpretation at which the objectification of action occurs, the construal of action as 
an object of inquiry, and is therefore ineliminably a productive dimension of any 
understanding achieved in its interpretation.  The presuppositions that underlie the 
act of description must therefore be taken into consideration as part of the 
interpretive process. 
Although not explicitly directed towards the problem of description, “The 
Model of the Text” is nevertheless well equipped to cope with such issues.  On a 
fairly broad level, the hermeneutic philosophy upon which the textual model is 
premised aims to engender a “hermeneutic consciousness” in the interpreter; a 
consciousness that the interpreter inevitably brings something into the interpretive 
situation, and a consciousness of how “prejudice” might inform or distort the 
understanding we achieve via interpretive activity.108  The demands of such a 
hermeneutic consciousness led Ricoeur to argue that “the critique of illusions of the 
subject must be integrated into hermeneutics” (Ricoeur, 1981g: 191).  A hermeneutic 
model of interpretation therefore encourages us to understand and engage with the 
active role we play not only in the interpretation of meaningful action, but, insofar as 
it plays a constitutive role in our understanding of action, also at the level at which 
action is “fixed” as a determinate object of reflective inquiry within the human and 
social sciences. 
                                               
108 There is, of course, no single and unique strict method for the description or interpretation of 
action within the human and social sciences. The particular form taken by the “vigilance” demanded 
by interpretation will depend to a certain extent upon the kind of inquiry into which we are entering, 
the kind of discourse and traditions of thought prevalent within the discipline(s) with which we are 
engaging and the kind of action we are looking to describe/interpret. 
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Where “The Model of the Text” stands out in this regard is in its recognition 
that for action to become the “object” of interpretation it must first be “fixed” in a 
manner analogous to the fixation of discourse in the text.109  This casts the 
objectification of action as an integral precondition for interpretive inquiry in the 
human and social sciences.  Part of the work involved in reflective inquiry within 
these disciplines includes, therefore, the representation of action as a “delineated 
pattern” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 204) of some kind.  However, the richness of experience 
means that any particular action is potentially describable in a number of different 
ways, with each different description capable of subtly emphasising (or obscuring) 
different elements of the meaningfulness of action.  We must therefore take this into 
account as part of our descriptive activities within the social and human sciences.110    
Description is, like interpretation, irreducibly partial.  “The Model of the 
Text”, by placing a great emphasis upon the “objectification” of action and the 
importance of self-critique within interpretation, is capable of engendering the kind 
of hermeneutic consciousness required to guard against the uncritical acceptance of 
disciplinary prejudice, and the distorting effect prejudice can have under such 
circumstances.  But if it is to do so, then it must also engage more thoroughly with 
the role of description in the constitution of action as an object of inquiry.  If 
different possibilities of description are informed by different presuppositions of 
meaning and “disciplinary prejudices”, a full and adequate description of action 
within the social and human sciences should attempt to contain within itself some 
                                               
109 E.g. “Meaningful action is an object for science only under the condition of a kind of 
objectification” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 203). 
 
110 John B. Thompson, for example, in response to the ineluctable potential for multiple descriptions 
of the same action or set of actions, claims that the task of sociological description is “no longer to 
identify some essential feature of action which endows it with meaning”, but instead to “clarify the 
ways in which an action may be described and to elucidate criteria for the evaluation of alternative 
descriptions” (Thompson, 1981a: 142). 
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account of the schema which helped generate this account, why they were used and 
in favour of what alternatives.  It is a case of “working out” how best to describe 
action, taking the role being played by disciplinary prejudice into account and 
specifying the standards by which a judgement of adequacy was made.  This is what 
I intend when I say that description within the social and human sciences should be 
“critical”. 
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Chapter Five: Wittgenstein, Ethnomethodology and the Case against 
Interpretation 
 
 
“The Model of the Text” is premised upon the idea that the social and human 
sciences are interpretive disciplines, concerned to at least some degree with the 
interpretive understanding of meaningful human action.  There are, however, 
thinkers within the social sciences inspired by the work of figures such as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Harold Garfinkel and Peter Winch that seek to move away from what 
they term an “interpretive” approach.  Although there are important differences 
between them, what unites these thinkers is the idea that interpreting action involves 
subsuming it under some general category, and therefore abstracting away from the 
particular and contingent circumstances under which action occurs and can be 
understood as meaningful.  If this is the case, then rather than “interpret” action we 
should understand it only in relation to the local features of the situation in which 
that action takes place, with particular reference to the self-understanding of those 
who are part of and belong to the social setting in which action occurs. 
However, it is far from clear that the hermeneutic conception of interpretation 
– or Auslegung – utilised by Ricoeur in “The Model of the Text” can be 
characterised as “interpretive” in the manner which concerns Wittgenstein, Garfinkel 
and Winch.  Within this chapter I will criticise the claim that hermeneutic models of 
the interpretation of action represent an a priori invalid abstraction away from the 
understanding of action as a lived phenomenon, and argue that rejecting “The Model 
of the Text” on this basis represents a misunderstanding of hermeneutic thought.  I 
will also, however, consider how claims that emphasise the locally-situated and 
transactional nature of action might offer an important contrast to Ricoeur’s textual 
approach, and reciprocally how Ricoeur’s textual model might be able to 
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complement these transactional theories in terms of understanding how action 
becomes an “object” of inquiry, and the role played by disciplinary prejudice within 
inquiry.  To do so I will engage both with the arguments made against interpretation 
by thinkers inspired by the work of Wittgenstein and Winch, and with the claims and 
work of the school of thought within the social sciences known as 
ethnomethodology. 
 
5.1: Against Interpretation 
 For Ricoeur and, more broadly, within the hermeneutic philosophical 
tradition of which he is a part, understanding is often described in terms of the 
“hermeneutic circle”.  At its most basic level this refers to the way in which 
understanding a text is conceived as an exchange between the text as a whole and the 
individual parts of the text which taken together comprise the text as a unified work; 
that the text as a whole is understood with reference to the parts of which it is 
composed, and these individual parts understood in relation to the text as a whole.111  
Applied to the interpretation of action, the hermeneutic circle can be used to describe 
the movement between our projections of meaning – the expectations we have of the 
meanings of action based upon our past experience and the context in which the 
action takes place – and our experience of the particular situation at hand, by the 
light of which our presuppositions of meaning are revised.  The interpretation of 
action, in the hermeneutic tradition, involves the attempt to explicitly articulate the 
meaning of action in terms of this “circular” exchange between presuppositions and 
the particular situation at hand. 
                                               
111 There are, of course, other formulations of the “hermeneutic circle” such as, e.g., an exchange 
between the reader and the text, between the text and the historical context of its production or, as it is 
imagined by Ricoeur, between understanding and explanation.  I refer to the hermeneutic circle here 
in these basic terms simply to introduce the idea of interpretation as a circular exchange. 
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 Some thinkers influenced by Wittgenstein, however, reject the idea that we 
can discuss human understanding in terms of the “presuppositions” brought by the 
subject to that which they perceive, arguing that to do so is to make a substantive 
claim about human understanding as “interpretive”, and thus misrepresents and 
intellectualises understanding as it is experienced in real life.  Phil Hutchinson, 
Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock, in There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science, draw 
upon the work of Wittgenstein and Peter Winch to argue against what they term “the 
dogma that it cannot be meaningful to speak of a description of some behaviour that 
is not already an interpretation of that behaviour” (Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, 
2008: 39).  Roughly speaking, the position advocated here is that understanding is 
not ordinarily problematic, and that interpretation is therefore unnecessary.  As such, 
describing understanding in terms of interpretation “continually risks over-
intellectualizing ordinary human action by means of investing it all within an 
interpretive horizon” (Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, 2008: 39). 
An example of this “dogma” given by Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock is the 
idea that, when we see a glass, judging that what we see is a “glass” rather than 
anything else involves engaging in interpretation; that we interpret what is before us 
as a glass.  In contrast to this, the Wittgensteinian claims that we simply see the 
glass, and that “other possibilities of what ‘the glass’ might be said to be do not arise 
only to be eliminated in favour of the best interpretation… they do not arise at all” 
(Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, 2008: 39).  To say that perceiving a glass as a glass 
involves interpretation is to over-complicate what is ultimately a relatively 
uncomplicated situation.  Rather than describe understanding in terms of 
interpretation we need instead only “to ‘grasp’ the rule actually being followed by 
the person(s) one is describing… just to look, and see it.”  In doing this “one avoids 
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a hermeneutic”, and one might therefore hope instead “to capture the terms of the 
rules they are following” (Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, 2008: 40), without 
positing anything extra on the behalf of those we are describing.  According to this 
argument, we should instead articulate understanding in terms of rule-following, 
because “[n]otions such as ‘rule’, ‘norm’ and ‘practice’ are first and foremost part 
and parcel of our social life already” (Hutchinson, Read and Sharrock, 2008: 42).  
This, therefore, supposedly involves no imposition of anything alien or extraneous to 
understanding as a phenomenon; we simply describe how someone comes to 
understand something. 
The thought here is that meaning is best expressed as being rule-governed 
insofar as rule-following allows us to articulate the kind of regularities 
characteristically evident in meaningful action; that by identifying the rule according 
to which something has meaning we can render that meaning perspicuous.  This is 
not to claim that understanding necessarily, or even usually, involves the explicit 
recognition of rules on the part of the agent of action.  To the contrary, 
understanding is best understood simply as the ability to engage in forms of 
behaviour that display the characteristics of being governed by rules, usually 
unreflectively.  A paradigmatic example of this, used by Winch and drawn from 
Wittgenstein, is the ability to continue a number sequence correctly:  
the test of whether a man’s actions are the application of a rule is not whether 
he can formulate it but whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right 
and a wrong way of doing things… Learning the series of natural numbers is 
not just learning to copy down a finite series of figures in the order which one 
has been shown. It involves being able to go on writing down figures that 
have not been shown one… ‘going on in the same way’ as one was shown. 
(Winch, 1990: 58-59) 
  
Understanding is participatory insofar as it is manifest within the practical ability to 
continue the number sequence in accordance with what is already there, in 
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accordance with a “rule” that can be said to govern the correct performance or use of 
what is understood. 
It is this practical aspect of rule-following which arguably makes it most 
distinct from interpretative conceptions of understanding.  This distinction is also 
evident when Wittgenstein claims that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not 
an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and 
‘going against it’ in actual cases”, leading him to conclude that the term 
“interpretation” should be restricted “to the substitution of one expression of the rule 
for another” (Wittgenstein, 2001: § 201).  With this, the benchmark for 
understanding becomes the “rules” which most adequately capture the everyday 
quality of engaging in practical life.  To “interpret”, in the sense recommended by 
Wittgenstein, is simply to articulate the particular circumstances under which 
understanding occurs on a case by case basis, and needn’t involve framing such a 
description in terms of “presuppositions” or “expectations of meaning” in the 
manner prevalent within hermeneutic philosophy. 
In terms of understanding the meaning of action this would mean that 
interpreting action would involve nothing more and nothing less than “looking and 
seeing”.  Understanding action necessitates viewing it within the social context to 
which it belongs, and it is only by doing this that we can hope to identify an action as 
itself.  Winch, along these lines, writes that “ideas cannot be torn out of their context; 
the relation between idea and context is an internal one. The idea gets its sense from 
the role it plays in the system” (Winch, 1990: 107).  By comparison, the 
“interpretive” approaches perceived as prevalent within the social sciences are said 
to involve critical and theoretical constructs being brought to bear upon the 
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identification and understanding of action, which in turn abstract away from and 
distort the phenomena being interpreted. 
 
5.2: In Defence of Interpretation 
We need, however, to question whether this represents an accurate 
characterisation of hermeneutic interpretation, and whether the Wittgensteinian 
alternative proposed does not also prove problematic in certain respects in regard to 
capturing the meaningfulness of human action.  Primarily this concern revolves 
around how the word “interpretation” is itself understood, and the kind of epistemic 
and substantive commitments this implies.  Many interpretive accounts are, or can 
be, far closer to the “descriptive” project of rule-following than to the kind of 
positivist and intellectualist approaches to the interpretation of action towards which 
Wittgensteinian criticism is justifiably aimed. 
Just as articulating understanding in terms of “rules” needn’t involve making 
substantive claims about the ontological status of these rules, describing 
understanding in terms of interpretation can simply be an attempt to articulate the 
conditions under which understanding something as meaningful is possible, rather 
than a suggestion that understanding necessarily implies overt or explicit interpretive 
activities.  I contend that looking more closely at the philosophical tradition of which 
Ricoeur is a part will show that interpretation understood in hermeneutic terms is 
importantly distinct from the kind of interpretation at which Wittgensteinian 
criticism is primarily aimed. 
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5.2.1: Heidegger in Translation 
The issue of the character of hermeneutic interpretation is perhaps most 
strikingly evident in the distinction that Heidegger makes between two forms of 
interpretation; Auslegung and Interpretieren.  Whilst both words can be translated as 
“interpretation”, they have very different implications.  “Interpretieren” is typically 
used by Heidegger to refer to systematic and theoretical interpretation.  “Auslegung” 
is used as a broader term to cover the activity of becoming aware of something as 
something; a kind of interpretation within which “understanding does not become 
something different. It becomes itself” (Heidegger, 2008: 188).  It is via 
interpretation that we become conscious of the world in which we exist pre-
reflectively.  Conceiving of understanding as interpretation is therefore not to add 
anything to the nature of understanding, but simply to express understanding in a 
way that draws attention to the contextual conditions under which it makes sense to 
say that something has some particular or potential meaning. 
The significance of this distinction becomes clearer if we look more closely 
at the German words translated as “interpretation” in the works of different 
philosophers who have written about understanding and interpretation.  To begin 
with, we will turn to Wittgenstein, specifically the Philosophical Investigations (PI); 
the work that provides the most direct source of inspiration for arguments against 
interpretation.112  When Wittgenstein says that “there is a way of grasping a rule 
which is not an interpretation”, the German word used and translated as 
“interpretation” is “Deutung” (Wittgenstein, 2001: § 201).  It is the noun “Deutung”, 
                                               
112 Unless otherwise specified, I will be referring to Elizabeth Anscombe’s translation of PI. Any 
reference to a different translation will be in order to draw attention to differences between 
translations and will be indicated when appropriate. 
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or alternatively the verb “Deuten”, not “Auslegung” or “Interpretieren”, that 
Wittgenstein primarily uses to refer to interpretation throughout the PI.113 
The term “Deuten” in particular suggests the sort of concerns Wittgenstein 
held regarding interpretation, as it can also be translated as “pointing to” or 
“indicating”.  Both of these potential translations show Wittgenstein as concerned 
with “interpretation” directing the understanding subject away from that which is 
being interpreted, against which he stipulates that we should only use this word to 
refer “to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another” (Wittgenstein, 
2001: § 201).  If Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with interpretation is specifically 
aimed at not diverting our attention away from that which we are interpreting, it is 
important that we take this into consideration.  “Auslegung” typically designates a 
form of interpretation quite different from this; it can, for example, also be translated 
as “exegesis”, an activity, associated primarily with textual interpretation, which 
necessarily involves attending closely to that which is being interpreted. 
Both “Deutung” and “Deuten” are words used minimally by those writers 
with whom the development of hermeneutics in its modern form is closely 
associated.  As we have already mentioned, Heidegger is careful to distinguish 
between “Auslegung” and the more thoroughly systematic “Interpretieren”.  Both of 
these, however, differ from “Deutung” and “Deuten”.  Heidegger uses both terms in 
Being and Time, but does so minimally and in a manner distinct from the way in 
which he uses either “Auslegung” or “Interpretieren”. 
                                               
113 Other examples, among many, include sections § 34, § 85, § 160, § 170, § 198… the list goes on. 
There are occasions on which “Deutung” is translated differently, however, such as § 32 in which 
“Deutung” is translated as “significance” in the Anscombe translation (but as “interpretation” in 
Hacker and Schulte’s revised translation (Wittgenstein, 2009: 19e). These alternate translations are 
simply a reflection of the way in which the German word can be used however, and do not signify any 
notable deviation from Wittgenstein’s use of “Deutung” to mean “interpretation” elsewhere. 
“Deuten”, meanwhile, appears in passages such as § 34, § 170, § 206, § 637 etc. 
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“Deutung” is translated as “explanation”, and used infrequently.  The 
occasion on which “Deutung” occurs most prominently is in a passage which begins 
with the sentence; “Dieser phänomenale Befund ist nicht wegzudeuten” (Heidegger, 
1967: 275).114  “Wegzudeuten” means to “explain away”, and it would seem that 
when Heidegger refers to “explanation” in this context it implies a similar kind of 
“interpretation” that fails to take account of the phenomena that it proclaims to 
explain, to explanations that lead us away from the phenomenon at hand; “Beide 
Deutungen überspringen vorschnell den phänomenalen Befund” is translated, for 
example, as “Both these explanations pass over the phenomenal findings too hastily” 
(Heidegger, 2008: 320). 
“Deuten” is used even more rarely, and is translated simply as “points to”.115  
The related term “Umdeuten” is translated as “giving new explanations” (Heidegger, 
2008: 298) and to “give a new explanation” (Heidegger, 2008: 305), and is closely 
associated by Heidegger with evasion and inauthenticity.  The only time at which 
“deuten” is associated with “Auslegung” is when Heidegger writes: “Die Analyse des 
Geredes und der Zweideutigkeit dagegen setzt schon die Klärung der zeitlichen 
Konstitution der Rede und des Deutens (der Auslegung) voraus” (Heidegger, 1967: 
346).  “Deutens” here is still translated as explanation, but is followed by 
“Auslegung” in parentheses, which serves as a qualification of “Deutens” indicating 
that interpretation (Auslegung) is a particular kind of explanation relevant to 
Heidegger’s “analysis of idle talk and ambiguity” (Heidegger, 2008: 397).  The very 
                                               
114 German references for Heidegger will be drawn from the 1967 eleventh, unchanged edition of Sein 
und Zeit. For English references I will be referring to the 1962 Macquarrie and Robinson translation 
of the seventh edition of Sein und Zeit. 
 
115 “Alle Modifikationen der Furcht deuten als Möglichkeiten des Sich-befindens darauf hin, daß das 
Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein »furchtsam« ist” is translated as “All modifications of fear, as 
possibilities of having a state-of-mind, point to the fact that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is ‘fearful’.” 
(German: Heidegger, 1967: 142; English: Heidegger, 2008: 182) 
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fact that Heidegger makes this clarification shows that he considers Auslegung 
importantly distinct from the kind of explanations or explanatory activity to which 
he otherwise refers with “Deutung” or “Deuten”.  We should be cautious, therefore, 
about conflating one with the other in translation. 
 
5.2.2: Gadamer & Ricoeur 
In Gadamer’s Truth and Method too the use of the words “Deutung” and 
“Deuten” is marginal in comparison to “Auslegung”.  “Deutens” occurs in reference 
to Kantian aesthetics.116  “Deutung”, meanwhile, is translated as “interpretation”, but 
primarily functions as a general and non-specific term for interpretation.  On at least 
one occasion “Deutung” is even related to the hermeneutic task “[o]nly in an 
extended sense”, although this may be because Gadamer’s notion of “Auslegung” is 
reserved specifically for text interpretation.117 
By comparison, Gadamer writes that “[t]o interpret [Auslegen] means 
precisely to bring one’s own preconceptions into play so that the text’s meaning 
[Meinung] can really be made to speak for us” (Gadamer, 1993: 397).118  There can 
be little doubt that Gadamer considers Auslegung the form of interpretation primarily 
relevant to the hermeneutic project.  The concept of an “interpretive horizon” then, 
                                               
116 “…bewährte sich darin, daß es dem Genuß und der Betrachtung einen unausschöpfbaren 
Gegenstand des Verweilens und Deutens bot” (Gadamer, 2010: 99); translated by Weinsheimer and 
Marshall as “…proved by the fact that it offered to pleasure and contemplation an inexhaustible 
object of lingering attention and interpretation” (Gadamer, 1993: 94); German references are taken 
from the seventh edition of Warheit und Methode published in 2010, English references are taken 
from Weinsheimer and Marshall’s revised translation of the fourth edition of Warheit und Methode. 
 
117 Gadamer writes that “[n]ur in einem erweiterten Sinne stellen auch nichtschriftliche Monumente 
eine hermeneutische Aufgabe... Was sie bedeuten, ist eine Frage ihrer Deutung, nicht der Entzifferung 
und des Verständnisses eines Wortlauts” (German: Gadamer, 2010: 394). This is translated as “[o]nly 
in an extended sense do non-literary monuments present a hermeneutical task… What they mean is a 
question of their interpretation [Deutung], not of deciphering and understanding the wording of a 
text” (Gadamer, 1993: 391). 
 
118 German: “Auslegen heißt gerade, die eigenen Vorbegriffe mit ins Spiel Bringen, damit die 
Meinung des Textes für uns wirklich zum Sprechen gebracht wird” (Gadamer, 2010: 401). 
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drawn from Gadamer, needn’t be something steeped in theoretical concerns which 
distract our attention from the concrete reality of that which we interpret, but simply 
a way of expressing the meeting that occurs between reader and text and the 
historical and social conditions under which understanding occurs. 
Ricoeur, of course, was not a native German speaker, and wrote the majority 
of his work in French.  In the notes on editing and translating that accompany the 
collection of essays Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, John B. Thompson 
indicates a number of distinctions he believes are important to take into 
consideration when reading Ricoeur in translation.  Thompson notes that “Ricoeur 
uses specific terms to translate German expressions” and that it is “important to 
preserve Ricoeur’s distinction if one is to make sense of his analyses of German 
texts” (Thompson, 1981b: 28).  Accordingly, he provides a short comparative list of 
various terms in both the German original, Ricoeur’s French terminology and in 
Thompson’s own English translations: 
119 
Both the French and English words used here to translate “Auslegung”, as it is used 
in the hermeneutic tradition, are words closely associated with literary analysis, in 
particular with the idea of making aspects of meaning which may remain tacit or 
implicit clear and explicit.  Explication involves looking at that which we explicate 
anew in some way and aims to enrich our understanding of that which we interpret 
by drawing attention to some particular aspect of the object of our consideration.  
The kind of attention we direct towards this object is guided by our presuppositions 
                                               
119 It is noteworthy too that Thompson chooses to translate “Deutung” as “interpretation”, and that 
Auslegung is distinguished from this in its own translation (Thompson, 1981b: 28). 
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and interests, often themselves influenced by the intellectual traditions with which 
we engage, and it is partly in relation to how we attend to that which we interpret 
that understanding emerges.  But our attention nevertheless remains directed towards 
and responsive to the phenomenon at hand.  To do otherwise is no longer to 
“explicate” anything. 
 “The Model of the Text”, as an essay, represents somewhat of an aberration 
within all this as it was originally written in English.  In this essay, and despite the 
distinction that Thompson makes in his translations of Ricoeur’s French writings, 
“Auslegung” is identified by Ricoeur with the English word “interpretation”.120  We 
should not, however, take this difference in translation to indicate that Ricoeur is 
using the word “interpretation” differently here than elsewhere.  Ricoeur is careful to 
identify the kind of interpretation he is engaged in within “The Model of the Text” as 
Auslegung in order to avoid such ambiguity.  For Ricoeur, like Gadamer, Auslegung 
is quite overtly literary; “Auslegung (interpretation, exegesis)… covers only a 
limited category of signs, those which are fixed by writing, including all the sorts of 
documents and monuments which entail a fixation similar to writing” (Ricoeur, 
1981h: 197). 
It is important, therefore, that we consider the use of the word 
“interpretation” within this context.  Ricoeur does not argue that, in our day-to-day 
lives, our understanding of the world and our actions within it necessarily involve 
any form of explicit interpretive activity.  However, when we take action as an object 
of inquiry, and thus “fixed” in a manner analogous to the text, we can submit it to 
interpretive examination in the manner of Auslegung; in doing so we can extrapolate 
                                               
120 It is, after all, conventional to translate both “Deutung” and “Auslegung” into English as 
“interpretation”; it is only when we are attending closely to the specific ways in which these terms are 
used, particularly within philosophy, that identifying one term with the other too closely becomes 
particularly problematic. 
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upon and make explicit particular aspects of human action that might (and often do) 
pass us by in day-to-day life. 
 
5.3: Reflective and Pre-Reflective Understanding 
 The association of Auslegung with literary interpretation may seem like a 
case of begging the question within the context of defending “The Model of the 
Text” against anti-interpretive claims; as if the claim were that Auslegung is free of 
the theoretical baggage that might accompany the use of Deutung or Deuten, but 
only under the condition that we subscribe to the notion of viewing action “as a text” 
in the first place.  But Ricoeur’s point is that action taken as an object of inquiry can 
be seen as having been fixed in a manner analogous to the text, and that it is under 
these circumstances that meaningful action becomes available to interpretation 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 203).  This kind of interpretation does not necessarily involve 
“adding” anything to the action, or any form of illegitimate abstraction.  Instead it 
can be used to articulate our “everyday” understanding of something, to state 
explicitly something of which we may already be tacitly aware, or to show 
something about action of which we may not otherwise have been aware. 
The fact that at a pre-reflective level we are not always, or even usually, 
explicitly aware of the ways in which our actions may relate to various factors – such 
as our historical heritage, our wider social position or our place within a network of 
power relations – doesn’t necessarily imply that these aren’t or can’t be 
acknowledged as factors contributing to the ways in which we act and the ways in 
which our actions have meaning for us and those around us.  Interpretation 
conceived along the lines of Auslegung often attempts to focus on the context in 
which action can be said to make sense, and to use it to illuminate the meaning of the 
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action at hand.  In this regard, there are definite parallels to be drawn between 
hermeneutic interpretation and the kind of descriptive Wittgensteinian approach, 
such as that expounded in There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science, in which 
action is presented in terms of “rules” in order to draw attention to some particular 
aspect of its everyday meaning. 
 
5.3.1: Rule-Following and Critical Understanding 
 The application of Wittgensteinian thought to the understanding of action 
undertaken by Peter Winch within The Idea of Social Science… involves the careful 
caveat that we should not too readily identify the meaning of action purely with how 
it might be understood in “everyday” situations.  Winch writes;  
I do not wish to maintain that we must stop at… unreflective… 
understanding… [But] that any more reflective understanding must 
necessarily presuppose… the participant’s unreflective 
understanding… although the reflective student of society… may find 
it necessary to use concepts… from the context of his own 
investigation, still these technical concepts of his will imply a 
previous understanding of those other concepts which belong to the 
activities under investigation. (Winch, 1990: 89)  
 
Winch’s arguments are aimed primarily against the use of purely empirical 
observations, modelled on the methods of the natural sciences, as the benchmark for 
understanding meaningful behaviour in the social sciences.  He argues that instead 
we need to be aware of the conceptual context within which action makes sense, and 
that our interpretations of action must ultimately relate to this context if they are to 
be valid. 
There is nothing endemic to “The Model of the Text” which implies that 
interpretation should be based on something conceptually “different in kind” 
(Winch, 1990: 113) in the manner against which Winch is careful to guard.  Of 
course, it is possible that an interpretation made in line with the textual model of 
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hermeneutics could transgress these conditions, but if an interpreter fails to 
sufficiently take account of the conceptual milieu in which action takes place this 
would simply be a case of bad interpretation.  The incorporation of self-critique as a 
moment within interpretation in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic model demands, however, 
that we are aware of the ways in which our theoretical presuppositions influence our 
understanding of action and, as such, that we take this into consideration as part of 
our interpretive deliberations if we find ourselves abstracting away from the context 
in which the actions we interpret can be said to make sense.  In this regard, the 
reflectivity of “The Model of the Text” provides a meta-methodological resource 
with which we can help guard against bad interpretation.121 
 This is not to suggest that the authors of There Is No Such Thing as a Social 
Science are committed to the idea that we mustn’t engage in any form of “critical” 
analysis of action, but simply that understanding “the practices of another culture” 
involves understanding those practices “in their terms” (Hutchinson, Read and 
Sharrock, 2008: 120), and that critical analysis is subsidiary and subsequent to this.  
However, the privileging of the way in which action is understood on an “everyday” 
basis within this approach comes with its own potential risks.   
Conceiving the attempt to “understand” the meaning of action too closely 
with identifying how things appear to the agents of action on a day-to-day basis risks 
taking this particular perspective for granted, and thus overlooking other critical 
perspectives that may be available to us.  Such perspectives may allow us to perceive 
something about action or the circumstances of its enactment that remains obscure 
from the point of view of the “everyday” perspective.  Nigel Pleasants, for example, 
has argued that Winch’s 1964 essay “Understanding a Primitive Society”, within 
                                               
121 The notion of reflectivity and self-critique as aspects of interpretation is discussed previously in 
chapter four (section 4.1.4) of this thesis, and comes to the fore once more in chapter six (section 6.3). 
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which Winch applies the principles of The Idea of Social Science… to an 
interpretation of Azande witchcraft practices, fails to come to grips with “key 
features of Zande social life, which concern such central issues as wealth, possession 
of scarce resources, social and political power” (Pleasants, 2000: 301). 
 Pleasants points out that “possession and use of the poison oracle was 
monopolized by the powerful elites of Zande society” and that “women were 
systematically marginalized and degraded as a consequence of being excluded from 
oracular practice” (Pleasants, 2000: 301).  The way in which wealth distribution, 
gender politics and unequal power relationships influence oracular practices in 
Zande society is almost entirely overlooked within Winch’s analysis, which 
compares Azande oracular rituals to Christian prayers of supplication in order to 
emphasise the way that they may be seen to “express an attitude to contingencies… 
which involves recognition that one’s life is subject to these contingencies, rather 
than an attempt to control these” (Winch, 1964: 321). 
Importantly however, Pleasants also points out that although these are 
“descriptions which quite obviously carry critical implications”, this needn’t in turn 
necessitate “theoretical judgment on the ontological and epistemic status of 
witchcraft and magic” (Pleasants, 2000: 301-02).  Bringing critically informed 
description to bear upon action needn’t mean that we are failing to engage with or 
consciously rejecting the self-understanding of those we are interpreting, but only 
that understanding the meaning of action can sometimes involve explicating the 
wider social context within which these practices take place even when this would 
usually remain tacit within the practices themselves. 
In Winch’s defence, he does state that “[w]e are not seeking a state in which 
things will appear to us just as they do to members of [the society we are 
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observing]”, only that we should aim to achieve “a way of looking at things” which 
has “taken account of and incorporated” the self-understanding of those we are 
interpreting (Winch, 1964: 317).  Nevertheless, Pleasants’ criticism shows that if we 
marginalise “critical” social and political perspectives from our analyses as a matter 
of principle, we are using “understanding” in a narrow and technical sense which no 
longer engages thoroughly with that which we are putatively seeking to understand.  
Even if “everyday” conceptions of the meaning of action are an ineliminable part of 
any engagement with meaningful action, by demarcating a narrow domain of what 
counts as “meaning” within inquiry we close off the potential to see new aspects of 
something in favour of focusing exclusively on one particular way of conceiving it. 
 The idea that the “everyday” should be privileged at the expense of any and 
every “critical” approach to understanding meaningful action is, of course, an 
extreme position, and not one which we should necessarily attribute to a 
Wittgensteinian approach.   As previously mentioned, most advocates of the idea of 
“rule-following” do not wish to rule out the possibility of criticism, but simply to 
stipulate that if we are to submit action to critical analysis we must first be aware of 
the “everyday” understandings held by those we are criticising.  If, however, this is 
taken to imply that critical analysis is something exclusively separate and subsequent 
to “understanding”, and that likewise to “interpret” action is something radically 
other than truly “understanding” it, then we must object.  This conclusion only arises 
if we place description and critical understanding in radical opposition to one 
another, and identify “understanding” as something primarily sympathetic.   
But the kind of understanding to which the human and social sciences aspires 
is not necessarily a case of simply understanding something from the other person’s 
point of view, but of understanding particular cases of action in all their complexity.  
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If trying to understand this situation as it is understood in situ is the best available 
method we have for achieving this understanding the two coincide.  Most of the 
time, however, this sympathetic approach can be complemented with other critical 
and explanatory approaches which may afford us a more rounded picture of how the 
situation at hand can be understood.  To the extent that it privileges the “everyday” 
meaning of action above and beyond any “critical” approach to the analysis of 
action, a Wittgensteinian approach to “understanding” maintains, or even possibly 
strengthens, the traditional interpretive dichotomy between Verstehen and Erklären.  
This dichotomy, however, is explicitly rejected by Ricoeur when he locates 
the critical moment as part of the “hermeneutical arc” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 218) that 
describes interpretive understanding and upon which the validity of hermeneutic 
interpretation is premised.  We do not, therefore, have to reject Erklären on the basis 
that it clouds or distorts Verstehen.  For Ricoeur, on the contrary, critical and 
explanatory activity is not antithetical to understanding but has a vital part to play in 
supporting the validity of interpretation and the kind of “understanding” to which the 
human and social sciences might aspire.  Both the demand to understand the other 
(Verstehen) and the demand to engage critically with action (Erklären) are part of 
interpretation and are obligations that the interpreter must aspire to meet within their 
activities. 
 
5.3.2: Objectification and Critical Understanding 
For Ricoeur “critical” or “reflective” and “naïve” understanding are all parts 
of the same phenomenon of “understanding” conceived in a broader sense than that 
admitted by some Wittgensteinian critics; critical understanding is achieved by 
moving from a naïve or pre-reflective state of understanding characteristic of our 
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day-to-day engagement with the world, passing through the “critical moment” in 
which that which we seek to understand is held as an object of reflection, and 
culminating once more in an enriched understanding of ourselves and the world 
around us. 
For Ricoeur, critical modes of thought are inseparable from the pre-reflective 
and “participatory” mode of being they attempt to explicate.  The appropriation 
which goes on in interpretation thereby “ceases to appear as a kind of possession, as 
a way of taking hold of… It implies instead a moment of dispossession of the 
narcissistic ego” (Ricoeur, 1981g: 192).  Hermeneutic interpretation, including any 
critical aspect of this activity, involves an element of passivity wherein we allow that 
which we interpret to impose itself upon us, revealing something about itself to us 
and shaping our understanding of that which we interpret and ourselves in relation to 
it. 
 It is via the distanciation which occurs in objectification that the object of 
interpretation is capable of speaking to us in this manner.  Taking action as an 
“object” of interpretive reflection interrupts our pre-reflective experience of action in 
our day-to-day lives meaning we engage with it in a way that would otherwise evade 
us.  In this regard, the distinction between “critical” and “naïve” understanding is an 
important one to make, even if they are ultimately inextricably linked, as it 
demarcates the kind of attentive engagement we reserve for certain situations under 
certain conditions.  Being aware of such differences of attention is an essential part 
of understanding how our interpretations of action relate to our phenomenal 
experience of the world around us, and how they might in turn inform one another.122 
                                               
122 This distinction cannot even necessarily be limited to the rarefied realm of academic discourse. 
The ability to continue a number sequence certainly demonstrates understanding of a kind, but under 
most circumstances we would probably think it very strange should the person doing this then proved 
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From a hermeneutic perspective, talk of the meaningfulness of action in 
terms of “presuppositions” is not a psychological claim about how people engage 
with the world.  It is rather a way of representing to ourselves some of the conditions 
which might be considered pertinent to how action is perceived as meaningful.  Most 
human action does not involve any explicit form of interpretation, but most human 
action does not involve rules either; we typically think about our actions in terms of 
rules when we think or suspect we might have transgressed them (it is only in light 
of the possibility of “going against” a rule that it makes sense to talk of “following” a 
rule, after all).123  As models of understanding, neither hermeneutic interpretation nor 
a Wittgensteinian inspired rule-following approach capture how we engage with the 
world as meaningful in “everyday life” in a manner entirely free from abstraction or 
reflective distanciation.  To do so would be to renounce any form of reflective 
understanding whatsoever, and we would be dominated entirely by our pre-reflective 
understanding of ourselves and the world around us.  
Ricoeur uses the text as a paradigm of the kind of distanciation undergone by 
action in objectification, and it is with this in mind that we should consider his use of 
textual hermeneutics to inform interpretive practices within the human and social 
sciences.  He does not claim, on the other hand, that the ways in which we 
understand action on a day-to-day basis are “interpretive”, nor that interpreters 
within the human and social sciences should not be concerned with the “everyday” 
meaning of action.  We cannot, therefore, discount a hermeneutic interpretive 
                                                                                                                                     
unable to tell us what rule they were following. Reflection is, after all, an important part of our 
everyday engagement with meaningful phenomena in our lives. 
 
123 Winch, in his preface to the second edition of The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy, distances himself from the idea that human action necessarily involves explicit rule-
following, describing this as an “over-idealization” (Winch, 1990: xvi). 
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approach to understanding action on the grounds that meaningful action is not 
typically “interpretive”.   
To do so represents a misunderstanding of the hermeneutic project and the 
nature of Auslegung as interpretation.  It would be to misunderstand “The Model of 
the Text” as a psychological thesis about understanding rather than an essay 
outlining some observations and suggestions regarding the objectification and 
interpretation of action within the human and social sciences.  Auslegung describes a 
different kind of interpretation to that with which Wittgenstein was primarily 
concerned.  If this is the case, then there is little reason to think that hermeneutic 
philosophy necessarily involves the same kind of “negative” abstraction from or 
imposition upon our everyday experience of the world as is implied within There Is 
No Such Thing as a Social Science.  
We can, of course, read too much significance into the minutiae of translation 
and the particularities of different kinds of interpretation.  Wittgenstein was not 
engaging directly with the work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur or with 
hermeneutic thought in general.  He would not, therefore, necessarily feel the need to 
distinguish between different kinds of interpretation in the same way, and it could 
still be the case that he might have intended “Deutung” and “Deuten” to be catch-all 
terms covering all activities that might be termed interpretation.  But it is precisely 
because Wittgenstein isn’t engaging directly with the work of hermeneutic writers 
that we need to be careful about the fine-grained differentiation involved in the 
translation of these examples of German terminology into “interpretation” in 
English, and why we should be interested in and remain open to how hermeneutic 
philosophy can inform the interpretive practices of the human and social sciences. 
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5.4: Ethnomethodology 
Another school of thought that rejects conventional “interpretive” approaches 
to social inquiry is ethnomethodology.  Like the thinkers inspired by Wittgenstein 
and Winch discussed above, ethnomethodology is marked by the belief that 
meaningful action can only be understood by attending closely to the way in which 
action is enacted and understood by individuals interacting in a shared social setting.  
The similarities between these approaches to social inquiry are not entirely 
coincidental; Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been identified as an important influence 
upon and exemplification of ethnomethodological practices (e.g. Pleasants, 1999: 
123) and his work is identified by Garfinkel as “a sustained, extensive, and 
penetrating corpus of observations of indexical phenomena” (Garfinkel, 1986: 169). 
By focussing upon the context and practices against which action is enacted 
in specific situations, ethnomethodology aims to avoid the problems that arise from 
“objectifying” action, and the distortions that occur when particular cases are 
subsumed under theoretical categories.  Focusing upon the work of Harold 
Garfinkel, herein I offer an account of ethnomethodology and consider whether 
ethnomethodological practices and principles might pose a challenge to the 
hermeneutic model of interpretation used by Ricoeur in “The Model of the Text”.  
Ultimately I will argue that Ricoeur’s hermeneutic model of interpretation is capable 
of incorporating many of the insights of ethnomethodology, and complementarily 
that “The Model of the Text” has the potential in turn to aid and inform 
ethnomethodological practice. 
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5.4.1: Ethnomethodological Principles 
 Ethnomethodology has its origins in the work of Harold Garfinkel’s Studies 
in Ethnomethodology, published in 1967.  Garfinkel defines ethnomethodology as 
“the investigation of the rational properties of indexical expressions and other 
practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful 
practices of everyday life” (Garfinkel, 1967: 11).  This refers to the study of “the 
body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations 
by means of which the ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way 
about in, and act on circumstances in which they find themselves” (Heritage, 1984: 
4).  Roughly speaking, the central tenet of ethnomethodology is that action only 
makes sense within particular social environments, and that the sense-making 
features of these environments are the product of the ongoing work of the individuals 
– or “members” – within that environment. 
Ethnomethodology professes to be distinct from the “resolutely theoretical” 
activities of the social sciences as a whole by recommending a “bottom-up” 
approach to social inquiry.  Rather than beginning with a particular theory of action 
by which the observer makes sense of what he or she observes, the 
ethnomethodologist starts with and focuses upon the particular features of some 
specific social situation.124  This “bottom-up” approach attempts to “get away from 
asking whether things really are the way members of the society say they are in order 
that one may examine what members of the society say they are and how they satisfy 
themselves that things are that way” (Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 106).  Escaping 
such traditional sociological preoccupations in turn allows us to attend to “the most 
                                               
124 Whether such a “resolutely theoretical” and top-down approach to inquiry is or was genuinely as 
pervasive within the social sciences as Garfinkel seems to imply is, of course, questionable.  
Garfinkel, nevertheless, is responding to a historical prejudice within sociology for “grand theory” 
within which universal and systematic rules for understanding social action are sought. 
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commonplace activities of daily life [with] the attention usually accorded 
extraordinary events” and in doing so “learn about them as phenomena in their own 
right” (Garfinkel, 1967: 1). 
Central to an ethnomethodological approach of this kind is the belief that “the 
activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday 
affairs are identical with members’ procedures for making those settings ‘account-
able’” (Garfinkel, 1967: 1).  Matters which are “accountable” in this sense are those 
that are “observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to members as situated practices of 
looking-and-telling”.  According to Garfinkel, such practices “consist of an endless, 
ongoing, contingent accomplishment” and “are done by parties to those settings 
whose skill with, knowledge of, and entitlement to the detailed work of that 
accomplishment – whose competence – they obstinately depend upon, recognize, 
use, and take for granted” (Garfinkel, 1967: 1).  For the ethnomethodologist, the 
recognisable structure of any given social group is therefore equivalent to the 
methods by which members of those groups make that structure present and 
recognisable to themselves, both tacitly and explicitly, in words and actions. 
These “methods” by which social action is structured are themselves 
indexical insofar as they refer “reflexively” back to the settings in which they are 
located.  Attempting to understand social action abstracted away from the reflexively 
constituted setting to which it belongs is therefore to miss the fundamental way in 
which meaning is a “local” phenomenon.  Garfinkel uses this idea of indexicality not 
only to “capture the traditional philosophical problem of the reference of deictic 
terms, but also to note that the sense of ordinary descriptive terms is powerfully 
influenced by the context in which they are uttered” (Heritage, 1984: 143).  It is the 
“reflexivity” of action which, according to Garfinkel, traditional approaches to the 
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social sciences often overlook or marginalise in favour of “objective” expressions 
purely for the sake of submitting action to formal analysis (Garfinkel, 1967: 4-7). 
Garfinkel further argues that due to their failure to engage with the reflexivity 
of action, objectifying reports of action cannot be seen as the “disinterested 
descriptions” they purport to be.  Instead formalised accounts of action consist of 
merely “a persuasive version of the socially organized character” of the situation 
being described, “regardless of what the actual order is… and even without the 
investigator having detected the actual order” (Garfinkel, 1967: 23).  Formal 
“codified” representations of social order provide social scientists with “a grammar 
of rhetoric; they furnish a ‘social science’ way of talking so as to persuade 
consensus” (Garfinkel, 1967: 24).  By identifying formal representations of this kind 
as “objective”, traditional social science ends up treating observable accountable 
elements of action as “sketchy, partial, incomplete, masked, elliptical, concealed, 
ambiguous, or misleading” (Garfinkel, 1967: 27). 
Rather than fall prey to the temptations of objectification and formal analysis, 
Garfinkel claims we should instead “assign exclusive priority to the study of the 
methods of concerted actions and methods of common understanding. Not a method 
of understanding, but immensely various methods of understanding are the 
professional sociologist’s proper and hitherto unstudied and critical phenomena” 
(Garfinkel, 1967: 31).  As such, ethnomethodology identifies “the desire to objectify 
phenomena” itself as an urge towards illegitimate abstraction, and one that leads us 
into misunderstanding “such that the nature of the phenomenon under inquiry may 
be forgotten” (Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 111).  Ethnomethodology aims instead 
to suspend such scientistic “objective” judgement and analysis of action in favour of 
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treating action in “its own right” in the terms of the social context to which it 
belongs. 
It is in relation to the notion of “objectivity” that ethnomethodology is 
perhaps most directly pertinent to “The Model of the Text”.  Although Ricoeur 
rejects scientistic paradigms of interpretive objectivity, the objectification of action 
is nevertheless central to the kind of critical interpretive understanding described by 
Ricoeur in “The Model of the Text”.  With this in mind, it is necessary to ask 
whether ethnomethodology poses a challenge to the way in which Ricoeur argues 
that the interpretation of action can only occur when action is “fixed” as an object of 
reflective inquiry. 
 
5.4.2: Ethnomethodology, Signs and Referents 
The emphasis placed by Garfinkel upon understanding action in terms of the 
sense-making methods employed in localised settings is partially grounded in a 
desire to avoid falsely imputing substantive beliefs about the world to those who we 
nominally seek to understand.  In particular, Garfinkel criticises “the assumption that 
in order to describe a usage as a feature of a community of understandings we must 
at the outset know what the substantive common understandings consist of” 
(Garfinkel, 1967: 28).  He claims that this assumption is invariably accompanied by 
a “theory of signs, according to which a ‘sign’ and ‘referent’ are respectively 
properties of something said and something talked about” and that by “dropping 
such a theory of signs we drop as well, thereby, the possibility that an invoked 
shared agreement on substantive matters explains a usage.  If these notions are 
dropped, then what the parties talked about could not be distinguished from how the 
parties were speaking” (Garfinkel, 1967: 28). 
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Traditional social science, according to Garfinkel, has been too consumed 
with the idea of the “referents” of speech and action, and as such has marginalised 
what people actually do and say as merely pointing towards substantive “common 
understandings” which underlie meaningful human interaction.  These concerns 
parallel those of Wittgenstein, in particular his criticism of the kind of 
“interpretation” which directs the interpreter’s attention away from the phenomena 
we are interpreting.  Garfinkel even goes as far as to say that ethnomethodology “is 
not an interpretive enterprise” or “in the business of interpreting signs”.  He argues 
that it is instead via attending to “ordinary everyday practices” in their “unmediated 
details” (Garfinkel, 1996: 8) that we can best understand and observe the ways in 
which social action is both possible and meaningful.  The distinction between “sign” 
and “referent”, by contrast, only obscures the fact that “the recognized sense of what 
a person said consists only and entirely in… seeing how he spoke” (Garfinkel, 1967: 
29). 
Part of this critique of this “referential” picture of the meaning of action, and 
part of being able to attend closely to the “ordinary everyday practices” in which 
social action is manifest, involves, for Garfinkel, recognising that “[e]nacted local 
practices are not texts which symbolize ‘meanings’ or events” (Garfinkel, 1996: 8).  
On the surface, this would seem to be in direct conflict with Ricoeur’s professed 
project of considering meaningful action “as a text”.   Before coming to this 
conclusion, however, we need to consider more thoroughly whether “The Model of 
the Text” does in fact involve the kind of metaphysical distinction identified by 
Garfinkel as endemic to a “theory of signs”, or whether Ricoeur conceives of 
objectification in a manner which aims to direct our attention towards that which we 
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are seeking to understand and not, therefore, towards some transcendental “referent” 
of which action is considered merely a signifier. 
Certainly the most important point that can be made in Ricoeur’s defence 
here is that he claims “the text” not as an exemplar of action as we experience it in 
our day-to-day lives, but as the object of the human and social sciences.  So while 
“The Model of the Text” is concerned with treating action “as a text”, this is only the 
case insofar as it provides a model for understanding action under the condition of 
objectification.  Objectification of this kind undeniably involves engaging with 
action in a manner that diverges from the attitude of those involved with it as a 
practical ongoing achievement. But objectification is also considered by Ricoeur as a 
precondition of bringing action to discourse and the reflective understanding of 
action we hope to achieve therein.  This needn’t, therefore, imply any 
“metaphysical” commitment to a “theory of signs”, nor to the idea that particular 
actions should be understood as “merely” signifiers which point towards a 
substantive realm of shared meaning.125 
For Ricoeur, no meaningful discourse is ever absolutely free of the “event” in 
which it originates.  The circumstances of the event of discourse constitute a vital 
part of its history – its Wirkungsgeschichte – and are therefore irreducibly a part of 
its meaning.  The inscription of discourse as a text represents the mediation within 
which discourse is preserved as a unique configuration that “illustrates and exalts the 
eventful character of discourse” (Ricoeur, 1981d: 137), without this “event” being 
lost in the ongoing ebb and flow of translocution.  Discourse is “fixed” as a text so it 
can be preserved, and precisely so that we can engage attentively with the eventful 
                                               
125 Even the autonomy of meaning attributed to the text by Ricoeur (discussed at length in chapter two 
of this thesis) does not imply that texts (or action under the condition of objectification) refer to some 
“transcendent signified”, only that their meaning can no longer be simplistically identified with the 
conditions of its eventuation. 
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character of discourse as a part of how it is meaningful.  This is achieved insofar as 
the text opens up and refers to a “world” for the reader via the “ensemble of 
references” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 202) – the unique configuration taken on by discourse 
via inscription – that constitute the text as text.  Ricoeur conceives the text, therefore, 
not as something which refers to some “transcendental signified” beyond itself, but 
as an invitation to the reader to think about and through the matter of the text itself. 
This represents a very different conception of referentiality to that of the 
“theory of signs” identified by Garfinkel as prevalent throughout traditional 
approaches to the social sciences.  This is not, of course, to say that Garfinkel and 
Ricoeur are in agreement regarding the idea of textual reference or the objectification 
of action.  It is only to point out that Garfinkel’s criticism that the objectification of 
action necessarily involves a metaphysical commitment to a “theory of signs”, and 
which thus leads us away from understanding action “in its own right”, cannot apply 
in the same way to Ricoeur’s textual model as it might to other “interpretive” 
approaches to the social sciences. 
Ricoeur utilises the text as an analogue of action constituted as an object of 
interpretive inquiry, but does so in a manner that demands the objectification of 
action should aspire to preserve the individuality and complexity of the course of 
events being objectified, to preserve the work of action, whilst simultaneously 
making it available as an object of reflection.  The valid interpretation of action 
according to this model should, therefore, involve attending closely to the concrete 
features of the particular situation at hand.  Just as textual interpretation requires that 
we support our suppositions of meaning by recourse to evidence manifest in the 
unique configuration of the text, attending to how action is uniquely manifest in any 
particular case is an ineliminable part of understanding what that action means. 
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The hermeneutic philosophy that undergirds “The Model of the Text” is 
therefore importantly distinct from the “theory of signs” defined by Garfinkel.  
Rather than metaphysical confusion, Ricoeur’s interest in textual hermeneutics as a 
paradigm of interpretation emerges from the perceived necessity of objectification to 
preserve the “event” of action; the observation that action, like discourse, is fleeting 
in its enactment whilst potentially having a significance that outlives this. 
Garfinkel, by contrast, is concerned only with the ways in which actions are 
meaningful in a given social setting at a given moment in time, as “practical tasks 
subject to every exigency of organizationally situated conduct” (Garfinkel, 1967: 
11).  Given this relatively narrow remit for the object of social inquiry “proper”, 
however, it could still be argued that by ethnomethodological standards Ricoeur’s 
model fails to adequately do justice to the nature of action as it is experienced in our 
day-to-day social existence, and that as such “The Model of the Text” might at best 
be relevant to those of the human sciences that deal explicitly with pre-fixed 
artefacts of action – such as historical records and monuments – with which the 
analogy to texts is more overtly obvious.  But while there may be some validity to 
the concern that the paradigm of the text risks marginalising the transactional nature 
of meaningful human action, completely dismissing “The Model of the Text” along 
these lines would be to obscure the ways in which ethnomethodology can benefit 
from Ricoeur’s hermeneutic approach to the interpretation of action, and the 
necessity of some form of objectification – understood in the sense used by Ricoeur 
– even within ethnomethodological research. 
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5.5: Ethnomethodology, Objectification and Disciplinary Prejudice 
One important aspect of the “reflexivity” of ethnomethodology is the claim 
that “every particular case of inquiry without exception, is the managed 
accomplishment of organized settings of practical actions” and the results of such 
practices of inquiry “are acquired and assured only through particular, located 
organizations of artful practices” (Garfinkel, 1967: 32).  Ethnomethodological 
inquiry is no exception to this.  However, ethnomethodological inquiry is also 
premised upon certain guiding ideas and principles, such as Garfinkel’s assertion that 
the sense of what someone says exists “only and entirely in” how they speak.  These 
ideas help orientate the “work” of ethnomethodology.  Given this, it is important that 
we take into consideration how the various interests and practices of 
ethnomethodology are themselves constitutive elements of the kind of accounts of 
action generated by ethnomethodological research. 
 
5.5.1:  Ethnomethodology and Objectification 
Despite the emphasis placed upon grounding ethnomethodological accounts 
of action in the situated “observable-and-reportable” features of the actions being 
described themselves, ethnomethodology still has to contend with an essential 
asymmetry between the researcher and those being reported upon.  At its most basic 
level, this involves engaging with the question of whether the methods and work 
employed in collecting information about human action accurately reflect the social 
reality that they are supposed to capture, i.e. whether it is possible to represent 
human action in a way which remains faithful to the lived reality of the agents 
represented.  Ethnomethodology may differ in how it understands the role and nature 
of evidence and data in social inquiry from mainstream sociology, in line with the 
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less scientistic approach recommended by Garfinkel, but it nevertheless has to face 
similar challenges regarding the relationship between that which is observed and the 
methods by which these observations are made and by which meaningful human 
action is brought to ethnomethodological discourse. 
This problem is described by Wes Sharrock and Bob Anderson, working 
within the ethnomethodological tradition, as “the elemental fact of research” 
(Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 112).  The reason that it poses a problem for 
researchers conscious of avoiding false attribution of meaning to action is that by 
describing, reporting or recording action as part of sociological research we 
appropriate it as “data”.  In treating action thus it is essential that we also recognise 
that it is “produced by research practices and data collecting and analysing 
techniques”.  Failing to recognise the essential element of abstraction involved in the 
constitution of action as an object of reflective inquiry risks, in turn, obscuring how 
“the work of seeing order and pattern in a transcript, video or photograph may be 
something made possible by the capacity to replay, halt, write down, and inspect it 
closely over and over again” (Sharrock and Anderson, 1986: 112). 
So although ethnomethodology works hard to maintain a non-hierarchical 
relationship between researcher and social actor, it cannot avoid the inherent 
asymmetry between actor and researcher and accompanying potential for “the 
relationship between what the researcher sees in the data and what was/would be 
noticed by social actors living in real-time situations” to become “problematic”.   
The capacity of researchers to “replay, halt, write down” some course of events “and 
inspect it closely over and over again” has an obvious affinity with what Ricoeur 
refers to as the necessity of objectification – of “fixation” – as a precondition of 
reflective understanding.  As ethnomethodology demonstrates, however, this notion 
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of “objectification” needn’t imply that the interpreter of action is free to interpret 
action without taking account of the situatedness and reflexivity of the action being 
interpreted.  Such “objectivism” stands in direct conflict with the hermeneutic model 
of interpretation developed by Ricoeur and employed within “The Model of the 
Text”. 
Objectification, in the sense discussed in “The Model of the Text”, is just as 
much a part of ethnomethodological practices as it is part of any interpretive work 
within the human and social sciences, and does not necessarily transgress the 
principles of localism and non-imposition that define ethnomethodology.  What is 
important, however, is that the activity of objectification is recognised as part of 
ethnomethodological practice, and taken into account as a productive dimension of 
the accounts composed therein.  It is the active element of description and 
interpretation that marks the asymmetry of researcher and agent of action subjected 
to inquiry most explicitly.  It is the researcher’s explicit aim to offer an account of 
some action or set of actions.  Even if we accept the ethnomethodological principle 
that members make the sense of their actions “observable/reportable” as a routine 
part of engaging in meaningful action, this nevertheless differs from the position of 
the researcher in that this reflexive accountability is typically evident within the 
activity in which they are engaged, not the specific end to which their actions are 
directed. 
 Given this, it is vital that the interpreter of action attempts to incorporate an 
awareness of any asymmetry that may exist between themselves and those whom 
they are observing into their accounts of action.  There are of course various 
activities in which explicit reflexivity and accounting for one’s action are an 
important part of the “methods” by which that activity is enacted.  But this is not 
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necessarily a feature of all action.  In each case we must try to acknowledge the 
asymmetry between researcher and member, especially in terms of how action is 
explicitly “objectified” for the interpreter of action, and attempt to take into account 
how this asymmetry may influence our understanding of the situation in question.  If 
we fail to do so we end up obscuring how our own interpretive practices help shape 
the accounts of action we give. 
 
5.5.2: Ethnomethodology and Disciplinary Prejudice 
Despite setting itself up as an “alternate” to traditional and mainstream 
sociology, it is no less vital that ethnomethodology is able to engage with its own 
presuppositions regarding the meaning and nature of human action.  In addition to 
the technical methods by which action is recorded and constituted as an object it is 
therefore also important that the interpreter of action considers how the 
presuppositions of ethnomethodological thought may also play a constitutive role in 
how action is understood.  Failure to do so as part of the ethnomethodological work 
involved in studying human action can lead to taking one’s presuppositions for 
granted and thus risks a failure of understanding. 
I will now examine Garfinkel’s famous case study of an intersexed person, 
Agnes, in order to demonstrate how “disciplinary prejudice” within 
ethnomethodology may work to demarcate the valid limits of the kind of accounts of 
action composed and the kind of understanding achieved within 
ethnomethodological inquiry.126 In particular I will examine how the 
ethnomethodological prioritisation of understanding meaningful action as an 
“ongoing achievement” evident in and only in the “observable/accountable” features 
                                               
126 The notion of disciplinary prejudice and its relevance to the description and interpretation of action 
is discussed in greater depth within the fourth chapter (section 4.1.3) of this thesis. 
207 
 
of members’ behaviour, although useful for making us aware of how certain 
elements of gender identity may be enacted by individuals in particular situations, 
may also lead us to exclude certain concerns potentially pertinent or useful for 
understanding gender norms. 
 
5.5.2.1: Agnes and Ethnomethodology 
Garfinkel describes the experiences of Agnes, a “nineteen-year old girl raised 
as a boy” who identifies as female and has secondary female sexual characteristics, 
but who also has “a fully developed penis and scrotum” (Garfinkel, 1967: 117).  
Specifically, the study is concerned with Agnes’ attempts to “pass” as female within 
a society in which gender difference is traditionally and commonly considered as a 
dichotomy between “male” and “female” corresponding to a biological dimorphism 
typical of the vast majority of the population, but within which Agnes does not 
comfortably fit.  Garfinkel in turn uses these observations regarding Agnes’ 
“performance” of femininity in order to draw conclusions about the social norms 
which define sexual identity within society.  Garfinkel’s argument is that Agnes’ 
self-conscious attempts to be accepted as an “ordinary” female work by “making 
observable that and how normal sexuality is accomplished through witnessable 
displays of talk and conduct” (Garfinkel, 1967: 180). 
The significance of Garfinkel’s choice to approach gender as a social and 
ethnomethodological issue in this fashion is important to remember.  Garfinkel 
writes against a socio-historical background wherein gender was most commonly 
considered something “natural” and wherein intersexed persons attempting to “pass” 
would find themselves, according to Garfinkel, “operating with the realistic 
conviction that disclosure of their secrets would bring swift and certain ruin in the 
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form of status degradation, psychological trauma, and loss of material advantages” 
(Garfinkel, 1967: 117-18).  Garfinkel’s commitment to recognising gender as 
something socially achieved, and to the idea that we might come to know the 
prejudices which define gender in society by observing the phenomenon of 
“passing”, marks his ethnomethodological approach to gender as both significantly 
ahead of its time and of enduring sociological interest. 
Nevertheless, there remains good reason to be cautious when it comes to the 
conclusions we might draw from Garfinkel’s study of Agnes.  One issue that has to 
be considered is whether Garfinkel gives sufficient thought to how the institutional 
setting and the expectations of the medical team with whom Agnes had contact may 
have influenced her behaviour.  Perhaps the most notable feature of Agnes’ 
circumstances in this regard is that she is actively seeking to conform to a perceived 
norm of femininity.  For Agnes, passing involved “an abiding practical 
preoccupation with competent female sexuality” (Garfinkel, 1967: 121).  Arguably, 
this in itself distinguishes Agnes’ experience of femininity and the social norms of 
femininity from the vast majority of the wider population, for whom “sexual status is 
neither something they strive towards, nor something ‘contingent’ which could at 
any time be radically undermined” (Pleasants, 1999: 143). 
More pertinently for our purposes, however, is the very specific manner in 
which Agnes experiences her sexual status as a goal, and that this takes place and is 
reported within an institutionalised medical environment.  As is acknowledged by 
Garfinkel, throughout their interactions Agnes had the specific aim of “obtain[ing] a 
competent, guaranteed, and low-cost operation without ‘submitting to research,’ by 
which she meant protecting her privacy” (Garfinkel, 1967: 162).  Garfinkel’s 
observations of Agnes’ “abiding practical preoccupation with competent female 
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sexuality” should, therefore, be set against the background of her intention “to 
display herself, through her talk, as always having been a real woman, as ‘real’ was 
defined by the doctors, so that the doctors would agree to surgery” (Kessler and 
McKenna, 1978: 117). 
To this end, Agnes even constructs a story in order to “naturalise” her 
identification as female, and to justify her desire for gender realignment surgery, and 
deliberately deceives those around her.  Contrary to her original claims, she 
eventually revealed that “she had never had a biological defect that had feminized 
her but that she had been taking estrogens since age 12” (Garfinkel, 1967: 287).  She 
chose to present her back story thusly so that it might fit more closely with the idea 
that her being born with a penis was “nature’s original mistake” (Garfinkel, 1967: 
181) and therefore in “natural” need of rectification by medical intervention. 
It is these circumstances that have led Susan Speer, for example, to state that 
Agnes “lacked power in the research process and was manipulated by the all-male 
research team” (Speer, 2005: 71).  It would be deeply incautious, given this power 
disparity, to draw conclusions from Agnes’ display of “passing” unless we also 
consider the ways in which her “performance” of femininity may relate to the very 
specific circumstances in which she found herself, i.e. being an intersexed individual 
seeking gender realignment surgery and having to “prove” her femininity to male 
“experts” working within a medical institution. 
Garfinkel leaves the question of any disparity in power or authority within 
his relationship with Agnes largely uncommented upon.  Some indications of a 
power disparity are, however, evident within Garfinkel’s text.  Amongst these we 
might wish to include Garfinkel’s accounts of his own efforts to “pass” with Agnes, 
i.e., deceptions he had to make in order to maintain his appearance of expertise when 
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confronted with questions the answers to which he did not know, when he says that 
he had to “side-step her requests for information in order to avoid any display of 
incompetence” (Garfinkel, 1967: 163); the fact that Agnes included “managing her 
conversations with us at U.C.L.A. in the hope that the decision would be favorable” 
amongst a list of “particularly difficult times” in her life (Garfinkel, 1967: 138); and 
perhaps nowhere more so than in Agnes’ fears that “the doctors at U.C.L.A.” would 
decide “among themselves, and without consulting her” that the right procedure 
would be to amputate her breasts and strip her of that which she considered the 
“essential insignia” of her femininity (Garfinkel, 1967: 132). 
It is important to bear in mind that Garfinkel was not ignorant of the 
sometimes instrumental character of Agnes’ “passing” with him.  He says, for 
example, that he believes that Agnes was engaging in “anticipatory following” with 
him “with disconcerting frequency” and that he was “appalled by the number of 
occasions on which I was unable to decide whether Agnes was answering my 
questions or whether she had learned from my questions, and more importantly from 
more subtle cues both prior to and after the questions, what answers would do” 
(Garfinkel, 1967: 147).  Garfinkel, however, does not seem to consider these cases of 
“anticipatory following” as particularly noteworthy or distinct, and includes them 
among what he terms Agnes’ “continuous project of self-improvement” (Garfinkel, 
1967: 147) by which she learns about the norms and standards of gender identity and 
behaviour from the social environment around her and by participating in activities 
governed by these norms. 
There is, of course, nothing fundamentally inconsistent about believing that 
Agnes’ interviews with Garfinkel were just another case in a long line of activities in 
which Agnes practiced passing.  It seems peculiar, however, that Garfinkel does not 
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give more consideration to whether there might not be important differences between 
the ways in which Agnes learned about gender from conversations and gossip with 
her female friends and roommates, or even from her rivalry with her female cousin, 
and the way in which she apparently sought to anticipate the best answers to give to 
someone who was in a position of power over getting access to surgery that was 
necessary to fulfil her “life-long desire to be the thing that she had always known she 
was” (Garfinkel, 1967: 130). 
One possible reason for this apparent oversight could arise from the 
ethnomethodological principle of privileging the perspective and perceived social 
context of the agents of action, and the accompanying assertion that action should be 
understood “only and entirely” in terms of the locally situated practices of those 
agents.  These principles, insofar as they guide the attention of those engaged in 
ethnomethodological research and help to demarcate some of the valid possibilities 
of how meaningful action should be described and understood, are an example of 
what I have previously termed “disciplinary prejudice”.  It is possible, therefore, that 
the ethnomethodological “prejudice” towards understanding meaningful action as 
evident in and only in the ongoing activities of particular individuals in particular 
social settings leads Garfinkel to privilege Agnes’ given account and her 
presentation of herself as the “120 per cent female” (Garfinkel, 1967: 129) and, as a 
consequence, to marginalise the activities of the researchers and the medical setting 
as conditions for the production of this account. 
The productive influence of this “prejudice” can perhaps be felt most 
strongly in the conclusions Garfinkel draws from the study.  He claims, for example 
that the research team “learned from Agnes, who treated sexed persons as cultural 
events that members make happen, that members’ practices alone produce the 
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observable-tellable normal sexuality of persons, and do so only, entirely, exclusively 
in actual, singular, particular occasions through actual witnessed displays of common 
talk and conduct” (Garfinkel, 1967: 181).127  He also cites Agnes’ methodological 
practices as the “sources of authority” for these findings and for their “recommended 
study policy” (Garfinkel, 1967: 181).  Herein Garfinkel places a great emphasis upon 
the activities of Agnes as the individual working to make her gender “observable-
tellable” for others. 
This, however, may to some extent marginalise the importance of the context 
within which this action takes place.  Specifically, we risk losing sight of the way in 
which the “norms” of femininity evident within Agnes’ accounts and actions may 
have been shaped to some extent by the institutionalised setting and prevalent 
gender-discourse within which the research team’s work took place, and therefore 
also of the context within which we can best understand how Agnes treats gender as 
an achievement and how this may differ from the experiences of both cis- and trans-
gender individuals not seeking gender reassignment surgery.128 
Again, it is worth reiterating that Garfinkel’s work is not radically 
undermined by the fact he marginalises concerns such as those described above.129  
                                               
127 Italics added for emphasis. 
 
128 It is arguably also Garfinkel’s emphasis upon seeing gender identity primarily as an “ongoing 
achievement” evident in and only in the “observable/accountable” features of members’ behaviour – 
i.e. as something which the gendered individual actively makes manifest within their behaviour – that 
leaves him little room to give much consideration to the ways in which gender might at times be 
constituted and maintained passively in relation to others.  Kessler and McKenna, for example, whilst 
agreeing with Garfinkel “that gender is omnirelevant in everyday interactions, and that gender ‘work’ 
is required”, claim that “most of the work is done for the displayer [of gender] by the perceiver.” 
Drawing upon and developing Garfinkel’s own work on gender, Kessler and Mckenna argue that 
beyond the initial moment of gender attribution “there is little that the displayer needs to do… except 
maintain the sense of the ‘naturalness’ of her/his gender” (Kessler and McKenna, 1978: 136-37). 
 
129 That his work was not necessarily exhaustive is something of which Garfinkel was evidently 
aware. He comments, for example, that “further information is needed comparing Agnes with normals 
with respect to the possibility that normals are more accepting of wilful election than she was” 
(Garfinkel, 1967: 125, fn. 4), and includes an appendix in which he claims that a “subsequent study” 
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There is great value in closely observing the “methods” by which an intersexed or 
transgender individual “passes” as a particular gender, and in considering how this 
relates to wider societal norms regarding gender identity.  There is also much to be 
said for Garfinkel’s professed belief that the “methods” of Agnes’ passing are 
ultimately subsidiary to interest in her as a “real and valuable person” (Garfinkel, 
1967: 184) faced with decisions on a day-by-day basis rather than a rational agent 
simply trying to maximize her femininity. 
Minimally, however, it can certainly be said that Agnes had a great incentive 
to consciously conform to the (male-dominated) medical team’s expectations of 
femininity, and that any conclusions we wish to draw about “normal sexuality” 
should attempt to take this into account (even if only as a “critical moment” within 
interpretation, i.e. a stage at which alternative accounts of Agnes’ behaviour could be 
considered as constitutive factors in how we should understand her actions). In order 
that we should fulfil our interpretive responsibilities – the demands placed upon us 
within interpretive activity – it is important that these kind of “critical” 
considerations constitute part of the “work” of interpretation. 
So although the principle of attending closely to the “methods” by which 
members act meaningfully is one of the greatest strengths of an ethnomethodological 
approach to studying human action, it is nevertheless still vital that we attempt to 
recognise these principles as a form of “disciplinary prejudice” which guides our 
attention towards action and upon which a certain kind of sociological analysis is 
premised.  Without this recognition, we run the risk of taking these principles for 
granted and thus blinding ourselves as to whether they may also leave some aspects 
of meaningful action obscure.  This is not only problematic from the perspective of a 
                                                                                                                                     
will be made in light of Agnes’ disclosure of the deceptions made within her back story (Garfinkel, 
1967: 288). 
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hermeneutic model of the interpretation of meaningful action such as that for which I 
argue within this thesis, but also represents a failure of the “reflexivity” central to 
ethnomethodological practice. 
By recognising these principles as productive factors in the accounts of 
action ethnomethodologists produce, however, we also open ourselves to considering 
how these guiding principles may relate to other forms of sociological discourse, and 
the potential for different critical, interpretive and descriptive modes of thought to 
inform one another.  I next give consideration to how “The Model of the Text” could 
help both to foster this “openness” within ethnomethodology and preserve the 
reflexivity central to an ethnomethodological approach to the study of human action. 
 
5.6: “The Model of the Text” and Ethnomethodology 
“The Model of the Text”, in and of itself, does not offer an alternative 
approach to understanding human action to that of ethnomethodology.  However, to 
the extent that it foregrounds the constitution of action as an “object” and the way in 
which “disciplinary prejudice” is implicated within this process of objectification, 
the accompanying necessity of self-criticism within this, and the importance of 
“explanation” as a critical stage within interpretation, Ricoeur’s textual model has 
the potential to help ensure ethnomethodology is properly ethnomethodological and 
to resist the threat of programmatisation that can emerge if we begin to take the 
principles upon which our inquiries are premised for granted. 
Ethnomethodology’s concern with the indexical properties of action 
performed in local social settings – its “bottom-up” approach – is designed in part to 
limit the extent to which researchers impose meanings alien to their setting upon 
actions.  But insofar as ethnomethodology still involves descriptive and interpretive 
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activities, and still involves drawing upon relatively narrow presuppositions 
regarding the “correct” methods for gathering and making sense of data, it would, as 
I have suggested in relation to Garfinkel’s case study of Agnes, be unwise to 
disregard the constitutive role that the researcher and the disciplinary prejudices 
upon which they draw have to play in the interpretive and descriptive activities in 
which they are involved. 
 
5.6.1: The Risk of Programmatisation 
The self-implicating reflexivity of ethnomethodology leaves it theoretically 
better placed than many other schools of thought to incorporate awareness of 
disciplinary prejudice into its work and methodology.  Nevertheless, criticisms have 
been made regarding the increasing programmatisation of ethnomethodology, and 
the negative implications this has for ethnomethodological reflexivity. 
Melvin Pollner, for example, observes that “[a]lthough a significant feature 
of ethnomethodological self-understanding in early work, radical reflexivity has 
diminished to the point that most contemporary studies view themselves almost 
entirely in terms of their capacity to represent empirical structures” (Pollner, 1991: 
372).  The consequence of this is that “[a]s ethnomethodology is codified into an 
empirical program concerned with interactional, conversational, or scientific 
practices per se, radical referential reflexivity is muted, discounted, or disowned” 
(Pollner, 1991: 374).  As ethnomethodology becomes “codified” and gains 
established and widely used methods of its own – such as conversation analysis as 
developed by Harvey Sacks, which has taken on the character of “a separate and 
highly technical enterprise” (Rawls, 2002: 41) – it begins to take its own conceptual 
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and intellectual background for granted, therefore becoming blind to how this 
background plays a constitutive role in the work of researchers within this tradition. 
This is not necessarily endemic to ethnomethodology.  But insofar as the 
principles of ethnomethodology are taken for granted and become “codified”, the 
disciplinary prejudices upon which this approach is premised inevitably become 
reified and lose their “productive” dimension, ultimately risking taking on the status 
instead of a “preconceived idea to which reality must correspond” (Wittgenstein, 
2001: § 131).  By taking the premises of ethnomethodology for granted, researchers 
within this tradition risk becoming insufficiently ethnomethodological about their 
own practices as interpreters of meaningful human action. 
Ethnomethodology, like any other form of social inquiry, must therefore 
attempt to engage with how the presuppositions and practices of researchers play an 
important constitutive role in the way social action is described and understood, even 
if those presuppositions and practices are not drawn explicitly from any rigid or 
systematic “theory” of action.  The price that has to be paid if we are going to avoid 
accidentally reifying disciplinary prejudices, especially for any “bottom-up” and 
non-programmatic approach to social inquiry, is that a great level of vigilance is 
required in regards to the constitutive role these presuppositions play in how 
researchers understand and interpret the action they observe. 
 
5.6.2: Objectification, Reflexivity and “The Model of the Text” 
 Greater sensitivity towards the “objectification” of action – how action is 
“fixed” in a manner analogous to the text – as part of the inquirer’s practices could 
certainly aid the work of ethnomethodological thinkers in this regard.  At its best, 
ethnomethodology does this very well.  Garfinkel is, for example, frequently careful 
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to state the nature of his intentions and the techniques he uses in undertaking studies, 
as well as often including a significant amount of supporting data with his analyses:  
“The Work of a Discovering Science Construed with Materials from the Optically 
Discovered Pulsar”, for example, involves a careful statement of the study’s 
intentions alongside reference to the “conventions of conversational analysis” 
(Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981: 132) used to transcribe a tape recording 
made during the discovery of an optical pulsar. 
In addition to this the article is accompanied by appendices including 
transcripts of conversations that occurred during the night’s work, notebook entries 
and the original discovery announcement made in the journal Nature.  This 
meticulous approach to documenting their own work could certainly be seen as in 
accordance with the kind of reflectivity that a hermeneutic model such as that 
recommended by Ricoeur demands from interpretive inquiry. 
Within this same article Garfinkel even writes that “[t]he social sciences are 
talking sciences, and achieve in texts, not elsewhere, the observability and practical 
objectivity of their phenomena” (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 1981: 133).  In 
this observation, Garfinkel and Ricoeur are, in a sense, remarkably close to one 
another.  However, Garfinkel intends this observation not as a comment upon his 
own working methods, but primarily as a criticism of the pretension of “naturally 
theoretic” social science towards a kind of objectivity traditionally associated with 
the natural “discovering” sciences.  He argues that such aspirations towards 
objectivity contribute to a phenomenon of “irrelevance” of social scientific 
observations in relation to the “interests”, “knowledge” and “practices” that 
“compose the in situ apt and familiar efficacy” (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, 
1981: 133) of the work of particular individuals in particular social settings.  In 
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contrast to such pretensions of objectivity, Garfinkel claims that our understanding 
of social phenomena must draw its sense from and only from the methods and 
accountable features of the social setting we are observing. 
But, as I have suggested previously, to some extent Garfinkel fails to get to 
grips with the degree to which even ethnomethodological inquiry of this sort 
involves a level of abstraction and objectification, and how ethnomethodological 
presuppositions about action are potentially limiting if they are adopted without 
careful consideration of the particular situation at hand.  To obscure the 
“objectification” undergone by action under ethnomethodological description is also 
to obscure the potential that the phenomenon at hand may be meaningful in ways not 
covered by any single description or interpretation.  So although the principles of 
ethnomethodology emerge in part out of a noble enough desire to avoid becoming 
lost in “theoretical” abstraction, abiding to them rigidly and failing to recognise that 
there is also an element of abstraction involved within ethnomethodology 
undermines their value. 
Ricoeur recognises that even if “objectifying knowledge is always secondary 
to the relation of belonging, it can nevertheless be constituted in a relative 
autonomy” (Ricoeur, 1981i: 243-44).  By this Ricoeur means that, by fixing action as 
an object of inquiry, we gain the possibility of adopting a critical attitude towards the 
conditions which help shape our understanding, and towards the received meaning of 
the situation we are seeking to understand.  The “relative autonomy” this affords us 
is the freedom from being dominated by the complex webs of social and historical 
relations to which we and those we seek to understand belong.  This amounts to a 
rejection of any form of “absolute” objectivity, wherein it is claimed that the 
researcher might hope to proceed free of any conceptual or methodological bias, in 
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favour of acknowledging the productive role that “prejudice” can play in how we 
understand meaningful human action.  This also applies at the level of the 
objectification of action, and demands that we engage in what I have termed the 
“critical description” of meaningful human action.130 
The fixation of action as a “text”, by this account, does not supplant the way 
in which action is meaningful as a situated phenomenon, but reflects the reflective 
“distanciation” that arises whenever we take action as an object of inquiry.  This 
distanciation, the potential to place our judgement regarding the meaning of action in 
a state of suspense, allows our understanding to take a “critical” detour.  The 
interpreter of action is in a position, one often not available whilst caught up in the 
rhythm of action, where she can temporarily suspend the normativity of the “norms” 
to which a “common sense” understanding of the situation at hand conforms, and 
therefore engage with them critically before either acceding to, qualifying or 
rejecting them. 
Concepts such as “power” and “ideology”, although alien to our pre-
reflective engagement with the world in most circumstances, nevertheless attempt to 
capture something important about our social existence.  We need, therefore, to at 
least be able to integrate them into our analyses, and not exclude such concepts 
before we have even considered their adequacy to the situation at hand. 
“The Model of the Text”, by incorporating the “critical moment” into 
interpretation, describes one way in which we can comprehend these different 
approaches to understanding action in relation to one another and the implications of 
any choice we might make to draw upon or exclude them from our analyses.  Even if 
this objectification represents a form of abstraction from our “everyday” engagement 
                                               
130 The notion of the critical description of meaningful action within the human and social sciences, as 
a response to the risk of taking our presuppositions of meaning for granted within the constitution of 
action as an object of inquiry, is discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
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with and within action, the possibility of critical interpretation is premised upon and 
must remain sensitive to this pre-reflective understanding.  Critically informed 
interpretation can, in turn, offer us different perspectives upon the situation at hand, 
directing our attention to things of which we would perhaps not otherwise have been 
aware.  The hermeneutic image of a “circle” or an “arc” drawn upon by Ricoeur, 
although a simplification of the confrontation between interpreter and text which 
takes place during interpretation, allows us to see how the “common sense” 
understanding of individuals needn’t be placed in absolute opposition to any 
“critical” understanding we might achieve of these same situations. 
The relationship between pre-reflective, lay and critical understanding can be 
more fluid and complex than might initially appear to be the case.  If this is not taken 
into account ethnomethodological research risks drawing upon sociological, popular 
and specifically ethnomethodological presuppositions of meaning uncritically in a 
way that fails to do justice to the action being observed.  The hermeneutic emphasis 
upon self-critique and Ricoeur’s re-formulation of the relationship between 
“understanding” and “explanation” mean that “The Model of the Text” has the 
potential to provide ethnomethodologists with a valuable resource for understanding 
how objectification plays a role within their analyses of action, and how 
ethnomethodological interpretations of action might relate to other forms of critical 
discourse regarding meaningful human action.  It has, in this respect, the potential to 
aid ethnomethodology in its efforts to resist the kind of programmatisation that 
threatens to undermine the reflexivity upon which it is premised. 
In balance to this, it is also important to acknowledge that the centrality of 
distanciation and the “critical moment” to Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy, and his 
focus upon how meaning endures beyond the event of discourse, arguably 
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downplays the importance of how action has meaning for us in our day-to-day lives 
as part of our interpretive practices.  The ethnomethodological emphasis upon 
attending closely and sympathetically with the “everyday” understanding of those we 
seek to understand, and upon meaningful action as an “ongoing achievement” in 
local settings, is therefore an invaluable antidote to Ricoeur’s preoccupation with the 
“enduring” meaning of action and with how action becomes “fixed” in both formal 
interpretation and as part of our everyday lives. 
So while “The Model of the Text” may have the potential to, so to speak, 
help ensure that ethnomethodological practice remains ethnomethodological, 
ethnomethodological criticism in turn confronts us forcefully with the ineliminable 
role that doxic accounts play in how we should understand action within the human 
and social sciences and how the meaningfulness of action is inseparable from the 
way in which we live with and understand others around us as we and they act and 
communicate in day-to-day life. 
 
5.7: Conclusion 
 Both ethnomethodologists and philosophers inspired by Wittgenstein and 
Winch reject the scientistic paradigm of “objectivity” within the inquiry into 
meaningful human action, emphasising instead a sympathetic understanding of social 
agents on their own terms.  Ricoeur shares with these thinkers their suspicion of 
scientistic objectivity as the standard of validity within the human and social 
sciences.  In “The Model of the Text”, however, he proposes instead a new paradigm 
of interpretive validity drawn from textual hermeneutics within which an emphasis is 
placed upon showing “that an interpretation is more probable in the light of what is 
known”, rather than “showing that a conclusion is true” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 212).  
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“Objectification” is the heart of the analogy Ricoeur draws between the text and “the 
so-called object of the human sciences” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 197).  But this does not 
mean that the interpreter of action should attempt to understand action independently 
of how it is understood by those to whom the action is imputed. 
 Rather, it reflects the idea that by constituting action as an “object” we take a 
different attitude towards it than we would if it was part of our everyday lives and 
our everyday ongoing concerns.  With objectification we gain the capacity to reflect 
critically upon action; upon how it is understood by those it involves, and even upon 
our own “critical” interpretations of that action.  It is this ability to weigh up, 
compare and criticise different ways of understanding and explaining action that 
lends interpretation modelled after textual hermeneutics a form of “objectivity” for 
Ricoeur, not the subscription to any presumed way in which action “must be” if it is 
to make sense.  It is for this reason that Ricoeur identifies interpretation in the human 
and social sciences with Auslegung, a term borrowed from literary interpretation.  
Given this, it is difficult to see how criticisms of traditional “objective” social 
sciences, within which the interpretation of action is diagnosed as “pointing towards” 
something other than the contingent and particular circumstances of the action itself, 
can apply in the same way to the hermeneutic model of  interpretation presented by 
Ricoeur within “The Model of the Text”. 
Instead, it is possible that “The Model of the Text” can help inform such 
“bottom up” approaches to social inquiry by aiding their recognition of the activity 
involved in the description and interpretation of action and encouraging them to 
incorporate this into their work and analyses.  “The Model of the Text” helps us 
explicate the way in which we objectify action in order to reflect upon it, and as such 
the need to consider the ways in which this fixation plays a constitutive role in our 
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interpretive understanding of action.  It is also the distanciation that arises with 
fixation within which Ricoeur identifies the potential for critical inquiry to form a 
part of our understanding of action, and as a prerequisite to the kind of self-critique 
that helps understand how disciplinary prejudice informs our interpretations of 
action.  Insofar as we recognise an analogous relationship between the text and the 
object of the human sciences, we also recognise a need for this kind of reflectivity in 
our activities as interpreters. 
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“In every philosophy there is a point at which the philosopher’s ‘conviction’ appears on the scene” (Nietzsche, 1990: § 8) 
 
Chapter 6: Responsibility, Attestation and Distanciation 
 
 
In the “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur articulates interpretive 
understanding within the human sciences in hermeneutic terms, using his 
conceptualisation of the text as an exemplar against which we can understand the 
way in which meaningful human action is taken as an “object” of inquiry.  Drawing 
upon Ricoeur’s understanding of the text as a paradigm of discourse under the 
condition of “fixation”,131 I will now discuss the ways in which objectification and 
distanciation contribute to the strength and validity of hermeneutic interpretation 
within the human sciences, particularly in terms of how they can be seen to provide 
the space within which interpretation can incorporate critical practices into itself.  
Specifically, I will articulate the idea of the exercise of suspicion within 
interpretation as an important constitutive part of the strength of hermeneutic 
validity. 
To do this I will examine the idea of interpretation as an activity which 
carries with it a sense of obligation and responsibility that we must fulfil if our 
interpretations are to be valuable.  I will then use Ricoeur’s concept of “attestation” 
in order to articulate the kind of non-absolute yet non-arbitrary validity characteristic 
of hermeneutic interpretation.  Finally I will attempt to relate this understanding of 
hermeneutic validity to “The Model of the Text” itself, drawing upon Ricoeur’s 
conception of a “model” in order to help understand his claims about the text and 
meaningful action. 
 
 
                                               
131 Ricoeur’s conception of “the text” and the use he makes of it in “The Model of the Text” is 
discussed in greater depth in chapter two of this thesis. 
225 
 
6.1: Responsibility and Interpretation 
 The notion of “responsibility” does not form an explicit part of Ricoeur’s 
textual hermeneutics.  One interesting occasion upon which Ricoeur does, however, 
make reference to the idea of responsibility is in his discussion of the “avowal” of 
evil.  For Ricoeur, the avowal of evil involves recognising evil as something that 
emerges from human freedom and action, as something for which we are 
responsible.  The avowal of evil is thus a “declaration of a freedom that admits its 
responsibility”, a “taking-upon-oneself” within which we acknowledge that our 
actions are our own, and that we are accountable for them. 
It is this notion of responsibility as a “taking-upon-oneself” that interests me 
most in relation to hermeneutic interpretation, especially given that Ricoeur also 
writes that the recognition of responsibility “is not a conclusion but a starting point” 
(Ricoeur, 1986: xlvi-xlvii).  The context in which Ricoeur discusses the term 
“avowal” is, of course, markedly different from any discussion of interpretation in 
the human sciences.  Nevertheless, insofar as this discussion recognises 
responsibility as something that emerges from our actions and marks a beginning, it 
also indicates how responsibility might be an important part of our interpretive 
practices considered as an activity. 
In making an interpretation we are, in a sense, making a commitment.  At the 
very least we are committing ourselves to the truth of what we say, and the validity 
of the reasons that have led us to that conclusion.  In making such an interpretive 
commitment, we are responsible for these claims.  This is not merely to say that we 
are, to paraphrase Socrates, the “fathers” of our words, our logos, and that as such 
we have a responsibility to defend them from misunderstanding and 
misappropriation.  This is, if anything, the most mundane sense in which we are 
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responsible for our interpretive activities.  More fundamentally to interpretation 
considered as an activity, we are also “responsible” in the sense that we have a set of 
obligations that we must meet in order to make a good interpretation.  It is in this 
sense that we can think of engaging in interpretation as a starting point.  Engaging in 
interpretive activity commits us to meeting a set of obligations regarding what 
counts as a valid interpretation, and to working to find evidence and reason for 
favouring some particular interpretation over its alternatives.  It is by the work of 
interpretation within the human sciences that we distinguish an interpretation, as 
something that is grounded in, informed and supported by evidence, from mere 
speculation or opinion. 
These obligations are related to many of the issues central to understanding 
interpretation that I have touched upon thus far in this thesis.  We have a 
responsibility, for example, to remain sensitive to the contextual features of action 
by which it is meaningful for those to whom it is part of their lives, in the sense 
emphasised by e.g. Winch and Garfinkel.132  Failure to meet this obligation involves 
a failure of understanding, a failure to engage properly with those about whom we 
are making interpretive claims.  We have a responsibility to think critically about 
action, not to rest with the given meaning of an action without first considering how 
this meaning might obscure alternative possibilities of meaning or leave certain 
aspects of some action unexplored.133  We also have an obligation to turn this critical 
eye towards ourselves.  We need to consider how constituting action as an “object” 
                                               
132 The importance of recognising action as a situated phenomenon and the work of Winch and 
Garfinkel is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
133 In addition to the necessity of adopting a “critical” attitude as part of the description and reception 
of action (discussed in chapter four), the importance of taking a critical stance towards “given” 
meanings in order to ensure the validity of interpretation will be further addressed later in this chapter 
(section 6.3). 
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of inquiry might risk distorting our understanding of it, and the ways in which 
“disciplinary prejudice” may play a role in shaping our interpretive practices.134 
I do not wish to claim that this exhausts the idea of “responsibility” in 
relation to interpretation, nor am I proposing any radically new form of 
interpretation.  Rather, I wish to suggest that in making an interpretation we are 
making a commitment that demands to be met, and for which we are responsible, and 
that the obligation placed upon us as interpreters is one internal to practices of 
interpretation within the human and social sciences. 
It is important to distinguish the responsibility we have as interpreters to 
meet these various obligations from the logocentric idea that words require “living 
thought” behind them in order to be meaningful, and that as such we are responsible 
for our words insofar as we are the “logos” that imparts them with meaning.  This 
stands in opposition to the autonomy Ricoeur ascribes to the text, and the 
hermeneutic thought which underlies this autonomy.135  This is not, of course, to say 
that interpretations of action are simply cast into the void and that we may never 
return to them or that the “texts” of the humanities have nothing to do with the 
opinions and beliefs of those who authored them.  It is a fairly basic principle of any 
discipline that aspires to “truth”, “knowledge” or “understanding” that its 
practitioners should not be disingenuous with their work.  And it is part of discursive 
practice in the human sciences that researchers engage with their interlocutors, 
defending or revising their positions in response to criticism, and build upon 
previous work as their research progresses. 
                                               
134 The productive role of disciplinary prejudice within the description of action is the primary focus 
of the fourth chapter of this thesis, e.g. section 4.1.3. 
 
135 There is, of course, also an important difference between the Platonic discussion of writing in 
which meaning is identified with “logos”, and the kind of “textuality” discussed by Ricoeur, but 
nevertheless the contrast is one worth making insofar as the “responsibility” demanded by 
hermeneutic interpretation does not imply any intentionalist or logocentric position. 
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However, the way in which the interpreter will “stand by” her interpretations 
does not express the same kind of responsibility as that of a parent to a child.  It is 
instead a commitment towards a kind of honesty or integrity in regards to our work, 
that we should not be blind to argument or evidence.  We should be ready to revise 
or abandon our interpretations if the situation calls for such action, just as much as 
we should be ready to defend them.  Commitment here is not simply self-constancy, 
but a commitment towards the reality and validity of our interpretations which 
governs and motivates our activities as interpreters.  This demand for intellectual 
honesty, for integrity on the part of the interpreter, has to be part of interpretive 
activity if interpretation truly aspires to understanding.136 
The key distinction here is between interpretation as an activity and some 
particular interpretation that might result from interpretive activity.  We are 
responsible for some particular interpretation insofar as we are its author, but we are 
as free to reject it as we are to endorse it.137  In making an interpretation, however, 
we are seeking to present a course of events and their significance as plausible, even 
probable.  Even if we make an interpretation disingenuously or purely as an 
intellectual exercise, arguing for some position to which we are not committed, as 
interpreters we must still act as if we are seeking to support and argue for the truth of 
our position.  The responsibility with which we are faced as interpreters involves 
                                               
136 Honesty, in the sense I discuss here, is perhaps worth comparing to the “extravagant honesty 
[Redlichkeit]” Nietzsche claims as characteristic of “every brave thinker” and which he describes as 
“a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience”.  This refers to the willingness of a thinker to 
entertain new ideas and let them challenge her understanding, and stands in contrast to the temptation 
to simply “assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the complex” and to “overlook or repel what is 
wholly contradictory” (Nietzsche, 1990: § 230). 
 
137 A situation which can, at least on occasion, lead to a thinker engaging with their own past work as 
an interlocutor, reflecting critically on a position they might once have held. Perhaps one of the more 
peculiar examples of this might be the point in Philosophical Investigations when Wittgenstein refers 
to his past self in the third-person as “the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” 
(Wittgenstein, 2009:  § 23). 
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fulfilling these conditions of plausibility and validity, without which reasoned and 
evidenced interpretative understanding is indistinguishable from speculation. 
Once again, however, it is important to realise that this obligation isn’t blind; 
we do not begin with a position which we simply and uncritically assume to be true, 
and then seek to find material that will support or rationalise our preconceptions.  
This is why Gadamer claims that “a hermeneutically trained consciousness” cannot 
be closed off, but must throughout interpretation be sensitive to alterity and be 
prepared for that which she interprets to “tell him something” (Gadamer, 1993: 269).  
It is on the basis of and in conjunction with the alterity of that which we interpret – 
the way in which a text or action exceeds our expectations of meaning and confronts 
us with new ideas or understandings – that we come to construct an interpretive 
position.  Interpretation demands that we seek to support our interpretive 
conclusions with argument and evidence, but in order to ensure the probity of our 
interpretive activities it is vital that we engage in interpretation openly, and respond 
to the “alterity” of that which we seek to understand.138 
 
6.2: Attestation as Hermeneutic “Certainty” 
Interpretive integrity and the interpreter’s commitment to “truth” are also, 
from the very beginning, inseparable from the exercise of doubt and suspicion. 
Ricoeur has elsewhere identified this admixture of doubt and commitment-to-truth 
within hermeneutic thought as part of his discussion of the “attestation” of self in 
Oneself as Another.  Attestation-of-self, as discussed by Ricoeur, refers to an 
assurance in our capacity to act, suffer and understand.  Importantly, this self-
                                               
138 Here, once more, we can see the relevance of Ricoeur’s notion of “linguistic hospitality” from his 
work on translation (as discussed previously in chapter two, section 2.3) To respond to the “alterity” 
of that which we seek to understand we must attempt to “make room” for it in our understanding, and 
not hastily subsume it under familiar categories of our own experience. 
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assurance is not given as a certainty, and its strength is inseparable from the exercise 
of doubt and the threat of a suspicion which presents our sense of self as a mere 
“effect” of something other. 
Ricoeur articulates this by drawing upon Descartes’ notion of the self-
founding cogito and Nietzsche’s critique of the same.  On the one hand, we have the 
certainty expressed in the cogito; the idea that the self is the single thing we cannot 
possibly doubt.  On the other hand we have the suspicion, expressed in Nietzsche’s 
critique, that it is merely grammatical convention, something “outside” of ourselves, 
that leads us to this false certainty, and that even our own self-identity can therefore 
be doubted.  Ricoeur’s claim is that the self can be understood as existing between 
these two extremes; between the certainty of the cogito and the all-pervading 
suspicion of Nietzschean perspectivism.  The “certainty” of attestation cannot 
therefore be absolute, but likewise it does not have to fall into the abyss of 
unbounded skepticism.  The self, rather, exists as “credence without guarantee, but 
also as trust greater than any suspicion” (Ricoeur, 1992: 23). 
Ricoeur says that the affirmation of attestation thus “has as its contrary 
suspicion”, but that this “is not simply the contrary of attestation, in a strictly 
disjunctive sense… Suspicion is also the path towards and the crossing within 
attestation. It haunts attestation, as false testimony haunts true testimony” (Ricoeur, 
1992: 302).  This intertwining of “doubt” and “commitment” works as an injunction 
that makes us aware of ourselves as being responsible for the validity of our 
interpretations.  For Ricoeur, this insuperable presence of doubt within attestation 
expresses the strength of hermeneutic understanding.  To doubt is to suspend the 
uncritical acceptance of our presuppositions of meaning, and thus to provide the 
space within which we might engage thoroughly, openly and critically with the 
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interpretive situation at hand.  It is thus via the exercise of doubt that we open 
ourselves up to alternative possibilities of understanding engendered by the very 
alterity of that which stands before us. 
In this regard, the exercise of doubt resembles to some extent the suspension 
of meaning that occurs with the objectification of action.  The hermeneutic 
“strength” afforded by both attestation and objectification is premised upon the 
possibility of distancing ourselves from the given of our pre-reflective understanding 
of the world. So although in Oneself as Another Ricoeur is discussing attestation and 
hermeneutic certainty in the context of the self, the concept of attestation may 
nevertheless help inform our understanding of the strength of hermeneutic validity, 
and therefore help us understand why Ricoeur proposes the relevance of textual 
hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful action in the human and social 
sciences. 
Attestation of self, for Ricoeur, refers to the way in which being a self is, at 
least in part, to identify oneself as an agent of action, as a patient of the action of 
others and as being-responsible for one’s actions as an agent/patient within the 
world; “the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering.”  Ricoeur also describes 
the attestation of self as “a kind of trust… a trust in the power to say, in the power to 
do” (Ricoeur, 1992: 22).  But this “trust”, and the strength of the assurance based 
upon it, is arrived at only via a detour of suspicion and doubt about our power to act 
and to exist meaningfully and freely.  Importantly, for our purposes, Ricoeur also 
describes attestation as “the sort of certainty that hermeneutics may claim” (Ricoeur, 
1992: 21).  And although Ricoeur is here discussing attestation-of-self, it is worth 
taking this suggestion seriously and considering what sort of “certainty” we might 
aspire to in hermeneutic interpretation within the human sciences.  The certainty of 
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attestation, as discussed by Ricoeur, can thus help us articulate the strength of the 
hermeneutic interpretation Ricoeur considers as applicable within the human and 
social sciences. 
The feature of attestation that stands out most clearly in this regard, perhaps, 
is that hermeneutic “certainty” is something Ricoeur considers distinct from any 
possibility of “ultimate and self-founding knowledge”, or “epistēmē”.  Rather, 
attestation “presents itself first, in fact, as a kind of belief”: 
But it is not a doxic belief, in the sense in which doxa (belief) has less 
standing than epistēmē (science, or better, knowledge). Whereas 
doxic belief is implied in the grammar of ‘I believe-that’, attestation 
belongs to the grammar of ‘I believe-in.’ It thus links up with 
testimony… inasmuch as it is in the speech of the one giving 
testimony that one believes. (Ricoeur, 1992: 21) 
 
In terms of the attestation-of-self, it is our own power to act and to know that we 
“believe-in”, hence the reference to “testimony”. We believe-in that to which 
somebody testifies because some combination of the character of the speaker and the 
context in which they speak leads us to place a certain level of trust in them.  
Similarly, the belief we have in ourselves can be thought of as a form of “trust” 
insofar as it exists between the two polarities of the self-certainty and unbounded 
suspicion, as characterised by Ricoeur in terms of Descartes’ self-founding cogito 
and Nietzsche’s critique of the same as a “habit of grammar”. 
 There are, of course, important differences that we must take into account 
between the “attestation of self” and any relevance this might have to the 
interpretation of action, the foremost of which is perhaps that in the human and 
social sciences we are engaged in varying forms of critical academic discourse.  
Such forms of discourse have their own conventions and, typically, high standards 
of validity; e.g. the demand for evidence, engagement with the existing literature, 
particular forms and styles of writing etc.  If we were to speak of “trust” in critical 
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discourse as being identical to the almost intuitive trust we have in ourselves as 
“selves” capable of acting and suffering, we would be failing to acknowledge the 
peculiarity and conventional demands of the human and social sciences.  But it is 
precisely these conventions that underlie our trust: the strength and authority of 
interpretive proclamations made by historians, anthropologists and sociologists 
relies, at least in part, upon the fact that their work and methods are circumscribed 
by the critical standards of the disciplines and institutions in which they work.139 
The power in which we trust in the case of the human sciences, and as 
conceived in the “The Model of the Text”, is a power to make valid and informative 
claims about action.  This “power” emerges partly in relation to the integrity and 
critical abilities of the individual interpreter.140  But the “will-to-truth” and integrity 
of the individual interpreter is also ingrained within the conventions and critical 
standards that constitute the institutional and disciplinary background against which 
practitioners of the human and social sciences work.  It is a power that involves 
interpreters engaging critically with ideas drawn from the realm of discourse in 
which they are working but, importantly, also involves engaging closely and 
critically with the particular circumstances at hand and, where possible, by engaging 
with and directly observing those whom we are seeking to understand.  It is also, as 
with attestation-of-self, a power whose strength is suffused with suspicion.  The 
exercise of this power is therefore fundamentally inseparable from the recognition of 
its limits, and from the inescapable contingency of interpretive understanding. 
                                               
139 This relationship between the credence of testimony and the doubt inherent within the critical 
practices of the social and human sciences is drawn most explicitly by Ricoeur when he writes that 
“we have nothing better than testimony and criticism of testimony to accredit the historian’s 
representation of the past” (Ricoeur, 2004: 278). 
 
140 In this regard there is perhaps an “ethical dimension” to interpretation; the interpreter is 
“responsible” for their interpretations and their practices are at least partly constituted in relation to 
this responsibility, the demand for integrity and a sense of humility in front of the other. 
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For this reason, Ricoeur ascribes to hermeneutic thought “its own special 
fragility, to which is added the vulnerability of a discourse aware of its own lack of 
foundation” (Ricoeur, 1992: 22).  Attestation never escapes this fragility, 
demarcating it clearly from claims to epistemic certainty such as that of Descartes’ 
cogito, but aims to incorporate suspicion into itself as part of itself.  This inherent 
fragility contributes towards the strength of attestation insofar as it demands a 
response.  The assertion and confidence in the truth of what is said stands against the 
injunction of falsity that lies in the finitude of discourse and the ineliminable 
possibility of being wrong.  It thus demands that we take responsibility for that 
which we assert, and as such that we are capable of fulfilling the demands that this 
responsibility entails. 
It is, in part, an awareness of the fragility of discourse that places us under a 
condition of obligation when engaging in interpretive activity.  Such suspicion and 
fragility alienates us from the uncritical endorsement of our pre-reflective 
understanding, leading us to “step back” and reflect upon the matter at hand at 
greater length.  The notion of responsibility, in this sense, is intimately related to the 
possibility of holding that which we wish to assert at a distance from ourselves, and 
to consider it and ourselves under critical auspices.  The possibility of fulfilling our 
responsibility as interpreters of action therefore demands the kind of distanciation 
that emerges from the fixation of action as an “object” of inquiry. 
 
6.3: Distanciation as the Condition for Critical Understanding 
The importance of holding ideas and beliefs at a distance in order to ensure 
the strength and validity of interpretive claims is a recurrent theme in the 
hermeneutic philosophy from which Ricoeur takes his cue.  The notion of 
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“attestation”, as discussed by Ricoeur, is foreshadowed in Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical interpretation of being in Being and Time.  Ricoeur’s discussion of 
attestation in Oneself as Another is much wider-ranging, but Heidegger is 
nevertheless interesting for our purposes insofar as he identifies “attestation” with 
the call of “conscience” and responsibility, and therefore the possibility of existing 
without being carried away by the prejudices and presuppositions which characterise 
and colour our pre-reflective engagement with the world.141  Similarly, Gadamer 
insists that for the “authority” of tradition to be valid it must rest on participants and 
inheritors of a tradition consciously choosing to endorse and preserve it (Gadamer, 
1993: 281).  In Ricoeur’s own hermeneutic philosophy we see this tendency made 
explicit with the incorporation of the “critical moment” – the possibility of adopting 
a temporarily distanced attitude towards the meaning of the text and considering it 
critically – being an essential stage between a “naïve” and a “critical” interpretation, 
all within “a unique hermeneutical arc” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 218). 
In each case the possibility and assurance of acting freely and of 
understanding genuinely is placed in opposition to the risk of being dominated by 
prejudice, preconception and our pre-reflective understanding of the world.  In 
response to this these hermeneutic thinkers all recommend adopting an attitude of 
doubt towards taking for granted that which is “given”, i.e. a willingness to question 
our own and others’ presumed acumen regarding both our “everyday” and our 
“theoretical” ideas about the world.  This needn’t necessarily lead to a rejection of 
the “given” ideas and beliefs in question, nor is the willingness to suspect motivated 
by the desire to reject them.  Rather, we want to be in a position to freely endorse, 
                                               
141 According to Heidegger, “conscience” takes the form of “guilt”, and in turn “also has the 
signification of ‘being responsible for’ – that is, being the cause or author of something” (Heidegger, 
2008: 327). Conscience is therefore Dasein calling to itself in a manner “that denies the they-self its 
domination” (Heidegger, 2008: 323). 
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qualify or reject what is given, based upon the best of our knowledge and 
understanding.  Reflective distance undermines the normativity of the “everyday” or 
the “given” ideas and beliefs which otherwise have the potential to dominate our pre-
reflective engagement with the world, opening an imaginary space where other 
voices, evidence and perspectives can be brought to bear on the situation at hand.  It 
is only after the exercise of such doubt and comparative analysis that the 
hermeneutic thinker feels their interpretive claims might be made with confidence. 
 
6.3.1: Self-Critique 
 The integrity of interpretation – the need for our interpretive claims to be 
valid, informed and informative – demands that we must be willing to question 
anything “given”; whether this is “everyday” meaning and the self-understanding of 
those we seek to understand, or the given of our own presuppositions and prejudices 
of meaning.  It is in this respect that Ricoeur argues that interpretation must also 
involve self-critique if it is to be anything more than an uncritical imposition of our 
own beliefs upon that which we are nominally seeking to understand, and that 
critical interpretive understanding therefore involves “exposing” ourselves to that 
which we interpret and receiving an “enlarged self” (Ricoeur, 1981d: 143) in return.  
For Ricoeur, this “enlargement” of the self “implies a moment of distanciation in the 
relation of the self to itself” (Ricoeur, 1981d: 144).  The interpreter must guard 
against taking their own critical categories and presuppositions of meaning for 
granted to just as great a degree as they must have a care not to take the given 
accounts of others entirely for granted.  It is vital that the interpreter attempt to 
evaluate their own ideas, and how they are applicable to the specific situation at 
hand, as part of their interpretive endeavours so that their interpretations might be 
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“formed by the matter of the text and not by the prejudices of the reader” (Ricoeur, 
1981d: 144). 
The text, as a model of objectification, provides a locus for self-criticism by 
demonstrating how objectification affords the opportunity to suspend our judgement 
and turn a critical eye towards ourselves as interpreters in addition to that which is 
nominally the object of our interpretation.  On one level, for example, it allows us to 
confront the ways in which our formulation and understanding of the interpretive 
situation is informed by disciplinary prejudice, how action is appropriated as an 
object of inquiry, and how these influence our interpretation of the situation at hand. 
At a more thoroughly “existential” level, perhaps closer to Ricoeur’s notion 
of the “enlargement” of the self, we also have the idea that in interpretation new 
possibilities of being and understanding are opened up to us; that by remaining open 
to what we are interpreting we can learn new things about ourselves.  Self-criticism 
like this demands that we, as interpreters, recognise ourselves as part of the 
interpretive situation, that we are actively involved in producing an interpretation of 
meaning, and that our own presuppositions of meaning are constitutive factors of the 
understanding we achieve via this activity.  And just as the “critical” attitude which 
we might adopt towards the everyday meaning of action does not imply that we will 
necessarily reject that given meaning, self-criticism does not mean we will reject 
every “prejudice” we discover.  It demands only that we understand how our 
interpretations are informed by our own presuppositions, and that we choose to 
employ them rather than blindly allowing them to surreptitiously delimit and 
“dominate” our thought. 
All of this demands that we are capable of adopting a distanced attitude 
towards our understanding of action and our own practices as interpreters of action, a 
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distance which for Ricoeur is embodied by and manifest in the fixation of discourse 
in the text.  This “distance” is, primarily, an affected attitude which has a specific 
role to play within critical reflective inquiry.  It would be wrong, for example, to say 
that without objectification and distanciation we have no understanding of 
meaningful human action.  If this were the case, we would not be able to engage 
meaningfully with other people, and there would be nothing for the human and social 
sciences to take as their object.  Our day-to-day lives rarely necessitate this kind of 
conscious endorsement of ideas on a regular basis.  In our day-to-day interactions 
with other people most of the time we simply live and act with and alongside them 
without having to resort to any sort of explicitly critical reflection. 
But insofar as existing meaningfully involves, to some extent, a self-
conscious awareness of ourselves as agents, responsible for our own actions and with 
the possibility of choice, it is impossible to divorce reflective distanciation entirely 
even from everyday meaningful human existence.  So although critical distance 
might be affected and atypical of much of our day-to-day experience and 
understanding of the world, it would be wrong to suggest that it is something entirely 
alien or non-conducive to understanding how action is meaningful within our lives. 
Ricoeur even argues that “externalization and objectification” occur, to some 
extent, “as soon as life is no longer simply lived, but begins to understand itself and 
to present itself for others to understand by means of the inner connection of its 
expressions” (Ricoeur, 1976b: 693).  For Ricoeur, the very possibility of becoming 
consciously aware of the meaningfulness of existence is therefore inseparable from 
the possibility of taking some aspect of our lives as an object of reflection, and of 
presenting and sharing this “object” with others.  It is this possibility that “The 
Model of the Text” draws upon and develops to a degree far beyond that commonly 
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prevalent within our day-to-day lives.  Under the condition of objectification we, as 
interpreters, are in a position to “remain in a kind of state of suspense” in regards to 
how we should understand the action at hand (Ricoeur, 1981h: 215).  Ricoeur 
focuses primarily on the idea that it is the meaning of the text which is held in 
suspense in the particular interpretive situation, but to a certain extent this 
underplays the role of the interpreter.  We do not, after all, simply grant meaning to 
action when we make an interpretive claim, nor is action meaningless unless it is 
first interpreted.  What is held in suspense is not the meaningfulness of action, but 
our acceptance of some given or pre-reflectively formulated meaning and our 
willingness to proclaim on the meaning of action until we have given it due 
consideration. 
In order for the meaning of the text, or any analogue of the text, to be held in 
such a state of “suspense”, the interpreter must first choose to suspend their impulse 
towards judgement.  By holding this impulse in suspense, we become capable of 
refraining from pronouncing on the meaning of action until we have considered 
various alternative possibilities of meaning and the socio-historico-theoretical 
context (both that in which the action took place, and that in which we now come to 
interpret it) within which we understand the action being interpreted.  Ideally, when 
engaging in interpretive activity we should only settle upon some judgement when 
we consciously choose to and are in a position to qualify our interpretations by 
demarcating the limits of their validity.  By holding that which is “given” in a 
temporary state of alienation – by objectifying it – we might attempt to overcome or 
ameliorate the perceived risk of domination within our interpretive activities, and 
thereby achieve the kind of hermeneutic “certainty” to which interpretation in the 
human and social sciences might hope to aspire. 
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The adoption of a critical attitude is, of course, no guarantee of truth or 
understanding, but only the condition under which we can attempt to fulfil the 
obligations involved in making a truth claim.  The responsibility we have as 
interpreters of action in the context of the human sciences, then, could be 
characterised by our capacity to commit ourselves to a claim to truth, and by the 
demand for intellectual integrity and rigour that accompanies this commitment.  This 
involves a readiness to open ourselves up to the “world” of which what we interpret 
is a part, to back up arguments with evidence in accordance with the conventions of 
critical discourse in which we are engaged, and that we are willing and able to accept 
the limitations – the contingency – of this claim.  We never “bottom out” in some 
final and foundational truth about action. 
But we nevertheless must have a “trust”, placed against the absence of a final 
transcendent signified, in our capacity to come to some kind of meaningful 
conclusion and to make valid statements about action and the world of meaningful 
human behaviour.  It is this notion of the fragility of interpretive judgement, as 
discussed by Ricoeur in relation to “attestation”, which is most vital to keep in mind 
when we consider the kind of claims made in “The Model of the Text” and the way 
in which the “text” can work as a model for action. 
 
6.4: The Textual Model as Interpretation 
In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur sets out a model of validity in which 
interpretive truth claims are considered as neither purely relativistic nor positivistic, 
and outlines the application of this textual model of interpretation to the 
interpretation of meaningful action in the human and social sciences.  I have argued 
that hermeneutic interpretation of the kind Ricoeur applies to interpretation within 
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the human and social sciences involves renunciation of the possibility of “absolute” 
truth claims, and that instead the validity of interpretation depends upon 
acknowledging and responding to the inherent “fragility” of interpretation.  I now 
wish to argue that “The Model of the Text” is itself offered in the same 
hermeneutical spirit; as an argument for the plausibility of a model of interpretation 
that draws upon various features of the text but without making any claim to 
“absolute” truth nor to be the only potentially valid model for interpretation in the 
human and social sciences.  What is at stake, therefore, is not whether the text is 
necessarily and universally the best possible model for action available to us, but 
rather how persuasive we find the arguments made for such a comparison and how it 
might inform our activities as interpreters. 
 “The Model of the Text” is an interpretive model that, if it is to be taken 
seriously, must attempt to accommodate concerns about the limited scope and 
validity of interpretive methodologies into itself.  If the proposals made in “The 
Model of the Text” are themselves an “interpretation” of how action is taken as an 
object and understood within the human and social sciences, then they are neither 
absolute nor necessarily the only way we might approach understanding and 
conceptualising the interpretation of meaningful human action.  Ricoeur discusses 
the interpretation of action within the human and social sciences in very broad terms, 
incorporating a wide range of academic disciplines by invoking the category of 
Geisteswissenschaften.  But the interpretation of meaningful action is not one 
homogenous activity across interpretive disciplines, and the insights afforded by 
considering meaningful action in terms of the text will have different application 
across this diversity of interpretive disciplines and particular interpretive cases.  
Even more fundamentally, the methods of interpretation appropriate in any given 
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situation should be determined in part by that which we are interpreting, in 
accordance with the openness towards alterity inherent to a “hermeneutically trained 
consciousness”. 
This “openness” of the hermeneutical attitude demands that, if it is to be 
consistent with its own interpretive principles, any hermeneutic model of 
interpretation should remain flexible and responsive to the particular circumstances 
in which we engage in interpretation.  Thus, we should not conceive of “The Model 
of the Text” as any kind of hard and fast set of rules for interpreting action.  Rather it 
is an interpretation that articulates a certain way of conceiving interpretive validity 
and the role of objectification within this, and by doing so exposes us to the 
possibilities afforded by textual hermeneutics to the interpretation of action in the 
human and social sciences.  
 
6.4.1: Ricoeur and Models 
One way in which we might approach understanding the interpretive status of 
Ricoeur’s application of textual hermeneutics to the interpretation of meaningful 
action is by looking more closely at his choice to describe his project as a “model”, 
and at what this implies for how we should read “The Model of the Text”.  
Elsewhere, Ricoeur describes a model as “an instrument of redescription… a way of 
seeing things differently by changing our language about the subject of our 
investigation” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 66-67).  This idea is one that draws heavily on Max 
Black’s treatment of “theoretical models” in Models and Metaphors.  Theoretical 
models within the natural sciences, for Black, consist not in positing some 
metaphysical ideal to which reality must conform, but rather in “talking in a certain 
way” (Black, 1962: 229).  The key to this lies in providing a new “language” with 
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which we can reconceptualise some given problem or phenomena, and allowing this 
to guide our investigations.  
According to Black, theoretical models work by drawing from language 
standardly used to picture one “relatively unproblematic, more familiar, or better-
organized” domain of inquiry, and applying this language to another domain in 
which “a need is felt for further scientific mastery” (Black, 1962: 230).  This 
proposed relationship between different domains of inquiry is then used to move 
from known inferences in the more familiar field to the correlating inferences in the 
target domain.  We assume that we can “model” inferences and procedures in the 
target domain upon those with which we are familiar in the domain from which the 
model is constructed.  These correlative inferences are then “independently checked 
against known or predicted data” (Black, 1962: 230) in the target domain. 
Whether or not Black’s account of theoretical models provides an adequate 
account of how models are used within the natural and physical sciences, this notion 
of the metaphoricity of models had an important influence on Ricoeur’s thought.  In 
study seven of The Rule of Metaphor, for example, Ricoeur draws upon this idea of 
the scientific model as an “instrument of redescription” in order to elaborate upon 
the aporia of metaphorical reference (Ricoeur, 1978: 239-246).  Given that Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic philosophy maintains the importance of not conflating 
Geisteswissenschaften with Naturwissenschaften, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Ricoeur is more interested in how Black’s account of theoretical models contributes 
to “the logic of discovery” within scientific investigation than he is in “the logic of 
justification or proof” (Ricoeur, 1978: 240).  It is the “metaphorical” dimension of 
models that interests Ricoeur most, and it is this which can perhaps best help us 
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understand how Ricoeur believes that the text can serve as a model for meaningful 
action within the human and social sciences. 
Ricoeur writes of the “theoretical model” that it is “essentially a heuristic 
instrument that seeks, by means of fiction, to break down an inadequate 
interpretation and to lay the way for a new, more adequate interpretation” (Ricoeur, 
1978: 240).  Ricoeur expresses this as “the conjunction between fiction and 
redescription” (Ricoeur, 1978: 247).  Under this conception, a model works by first 
denying the prima facie adequacy of “our ordinary vision and the language we 
normally use” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 67), so that in turn “the heuristic fiction [of the 
model] can work its redescription of reality” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 68).  The model itself 
is a heuristic fiction, but it aims towards the redescription of something “real” about 
the targeted domain of inquiry, based upon a “presumed isomorphism between the 
model and its domain of application” (Ricoeur, 1976a: 67).  So whilst the model of 
the text is a construction, it is designed to describe and direct our awareness towards 
certain aspects of the reality of working with action as an object of inquiry within the 
human and social sciences, insofar as this “objectified” action “displays some of the 
features constitutive of text as text” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 197).  Based upon this 
redescription, Ricoeur is then able to draw from the domain of literary interpretation 
in order to disclose to us new ways of conceiving the interpretation of meaningful 
human action. 
Ricoeur identifies textual hermeneutics as a domain in which interpretive 
validity is arguably better understood than it is within traditional interpretive models 
prevalent within the human and social sciences, especially when these interpretive 
models are based upon the same standards of validity that are prevalent within the 
physical and natural sciences.  Proceeding from the parallels he perceives between 
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the text and action taken as the object of inquiry, Ricoeur identifies the interpretation 
of meaningful action within the human and social sciences as a domain which could 
benefit from the textual model.  The evidence that bears testimony to the 
“isomorphism” between “the text” and action-as-object of the human sciences will 
not, however, be found in the kind of empirical observations made within the natural 
and physical sciences, and upon which the validity of scientific models is premised 
according to Black. 
Rather, the validity of “The Model of the Text” is a hermeneutic validity of 
the kind discussed in this chapter.  It is a contingent and “fragile” claim, based not 
upon anything “verifiable” but instead on the plausibility of the arguments given by 
Ricoeur for perceiving a parallel between action and the text.  This kind of evidence 
has the same kind of weight as the evidence we give to support a particular reading 
of a text: it makes an appeal to our understanding, but always remains a partial and 
contingent view of the matter open to challenge or revision in light of new 
arguments, evidence or competing alternative interpretations.  Understanding the 
contingencies and limitations involved in making an interpretation of this kind is an 
important part of circumscribing its validity, and the claim that we might use a 
“fiction” to redescribe reality demands a similar level of epistemic vigilance. 
This need for vigilance arises from the very nature of using a model in this 
manner.  The idealisation involved in constructing a model – the selection and 
emphasis of certain aspects of that which is modelled at the expense of others – 
means that we must always take care not to lose sight of the ways in which that 
which we are seeking to understand may differ from the “fiction” we utilise in order 
to do so.  The difference between a literary metaphor and the metaphoricity of a 
model is illustrative in this regard.  Ricoeur recognises that metaphor, as compared 
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to simile, tends to obscure its own fictiveness, in that although a metaphor is said to 
“stand for” something, it nevertheless presents itself as something to be “taken for” 
(Ricoeur, 1978: 252) that with which it is identified.  Metaphor hides its own 
metaphoricity in that it hides the “as if” of the identity claim between the subject and 
object of the metaphor, the tacit “is not” that exists within the “is” of metaphorical 
reference.  For this reason, Ricoeur claims that models, as compared to literary 
metaphors, demand a “deliberate mastery” of this “as if”, and that we must engage in 
a form of “ontological abstinence” in our claims to model one domain after another, 
no matter how “difficult to maintain” (Ricoeur, 1978: 254) this might be. 
So whilst the rhetorical power of literary metaphor relies upon us being, to 
some extent, carried away by the comparison made and identifying the subject and 
object of metaphor with one another, the valid application of a model demands 
lucidity and control on behalf of the person using the model to speak about that 
which is being modelled.  If we do not achieve a level of “mastery”, we run the risk 
of uncritically subsuming reality under the “fiction” we are nominally using to 
orientate our understanding.  The test of the model lies in its application; we must 
remain epistemologically vigilant, aware of how adequately our “redescription” 
seems to fit the actuality of that which we are describing and interpreting, and 
willing to reject or modify our interpretive descriptions if we cannot find evidence 
for them in each case of application.  If the text is to work as a model for action, it 
must then also incorporate an acknowledgement of the limitations of this project, to 
acknowledge the “is not” present within the metaphor of action-as-text, upon which 
“The Model of the Text” is premised. 
 So at the very same time as the model guides our adoption of an attitude 
towards our interpretive practices, the concrete situation at hand has the potential to 
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become an injunction against the model.  The concrete task of “fixing” action as an 
object of inquiry and of interpreting that action works as a test of the textual model 
itself in that we need to judge how best to describe the action at hand.  The need to 
respond to this injunction from reality, rooted in our commitment to the integrity of 
interpretation, is what I refer to as the “responsibility” involved in interpretive 
activity.  This includes attempting to evaluate how well these (re-)descriptions 
accord with the self-understanding of those we are describing, and how well they fit 
with the interpretive standards of the discipline in which we are working.  We must 
aspire to the hermeneutic ideal of remaining “open” to the alterity of what we are 
interpreting, and of being aware of the challenges this poses to us as interpreters. 
The question is not therefore one of whether using textual hermeneutics as a 
model for action is fundamentally right or wrong, but of how plausible and 
persuasive we find the suggestion and of what possibilities the model discloses to us 
as interpreters.  Ricoeur uses a construct of “the text” in order to focus our attention 
upon certain features of meaningful action as it is appropriated by interpreters within 
the human and social sciences and, consequently, to guide our engagement with and 
understanding of the ways in which action is meaningful.  It is a reminder of the role 
played by objectification within the discourse of the human and social sciences, a 
reminder that it is via objectification and reflective distanciation that the possibility 
of critical understanding emerges, that the validity of interpretive inquiry into human 
action is closer to the validity of literary interpretation than it is to positivistic 
verification, and that self-critique is an essential part of the thoroughly “critical” 
understanding of action.  But, no matter how powerful this metaphor might be, the 
model of the text does not claim to be either an exhaustive or an exclusive account of 
how we might come to understand and interpret action. 
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6.4.2: Concerns and Qualifications 
The necessity of keeping the “fragility” of interpretation in mind with regards 
to a model such as that of Ricoeur’s is rooted in the risk of misapplication.  It might, 
for example, be asked whether the emphasis placed on “ontological abstinence” and 
“epistemological vigilance” indicates that a model lends itself, by its very nature, to 
over-generalisation.  The thought here is that analogical transference on the scale 
involved in constructing and applying a model such as this is prone to being 
extended beyond its valid limits; that the text is a limited paradigm, but that the 
temptation for interpreters is to transgress these limits and overlook features of 
meaningful action that fall outside of the textual paradigm.  The scope of a model, 
which is aimed at a “domain” of knowledge and presents itself as potentially 
applicable in a wide range of different interpretive situations, makes this risk to some 
extent unavoidable. 
Rather than any particular case of interpretative activity, the textual model 
seeks to determine the conditions under which action can be understood when it is 
taken as an object of inquiry within the human sciences.  We can realistically say 
that in any particular case of interpretation we can harbour hopes of reaching some 
kind of non-arbitrary judgement, even if this judgement is always going to remain 
open to reinterpretation or revision in the light of new information, or when 
considered from a different critical perspective.  But how we go about any particular 
case of interpretation – the information and methods we bring to bear on the problem 
– depends necessarily upon the particular circumstances of that case.  It is difficult, 
therefore, to say a priori how the textual model will be applicable in different 
circumstances, and what constitutes a misapplication in any particular case. 
Consequently, the “problem” of interpretation to which “The Model of the Text” is 
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addressed is, in a very real sense, irresolvable, and remains as long as people seek to 
interpret meaningful action. 
It is precisely the indeterminacy that accompanies this breadth of potential 
application which leaves “The Model of the Text” open to the possibility of 
misapplication.142  There emerges a risk of unthinkingly subsuming the interpretation 
of action under the rubric of textual hermeneutics, rather than allowing the textual 
model to guide our interpretive activities whilst simultaneously striving to remain 
open to that which we are seeking to interpret, and taking the specificity of each case 
into consideration.  If there is this risk that a “model”, as envisioned by Ricoeur, is 
prone to reification or over-generalisation in this manner, there is also a risk of 
obscuring those features of action that are less amenable to being understood in 
terms of the text.143  Given that “The Model of the Text” is concerned, to a large 
extent, with the valid interpretation of meaningful action in the human and social 
sciences, this risk is not one we can afford to dismiss lightly.  If such a model is 
likely to cause us to misunderstand that which we are interpreting, then it is clearly 
not suited to the task.  
Taken and generalised without caution, it is possible that “The Model of the 
Text” could lead us to misunderstand certain aspects of the way in which action is 
meaningful, or certain ways in which we as interpreters might impose meaning upon 
action.  I have argued, however, that a hermeneutic model of interpretation such as 
                                               
142 Once again, it is worth remembering that “The Model of the Text” was formulated as part of 
Ricoeur’s ongoing engagement with the role of structuralism as a “science” of language, and as an 
analytical tool in the human and social sciences. The broad scope of “The Model of the Text” at least 
in part reflects the level of generality at which this debate was taking place. 
 
143 It is partly for this reason that we cannot uncritically appropriate everything that is true of the 
literary text when considering action as a text, even given Ricoeur’s characterisation of the text in 
terms of discourse submitted to fixation. At the very least, we owe a greater debt of humility to those 
we are trying to understand than we do to the author of a literary text. The responsibility we have as 
interpreters of action is therefore importantly distinct from the responsibility we might have as 
interpreters of literary texts. 
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Ricoeur’s provides us with a valuable resource for resisting such misunderstanding, 
and thus carries with it an injunction against misapplication that I have characterised 
in terms of interpretive responsibility.  Ricoeur recognises that interpretive activity 
should be accompanied by a hermeneutic consciousness that works hard to avoid 
misunderstanding that which is being interpreted, and to avoid uncritically over-
generalising or reifying given modes of understanding.  If we take the proposals of 
“The Model of the Text” to be an interpretive claim of this kind, then the same levels 
of care and self-critique as demanded by interpretation should also be involved in 
any application we might wish to make of the textual model in regards to the 
interpretation of meaningful human action. 
Whether Ricoeur manages this adequately in the relatively brief space he 
gives over to explicitly discussing the textual model is perhaps more questionable.  
There is a slightly “scientistic” tone to his writing, including his choice to describe 
the text as a “model”, which seemingly stands at odds with his rejection of positivist 
principles within the interpretation of human action.144  Given his prudence 
elsewhere regarding the importance of maintaining a distinction between the 
Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften, one would also perhaps hope to 
see a more cautious distinction drawn between the way in which models are used 
within the natural and social sciences within in his discussion of the metaphoricity of 
models. 
                                               
144 In Ricoeur’s defence, his “scientistic” language, although potentially misleading on a shallow 
reading, is framed within the traditional hermeneutic debate about the relationship between the 
Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften.  His insistence that it is possible to have a 
“scientific knowledge of the text”, for example, emerges from his discussion of the possibility of 
making valid interpretive claims “without conceding anything to the alleged dogma of the ineffability 
of the individual” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 212).  In this context a closer reading demonstrates that Ricoeur is 
using the notion of a “science” of interpretation primarily to emphasise that interpretation does not 
necessarily involve unconstrained relativism, or mysticism, rather than conflating the human and 
social “sciences” with the natural sciences without being sensitive to the differences between these 
domains of inquiry. 
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Ricoeur also makes certain claims, such as that “social reality is 
fundamentally symbolic” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 219), which do seem to conflate the 
application of semiotic theory to the interpretation of action with the foundations of 
the “reality” of what is being interpreted.  Without significant qualification, this 
would be a much stronger claim than could be justified given the arguments made 
within “The Model of the Text”, and arguably conflicts with the relative modesty of 
the claims made elsewhere in the essay.  Similarly, I have argued elsewhere145 that 
Ricoeur does not address the importance of the Gadamerian notion of the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of a text and the way in which it can help us understand the 
ineliminability of intentional and historicist concerns within the interpretation of 
action, or the importance of critical awareness at the level of the “objectification” of 
action. 
Ricoeur recognises, however, that the “fruitfulness” of a model depends upon 
us “knowing how to make use of it” (Ricoeur, 1978: 241).  He qualifies the claims 
he wishes to make from the very outset of “The Model of the Text” when he writes 
that the kind of interpretation he is discussing (Auslegung) “covers only a limited 
category of signs, those which are fixed by writing, including all the sorts of 
documents and monuments which entail a fixation similar to writing.”  His 
hypothesis too makes the relatively modest claim that textual hermeneutics might 
inform interpretation within the human sciences “inasmuch as their object displays 
some of the features constitutive of text as text” and “inasmuch as their methodology 
develops the same kind of procedures as those of Auslegung or text-interpretation” 
(Ricoeur, 1981h: 197). 
                                               
145 The notion of Wirkungsgeschichte is discussed in more detail in sections 1.1.2.1and 2.1 of this 
thesis, and critical awareness as a necessary moment within the description and objectification of 
action in chapter four (sections 4.1 and 4.2). 
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All of this is consistent with the note of caution sounded by Ricoeur when he 
says that “only some features are relevant in a model, others are not. The model 
purports to be faithful only to its relevant features” (Ricoeur, 1978: 240).  That there 
are features of meaningful action not easily accounted for in terms of the text, and 
that other approaches to the understanding and interpretation of action may attend to 
these features in a way that “The Model of the Text” might not is therefore 
something inherent to Ricoeur’s conception of a “model”. 
 Ricoeur is primarily interested in how we can understand the validity of 
interpretation within the human and social sciences, and how textual hermeneutics 
can help us understand this.  He focuses upon the way in which meaningful action 
can become “fixed” as an object of inquiry, and how this can provide a “fresh 
approach” (Ricoeur, 1981h: 209) to understanding the relationship between 
“understanding” and “explanation” within the interpretation of action in the human 
and social sciences.  The text is chosen as a model for the interpretation of action 
specifically because Ricoeur believes that it offers us a new way of conceiving of 
interpretive validity in the human and social sciences, and not because Ricoeur 
believes that “action” and “the text” can be unproblematically identified with one 
another without caution or qualification.  By focussing upon action in this way, 
Ricoeur inevitably obscures other features of action in which we might, as 
interpreters, be interested.146 
For this reason, I have argued that “The Model of the Text” must be 
supplemented with a greater understanding of the way in which action is constituted 
as an object of inquiry, the challenges this poses to us as interpreters, an emphasis 
                                               
146 The ethnomethodological emphasis upon understanding meaningful action as it is understood in 
situ as an ongoing and transactional achievement is perhaps one example of an approach to action 
which is potentially marginalised by focussing upon the “fixed” forms of action and its enduring 
meaning, as I have discussed in greater depth in chapter five of this thesis.  
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upon our “responsibilities” as interpreters, and acknowledgement of the importance 
of considering these factors on a case-by-case basis.  The hermeneutic structure of 
interpretation as conceived by Ricoeur, however, carries with it a moment of self-
critique that should help us guard against misunderstanding.  This will not always be 
the case in practice.  But these will be cases of bad interpretations, not of a 
fundamentally flawed model of interpretation.  They will, in fact, be interpretations 
that have failed to take heed of the caution and critical sensitivity that “The Model of 
the Text” seeks to engender in interpreters. 
The “risk” inherent in misapplication and over-generalisation of a model is 
inseparable from the “fragility” identified by Ricoeur as inherent to hermeneutic 
validity.  We can never guarantee that using the text as a model for understanding the 
interpretation of action will not lead us into misunderstanding, but this does not 
mean that the model has no value.  “The Model of the Text” presents us with a way 
of orientating ourselves in our interpretive activities, and of understanding how the 
human and social sciences might benefit from textual hermeneutics.  But these 
claims remain an interpretation of how we appropriate action within these 
interpretive disciplines, and at no point claim to encompass every concern which 
might be relevant to understanding meaningful human action regardless of the 
circumstances.  The strength of the textual model lies precisely in how it is capable 
of acknowledging its own contingencies as part of its application, and in its ability to 
engender a sense of “responsibility” in interpreters. 
 
6.5: Conclusion 
That hermeneutic interpretation does not aspire to a false ideal of “absolute” 
truth, and that hermeneutic validity is inherently contingent and fragile, lies at the 
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very core of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy.  Interpretation is fundamentally an 
activity, and the validity of interpretation depends upon the practices of those 
engaged in interpretation.  We must recognise ourselves as responsible for our 
interpretive activities, and the work of interpretation must involve an attempt to fulfil 
the obligations that arise with this.  By engaging critically with that which we 
interpret, and with our own practices as interpreters, we can hope to reach a position 
in which we are capable of making plausible arguments for some particular 
interpretive claim, and to support these claims with evidence and arguments.  Part of 
the validity of these claims, however, lies in our ability to recognise their 
contingency, and the conditions under which they are valid. 
In “The Model of the Text”, Ricoeur argues that the validity of interpretation 
in the human and social sciences can be understood similarly, i.e. as a valid but 
ultimately contingent truth claim, supported by argument and evidence.  It is the 
“objectification” of action, identified by Ricoeur with the fixation undergone by 
discourse in the text, which provides the condition under which achieving this 
hermeneutic validity is possible.  By objectifying action it becomes possible to hold 
our presuppositions and judgements of meaning in a state of suspense, allowing us to 
engage critically with both the action at hand and our own interpretive practices.  
This detour of suspicion – suspicion towards that which is given and that we might 
otherwise take for granted – mediates between our pre-reflective and critical 
understanding of action, and allows us to fulfil our responsibilities as interpreters of 
action.  The state of suspense in which the meaning of action is held within 
objectification allows us to “take upon ourselves” the responsibility of interpretation, 
and strive to ensure the integrity of our interpretive work.  Within this, interpretation 
can achieve a strength and authority which is neither absolute nor arbitrary.  It is in 
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this manner that textual hermeneutics might inform the interpretive practices of the 
human and social sciences, and that the text can serve as a “model” for meaningful 
human action. 
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Concluding Comments: The Model of the Text and the Objectification of 
Action 
 
 
 In this thesis I have offered a critical but sympathetic reading of Paul 
Ricoeur’s textual model of interpretation as it is presented in “The Model of the 
Text”.  In addition to this I have attempted to draw upon and develop the analogy 
between text and action in directions left largely undeveloped by Ricoeur, with a 
particular emphasis placed upon the role of objectification and description as part of 
the interpretation of meaningful action within the social and human sciences. 
My main reason for focussing upon these aspects of “The Model of the Text” 
in particular is that Ricoeur’s account makes use of the notion of the objectification 
of action in order to establish an analogy between action and text, yet leaves the 
question of how action can be “fixed” as an object of inquiry relatively obscure.  I 
also argue that Ricoeur’s notion of interpretive validity is inseparable from the 
distanciation and temporary suspension of meaning that Ricoeur identifies as 
accompanying the fixation of discourse as a text, not least because these are 
preconditions to the adoption of the “critical” and “explanatory” attitudes that 
Ricoeur identifies as an important stage within the hermeneutic arc, and thus for 
fulfilling the responsibilities and obligations which arise from interpretive activity.  
Given this, the issue of the objectification of action is important both to the validity 
of Ricoeur’s textual model, and, subsequently, to understanding the kind of 
interpretive validity that he recommends via “The Model of the Text”. 
 
Following a brief survey of “The Model of the Text”, I have attempted to 
clarify the way in which Ricoeur conceives “the text” and the “autonomy” of 
meaning that accompanies it.  I placed a particular emphasis on understanding how 
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Ricoeur’s picture of textual autonomy differs from that associated with notions of the 
“absolute text”.  I have argued that the primary importance of this distinction is that 
Ricoeur’s notion of limited autonomy, in contrast to the “irreducible multiplicity” of 
meaning associated with “absolute” autonomy, preserves the possibility of 
arbitrating between good and bad interpretations of action within the human and 
social sciences. 
I have also argued that “The Model of the Text” fails to adequately account 
for the way in which action is constituted as an “object” of inquiry and that this, in 
turn, fails to acknowledge the prominence of the objectification of action as a 
productive part of its interpretation.  Drawing upon the work of various thinkers, 
especially the hermeneutic philosophy of Ricoeur, Gadamer and Heidegger, I have 
attempted to articulate how meaningful action is brought to the primarily linguistic 
discourses of human and social sciences as an object of reflective inquiry, and how 
the objectification of action can subsequently influence the interpretations we make 
of it.  Based upon this, I argued for the necessity of considering how different 
descriptions of action may be informed by the presuppositions and “disciplinary 
prejudices” of the academic and institutional traditions of which we are inheritors 
and within which we work.  Such “critical description” should be considered as a 
necessary part of the self-critique that Ricoeur identifies as an important part of 
interpretive activity and validity, and has the potential to provide a complement to 
the already established culture of critical reading prevalent within the human and 
social sciences. 
 Following on from this I have offered a defence of the textual model and 
hermeneutic philosophy against anti-interpretive criticism within the social sciences, 
particularly those based upon the work of Peter Winch, and Harold Garfinkel’s 
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ethnomethodology.  I argued that there is an important distinction to be made 
between the hermeneutic notion of Auslegung and the kinds of “interpretation” at 
which these anti-interpretive arguments are aimed.  I also argued that, although there 
are important differences between the kind of approach to meaningful action 
recommended by Ricoeur and those of thinkers such as Garfinkel and Winch, we 
should not view these different traditions as fundamentally opposed.  We should 
rather seek to understand how they might be capable of informing one another and 
the interpretive practices and principles recommended by each. 
I turned next to articulate the role played by the objectification of action 
within Ricoeur’s conception of interpretive validity.  Drawing upon Ricoeur’s 
reconstruction of the hermeneutic dichotomy of explanation and understanding – 
wherein explanation is understood as a necessary “stage” between naïve and critical 
interpretation – I argued that the strength of interpretive validity is based upon the 
potential for holding our judgements of meaning in check in order to weigh different 
potential interpretations against one another and engage critically with the 
presuppositions upon which our interpretations are based.   The necessity of 
engaging critically both with the action we interpret and with our own 
presuppositions and prejudices as interpreters is what I have referred to as 
interpretive “responsibility”. Fulfilling these obligations is possible in light of the 
distanciation produced by the objectification of action, considered by Ricoeur as the 
analogue to the fixation of discourse as a text and a precondition for engaging in 
critical interpretation.  Interpretive validity, understood in light of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic philosophy, should therefore be understood as both strong and fragile, 
as “credence without guarantee, but also as trust greater than any suspicion” 
(Ricoeur, 1992: 23).  “The Model of the Text” helps us see how a similar notion of 
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validity is applicable to the interpretation of meaningful action within the human and 
social sciences. 
Finally, I have argued that it is important to read “The Model of the Text” as 
itself making an interpretive claim about how we interpret action in the human and 
social sciences, and not as a rulebook for interpretation.  Under this reading, the 
paradigm of the text can serve to inform without a priori determining our 
interpretive practices.  It does this by making us aware of the way in which action is 
appropriated as an “object” of inquiry and encouraging us to be aware of the 
constitutive influence of our own presuppositions and methods upon the descriptions 
and interpretations of action that we make.  In order for it to do so, however, it is 
important that we engage critically with “The Model of the Text” itself and attempt 
to consider the limits of the analogy between text and action as part of its 
application. 
 
I have argued that it is an important condition of the validity of an argument 
that it attempts to demarcate at least some of the limits of the validity of its claims, 
and given this it is perhaps especially important that I attempt to identify some of 
both the strengths and weaknesses of my presentation of “The Model of the Text” 
and the suggestions I make to supplement Ricoeur’s project therein.  When 
appropriate, I have attempted to indicate some potential concerns as they have arisen 
within the work of the thesis itself.  In chapter five, for example, I touch upon the 
concern that the focus placed within the textual model upon the enduring meaning 
and objectification of action risks marginalising the importance of recognising the 
ways in which action is meaningful for the agents and patients of action as a form of 
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situated transaction.147  I have also previously touched upon the role of non-textual 
methods of representing action within the human and social sciences, and the 
importance of recognising what these might offer interpreters that purely linguistic 
descriptions cannot.148 
 At a more general level than this we may be concerned that the scope of “The 
Model of the Text” is inherently too broad, and that any “model” of interpretation 
which aspires to cover the many and varied disciplines and schools of thought within 
the human and social sciences will inevitably fail to remain sensitive to the particular 
demands of these disciplines and the work done therein.  My own interpretation of 
“The Model of the Text”, although offering criticism on a number of counts, has 
largely engaged with the issue of the interpretation of meaningful action on the same 
slightly abstract level as Ricoeur’s (albeit with perhaps a greater focus upon 
sociology in terms of the other thinkers and theorists with whom I have engaged).  
As such, the challenges posed by the objectification and interpretation of action as 
part of individual disciplines and schools of thought within the human and social 
sciences still demand further exploration. 
In order to meet this demand it would be necessary to examine different 
interpretive disciplines in detail, and to explore the different ways in which human 
action is constituted as an “object” of inquiry and the different interpretive 
responsibilities we might have to meet in order to support the valid interpretation of 
action within individual disciplines and traditions of thought.  Even on a fairly broad 
level, for example, it should be evident that the ways in which action is brought to 
discourse within disciplines such as sociology or anthropology – wherein interpreters 
                                               
147 A concern to which I have recommended both an ethnomethodologically informed interest in the 
“indexicality” of action and a recognition of such situated meanings as an irreducible part of the 
Wirkungsgeschichte of action as potential antidotes. 
 
148 As discussed primarily in section 2.4 of chapter two of this thesis. 
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may be able to observe action directly and compose descriptions upon this basis – 
differ significantly from disciplines such as history or archaeology wherein the only 
access we have to the actions of those we seek to understand come in the form of its 
“traces” – artefacts and accounts of action that have been preserved perhaps long 
after the events to which they bear testimony have passed. 
In each case there remains a responsibility on behalf of the interpreter of 
action to be aware of how action has been constituted as an object of inquiry, but 
how this affects their interpretive practices will differ depending upon the traditions 
and interests of the disciplines within which the interpreters are working.  Perhaps 
also important in this respect is to try and understand the cross-pollination that 
occurs between disciplines concerned with understanding human action, and any 
problems that may arise when accounts and interpretations of action composed 
within one tradition are appropriated by another (philosophy as a discipline, for 
example, is perhaps particularly guilty of drawing upon “evidence” from other 
disciplines in order to support philosophical arguments without necessarily giving 
due consideration to the importance of understanding the context within which these 
accounts were composed).  Ricoeur’s textual model, although addressed to the issue 
of objectification and interpretive validity at a level more general than any of these 
issues, nevertheless has the potential to serve as a stimulus and starting point for 
considering how the objectification of action occurs within each of these more 
localised and specialised situations.149 
                                               
149 There are, of course, many examples of thinkers and interpreters within the social and human 
sciences who already place a great emphasis upon being sensitive to the way in which action becomes 
the object of interpretive inquiry and the way in which “prejudice”, both disciplinary and socio-
cultural-historical, informs (or sometimes distorts) our understanding of action.  These include 
thinkers who directly engage with Ricoeur’s work, such as the sociologist John B. Thompson, and 
others who demonstrate a creditable awareness of the same kind of concerns independently of any 
explicit engagement with Ricoeur’s thought such as William Arens’ study of anthropology and 
anthropophagy, Edward Said’s work on Orientalism or the work of ethnomethodologists inspired by 
Harold Garfinkel.  In this respect, “The Model of the Text” is part of a more general trend within the 
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To return to the limits of my own interpretation of the textual model, 
however, we may also wish to ask whether the stringent demands for self-criticism 
that I claim must be incorporated into the description and interpretation of 
meaningful action in the human sciences are excessive; whether they ask too much 
of interpreters of action, demanding a “superhuman” level of critical self-awareness 
that is impossible to ever achieve.  George Marcus, for example, has described the 
demands of a “hermeneutic sensitivity” within ethnography as a form of “puritanical 
honesty” (Marcus, 1986: 184).  It is certainly true that no-one can ever have a 
complete overview of the historical and traditionary traces that inform their thought 
and actions, and an ability to absolutely “master” such conditions is no failure.  
Nevertheless, and as I have argued, the validity of interpretation depends to at least 
some extent upon the ability of the interpreter to engage in self-criticism that places 
their interpretation within a tradition of thought and, as Ricoeur puts it, “no thinker is 
dispensed from clarifying his presuppositions as far as he is able” (Ricoeur, 1978: 
257). 
This effort towards clarification does not guarantee validity, but as a 
regulative ideal this obligation towards self-criticism at least encourages us to 
engage more thoroughly with both that which we are interpreting and with our own 
practices as interpreters.  To this extent, at least, while my demands for a “critical” 
approach to the interpretation of meaningful action may be conceived as excessive, I 
would prefer, to paraphrase Friedrich Nietzsche, to think of them as a call for an 
“extravagant honesty”. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
human and social sciences, particularly since the mid-twentieth century, for finding a central place for 
reflective and (self-)critical practices within the wider activities of interpreters of meaningful human 
action. 
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The model of the text, as a paradigm of interpretive understanding applied to 
the human and social sciences, is an analogy designed to draw our attention to 
certain aspects of the interpretation of meaningful action and to suggest ways in 
which we might engage with action as an object of interpretive inquiry.  This is not, 
of course, to say that the interpretation of literary texts and the interpretation of 
meaningful human action are exactly equivalent to one another, nor that 
understanding the interpretation of action in terms of the text could never lead us into 
error.  The claims of “The Model of the Text”, as I have interpreted it, are more 
modest than this.  An analogy such as that drawn by Ricoeur is foremost an 
invitation to thought. 
Ricoeur explicitly invites us to consider interpretive validity and the dialectic 
of understanding and explanation within the human and social sciences in terms of 
textual hermeneutics.  In addition to this, and as I hope to have shown, the textual 
model also invites us to consider in greater depth how the “objectification” of action 
is an important component of the notion of interpretive validity, and, consequently, 
how interpreters of action must give due consideration to the ways in which action is 
constituted as an “object” of inquiry. 
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